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ARTICLES
CONTRACTUALIZING CUSTODY
Sarah Abramowicz*
Many scholars otherwise in favor of the enforcement of family contracts
agree that parent-child relationships should continue to prove the exception
to any contractualized family law regime. This Article instead questions the
continued refusal to enforce contracts concerning parental rights to
children’s custody. It argues that the refusal to enforce such contracts
contributes to a differential treatment of two types of families: those
deemed “intact”—typically consisting of two married parents and their
offspring—and those deemed non-intact. Intact families are granted a
degree of freedom from government intervention, provided that there is no
evidence that children are in any danger of harm. Non-intact families, by
contrast, are subject to the perpetual threat of intervention, even in the
absence of harm. The result of this two-tier system is that non-intact
families are denied the autonomy and stability that intact families enjoy, to
the detriment of parents and children alike.
The goal of this Article is to address inconsistent scholarly approaches to
custody agreements, on the one hand, and parentage agreements, on the
other. Marital agreements about children are largely unenforceable, and
even scholars who otherwise favor the enforcement of marital agreements
largely approve of this approach, concurring that a court should be able to
override a contract concerning children’s custody if it finds that
enforcement is not in the children’s best interests. By contrast, those who
write about parentage agreements, such as those made in the context of
assisted reproductive technology or by unmarried, single, or multiple (i.e.,
more than two) parents, are more likely to favor the enforcement of such
agreements. This Article argues that many of the rationales for enforcing
parentage agreements extend to custody agreements as well.
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INTRODUCTION
Many scholars otherwise in favor of the enforcement of family contracts
agree that parent-child relationships should prove the exception to any
contractualized family law regime. 1 This Article questions the continued
refusal to enforce contracts concerning parental rights. It does so by
focusing on a subset of parental-rights contracts that have received little
attention or support in recent scholarship: custody contracts.
This Article addresses the potential benefits of enforcing custody
contracts by drawing on discussions of another subset of parental-rights
contracts that has received greater attention in recent years: parentage
contracts. While custody contracts allocate rights and responsibilities
among those who are parents, parentage contracts determine who is a parent
in the first place by creating or terminating parental rights.
Custody contracts are typically understood as a subset of marital
agreements, and have thus been addressed primarily by scholars of marital
contracts. 2 Marital agreements about the custody of children are largely
unenforceable. 3 Even scholars who otherwise favor the enforcement of
marital contracts largely approve of this approach, concurring that a court
should be able to override a contract concerning children’s custody if it
finds that enforcement is not in the children’s best interests.4 By contrast,
those who write about parentage agreements, such as those made in the
context of assisted reproductive technology 5 or by unmarried, single, or
1. See, e.g., Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance:
Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 475 (1998) (advocating greater
enforcement of marital contracts, with the exception of provisions relating to custody or
otherwise affecting children’s interests); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law,
1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1554–56 (proposing greater limits on privatization in families with
children); Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern
Marriage Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 1525–26 (2001) (recommending continued judicial
determination of children’s best interests in proposed regime facilitating greater
customization of marriage); Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L.
REV. 827, 830 (advocating greater enforcement of postnuptial contracts, with the exception
of provisions related to child custody or child support).
2. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U.
L. REV. 65, 90–91, 105–07 (1998) (contending that the parental interest in custody is an
integral component of the family economy within which marital bargains are formed).
3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 323
(recommending making “bargained-for intentions” determinative of parentage for children
born through assisted reproductive technology); Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a
Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1,

70

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

multiple (i.e., more than two) parents,6 are comparatively more likely to
favor the enforcement of such agreements.7 Parentage scholars, however,
have not generally considered custody agreements to be a species of
parentage agreement, and thus these scholars for the most part have not
explicitly disagreed with those who endorse the unenforceability of custody
agreements. 8
On closer examination, these two strands of the literature are in tension
with each other. This Article argues that many of the rationales for
enforcing parentage agreements extend to custody agreements as well, and
that custody contracts have a currently unrecognized potential to work in
tandem with parentage contracts to provide families with benefits such as
stability, certainty, and freedom from state intervention.
This argument is advanced as follows. Part I of the Article reviews
current judicial approaches to custody contracts and to parentage contracts.
Custody contracts are not typically enforceable. Courts are least likely to
enforce custody contracts entered into when the parents’ relationship is
intact, even though such contracts have the most promise of any custody
contracts for providing certainty and stability, and are less likely than
contracts agreed to at separation or divorce to be the product of a bargaining
imbalance created by a primary caregiver’s fear of losing custody. Judicial
attitudes are a function both of judges’ view that they must ensure the best
interests of children and of their concern that agreements may not be truly
voluntary. But the best interests of children might be best advanced by
rules that privilege parental agreements over judicial supervision, at least
absent evidence of unequal bargaining power or harm to children. Courts
are more likely to defer to custody agreements entered into at or after
separation, but only if the courts find them to be in the children’s best
interests (or, in some states, not adverse to their interests), thus maintaining
a central judicial role in the lives of non-intact families even where those
families are able to come to an agreement about custody.
Courts are more likely to enforce parentage agreements, though certainly
not uniformly, and there is considerable resistance to the enforcement of
certain types of such agreements. Judicial approaches to parentage
22–26 (2003) (describing benefits of privatization in the context of assisted reproductive
technology).
6. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1222 (2010) (arguing that
defining parenthood with reference to consent in the context of assisted reproductive
technology would better protect children born to single or unmarried parents); Nancy D.
Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have To Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Lesbian
Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 243–46 (2009)
(recommending recognition of agreements extending parental status to a third parent, such as
a sperm donor who agrees to raise a child along with lesbian co-parents); Katharine K.
Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental
Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 38–61 (2004) (arguing for contractual approach to
parental status, and for recognition on this basis of both single parenthood and parenthood by
unmarried same-sex couples).
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part II.B.

2014]

CONTRACTUALIZING CUSTODY

71

agreements vary tremendously depending on both the jurisdiction and the
type of agreement; responses can range from enforcing parentage
agreements without any reference to children’s interests to refusing to take
such agreements into account at all. Parentage agreements include coparenting agreements, often employed by same-sex couples, whereby a
child’s legally recognized parent agrees to jointly raise the child with a coparent; 9 gamete donation agreements, where anonymous or known donors
of ova or sperm agree either to relinquish or to retain their parental status; 10
and surrogacy agreements, 11 including gestational surrogacy, where the
ovum is not the surrogate’s. Part I shows that the differences between
custody and parentage agreements are not as stark as may appear, and that
both lie on a spectrum of parental agreements.
Part II describes the divergence of scholarly approaches to custody and
parentage agreements. Since the 1980s, the scholarly consensus has
increasingly been in favor of using contracts to define family rights and
obligations, at least where agreements are fairly procured.12 Contract has
facilitated arrangements not only between spouses but also between those
who cannot marry or prefer not to.13 Some scholars have worried that these
contracts may be unfair to women, particularly if they are pressured into
signing prenuptial agreements, but most have viewed such problems as
demanding oversight rather than wholesale invalidation of such contracts. 14
The literature, however, has largely assumed that this approach has no
applicability to custody agreements, 15 both because children are not parties
to these agreements 16 and because parents are unlikely to be able to predict
their children’s interests, especially before their children are born.17
At the same time, however, a robust literature on parentage agreements
has been significantly more favorable toward enforcing such agreements.
The literature on custody and marital contracts has ignored the fact that the
literature on parentage agreements provides counterarguments that extend
easily into the custody context, addressing concerns about unpredictability,
duress, and child welfare that are common to both contexts. Moreover, it
has ignored that parentage and custody agreements are often intertwined.
For example, co-parenting agreements often include provisions relating to
custody. 18 Scholars have given no defense of the implicit claim that it is
acceptable to contract about whether one will have the status of a co-parent,

9. See infra notes 136–55 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 157–73 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 174–200 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New
Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 328–34 (1982) (proposing contractual
ordering of marriage).
13. See infra Part II.A.1.
14. See infra Part II.A.1.
15. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 12, at 211 (excepting agreements affecting children
from proposed regime of contractualized marriage).
16. See infra notes 240–42 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 262–63 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 136–39 and accompanying text.
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but unacceptable to contract about the portion of co-parenting rights each
parent will have should they raise their children in separate households.
The argument in Part II leaves open the possibility that the best course is
for the courts to enforce neither custody nor parentage agreements, but Part
III offers an affirmative argument for enforcing custody contracts along
with parentage contracts. The principal argument is that the current judicial
refusal to enforce custody contracts contributes to a differential treatment of
two types of families: those deemed “intact”—typically consisting of two
married parents and their offspring—and those deemed non-intact. Intact
families are granted a degree of freedom from government intervention as
long as there is no evidence that children are in any danger of harm. Nonintact families, by contrast, are subject to the perpetual threat of
intervention, even in the absence of harm. The result of this two-tier system
is that non-intact families are denied the autonomy and the stability that
intact families enjoy, to the detriment of parents and children alike.
In an age of serial divorce, unmarried parentage, new family forms, and
assisted reproductive technology, marriage can no longer suffice to render
families intact. Rather than force parent-child relationships into a marital
paradigm that is increasingly out of touch with current realities, we should
permit and encourage parents to use contract to create the intact status that
marriage can no longer provide. While children’s welfare and relationship
security should be the primary consideration here, enforcement of custody
contracts can promote other values as well, such as gender neutrality,
diversity of family forms, and parental autonomy.
Finally, Part IV advances a concrete proposal for enforcement of child
custody agreements. A modified version of the American Law Institute’s
(ALI) approach toward enforcing prenuptial agreements should be extended
to the custody context, 19 as should the ALI’s view that such contracts merit
more stringent policing than commercial contracts. 20 This proposal
resembles the ALI’s approach toward enforcing parenting agreements
reached when the parents’ relationship dissolves 21 (which currently has
been adopted by only one state), 22 while extending this approach to prior
agreements between the parents and modifying it accordingly.
Procedurally, courts should ensure that custody contracts are made with
voluntary and informed consent, rather than under undue pressure or duress.
Substantively, courts should not enforce custody agreements that would
19. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.07 (2000) (excepting custody agreements from ALI provisions on
premarital agreements).
20. See id. § 7.04 (requiring party seeking enforcement of premarital agreement to
establish that it was voluntary and knowing); id. § 7.05 (requiring party contesting
enforcement of premarital agreement to establish that enforcement would inflict a substantial
injustice).
21. See id. § 2.06 (providing for enforcement of post-dissolution custody arrangements
to which both parents agree as long as these are knowing and voluntary and do not pose a
risk of harm to the child).
22. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-201(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2009) (adopting ALI approach
to parenting agreements).
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harm a child’s emotional, intellectual, or physical development; this is a
considerably higher bar than a best-interests analysis. Concerns about
insufficient judicial scrutiny of custody agreements under this more
deferential standard can be addressed through presumptions that certain
situations are harmful to children, such as an award of custody to a parent
who has engaged in domestic violence.
This Article also questions the commonplace view that custody contracts
made after the parents’ relationship has dissolved should be given the
greatest deference. Vulnerable parents may have greater leverage prior to
or during a marriage than afterward. While it may be difficult to anticipate
the needs of a child, premarital or marital custody agreements can be
negotiated as those needs evolve. Meanwhile, agreements should continue
to be enforced post-dissolution, or at least to receive substantial deference,
even as a child’s needs and situation change. The value of such agreements
is that they provide predictability and security, not just for the parents, but
also for the child.
I. CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO PARENTAL AGREEMENTS
This part will review current judicial approaches to enforcing custody
and parentage agreements, respectively. Part I.A provides an overview of
judicial enforcement of custody agreements. As Part I.A demonstrates,
courts are especially reluctant to enforce custody agreements reached before
the parents’ relationship has dissolved, but are beginning to give greater
deference to certain types of post-dissolution custody agreements that are
seen as promoting parental cooperation, such as agreements to share
custody. Even such favored custody agreements, however, are largely
unenforceable if a court finds them to be at odds with a child’s interests.
Part I.B then surveys judicial approaches to three types of parentage
agreements: co-parenting agreements, gamete donation agreements, and
surrogacy agreements. As Part I.B shows, the judicial approach to
parentage agreements varies widely according to both jurisdiction and type
of agreement. There is a trend toward the enforcement, or at least the
recognition, of certain such agreements. But courts nonetheless exhibit
considerable reluctance to countenance the contractualization of
parenthood.
A. Custody Contracts
The traditional rule has long been that agreements regarding the custody
of children are unenforceable. When courts were first confronted with
custody agreements in the early nineteenth century, the prevailing default
rule was that fathers possessed superior rights to the custody of their
children. 23 The custody agreements that made their way to court thus
23. See, e.g., People ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399, 408 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842)
(“[T]he mother, as such, is entitled to no power over [her child], but only to reverence and
respect.”) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *478–79); People ex rel. Brooks
v. Brooks, 35 Barb. 85, 92 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1861) (“If the husband is in all respects fit and
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tended to involve the transfer of custodial rights to someone other than the
father, typically either the children’s mother or a third party, such as a
grandparent. Such agreements were held unenforceable for a number of
reasons—because a husband could not contract with his wife; 24 because
agreements contemplating separation were unenforceable as a matter of
public policy; 25 and because parents could not contract away rights that
they possessed for the benefit of their children.26
Even as courts refused to enforce custody agreements, however, they
would at times award custody in accordance with the terms of such
agreements nonetheless. 27 They did so on the basis of the doctrine that over
the course of the nineteenth century emerged as the paramount
consideration in child custody decision making: the welfare of the child. 28
Initially a factor that permitted courts to award custody to mothers in cases
involving children of “tender years”29—typically, under the age of seven—

proper to have the care of the child and to superintend its education, and other things are
equal between the two, the recognized paramount right of the father must prevail over the
otherwise equal claims of the mother.”); Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 305 (1877) (“As a
general rule, the father is considered as being entitled to the custody of his minor
children . . .”).
24. See Mercein, 3 Hill at 408 (“A man cannot grant any thing to his wife, or enter into
covenant with her; for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence; and to covenant
with her would be only to covenant with himself.” (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *468)).
25. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 1 Barb. Ch. 639, 645 (N.Y. Ch. 1846) (expressing concern
that enforcement of custody agreement would encourage collusion between divorcing
spouses); People ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 8 Paige Ch. 47, 67 (N.Y. Ch. 1839) (citing cases
in support of proposition that an agreement for future separation is void as a matter of public
policy); see also Brooks, 35 Barb. at 91, 93 (holding it necessary to “the interests of
society . . . and good order” to find that “whenever the wife, without just cause, lives apart
from her husband, she is deemed to have forfeited her claim to her children”).
26. See Mercein, 3 Hill at 410 (“I deny that he has, therefore, the right still farther to
violate his duty by selling his children . . . . These he holds under the duty of a personal
trust, inalienable even to [his wife].”); Mercein, 8 Paige Ch. at 67 (asserting that the parental
duties imposed by virtue of the marriage contract “are imposed as much for the sake of
public policy as of private happiness”).
27. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 6 Me. 462, 468–69 (1830) (noting that the father had
voluntarily transferred custody to the mother under a postmarital agreement providing that
the mother could separate and retain children’s custody in the event of ill treatment, but
resting refusal to grant the father’s petition for custody on a finding that such an award
would be contrary to the “permanent interest of the infant[s],” which required that they be
left in the care of their mother).
28. See id. (refusing to enforce parental custody agreement but awarding custody in a
manner consistent with that agreement nonetheless, on the basis of children’s interests);
Sarah Abramowicz, Childhood and the Limits of Contract, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 60–
62 (2009) (describing resistance of nineteenth-century English courts to enforcing
contractual transfers of parental rights, and their concomitant willingness to endorse the
transfers of custody provided for by such contracts where to do so was consistent with a
judicial assessment of children’s welfare).
29. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 238–40 (1985); MARY ANN
MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD
CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 61–62 (1994).
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the welfare of the child by the end of the nineteenth century became the
predominant factor in child custody disputes.30
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the doctrine of
coverture was slowly dismantled 31 and separation and divorce became more
common, 32 courts showed increasing willingness to take separation deeds
and other forms of custody contracts into account in determining who
should raise a child. 33 Some courts even deemed such contracts
“binding.” 34 But they insisted in the same breath that such agreements
could not “impede . . . that wide discretionary power given to courts in the
disposition of the custody of children, in accord with their best interests.”35
The agreements were relevant only insofar as they had bearing on, or were
consistent with, children’s interests. They thus were not enforceable in any
meaningful sense.
Despite considerable development of custody and parentage law over the
course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, 36 the enforceability of
custody contracts remains much the same today: such agreements are
largely superfluous, in that courts retain the jurisdiction to override them in
the name of children’s interests.
This section provides an overview of current judicial approaches to the
enforcement of custody contracts. It begins by discussing those custody
contracts that courts are most resistant to enforcing—premarital or midmarriage custody agreements—and then proceeds to discuss the prevailing
30. See GROSSBERG, supra note 29, at 234–59 (charting emergence of the best-interests
standard in nineteenth-century American custody law).
31. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082–85 (1994) (tracing history
of legislation that enabled married women to own property and to engage in legal
transactions, while arguing that the structural inequalities of coverture persisted despite such
changes).
32. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2133–34 (1996) (describing expansion of grounds for divorce in the
post-Civil War period).
33. See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 157 N.Y.S. 821, 823 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (“The right of the father
to transfer the custody of his child to his wife, where they have separated, and where there is
nothing in the agreement inconsistent with the welfare of the child, is generally recognized
by the leading text-book writers and leading cases in other states and in England.”).
34. See, e.g., Sargent v. Sargent, 39 P. 931, 932 (Cal. 1895) (“Parents have a right to
contract with each other as to the custody and control of their offspring, and to stipulate
away their respective parental rights, and such contracts are binding upon them.”).
35. Id. at 933; see also, e.g., Bonnett ex rel. Newmeyer v. Bonnett, 16 N.W. 91, 93
(Iowa 1883) (awarding custody to grandparents over father on the basis that “[w]hen a parent
has, either by abandonment or contract, surrendered his present legal right to the custody of a
child, in all controversies subsequently arising respecting its custody, the matter of primary
importance is the interest and welfare of the child”); Cunningham v. Barnes, 17 S.E. 308,
312 (W. Va. 1893) (same); cf. Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 305–06 (1877) (holding, in
case concerning whether custodial grandfather could bring kidnapping action against third
parties, that where “parents have . . . transferred their [child’s] custody to another” and “the
custodian is, in every way, a proper person to have the care, training, and education of the
infant, and the court is satisfied its social, moral, and educational interests will be best
promoted by remaining in the custody of the person to whom it was transferred . . . the new
custody will be treated as lawful and exclusive”).
36. See generally, e.g., MASON, supra note 29.
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approaches to custody agreements made at separation or divorce, both
generally and with respect to certain types of such agreements, such as
agreements governing modification of custody, agreements to arbitrate
custody, parenting plans, and agreements for joint custody. As we shall
see, it is precisely those agreements that attempt to provide certainty into
the future—such as premarital custody agreements and agreements
governing modification—that courts are least likely to enforce in awarding
custody.
1. Premarital and Postmarital Custody Agreements
There are few published cases involving the enforceability of premarital
custody agreements, perhaps because courts have consistently refused to
enforce such agreements. Courts have been equally reluctant to enforce
postmarital custody agreements, that is, custody agreements reached during
an intact marriage, before separation occurs. In the handful of published
cases on premarital and postmarital custody provisions, courts have been in
accord that these are not enforceable.37 As with custody agreements
generally, the rule articulated in such cases is that parents cannot bind the
courts by their private contracts when it comes to custody, because a court
making a custody decision must be given the discretion to protect children’s
interests. 38
A further objection expressed in the context of premarital agreements is
that a premarital custody agreement should be given especially little
deference by custody courts, because it is highly unlikely to be either
knowing or voluntary. How, it is asked, can a parent possibly know what is
best for a child who has not yet been born? And how can a parent
voluntarily consent to forgo custody of a child with whom she has not yet
developed a relationship? Courts are quick to assert the absurdity of
permitting parents to bind themselves, and to limit the discretionary power
of the courts on matters of custody, on the basis of “an agreement entered
into before the child in question has come into the world.”39
Premarital custody agreements are rarely contemplated in state statutory
schemes regulating child custody. This neglect is visible in one of the more
prominent cases to address such agreements, In re Marriage of Littlefield.40
In Littlefield, the Supreme Court of Washington addressed the
enforceability of a premarital custody provision under a statute intended to
37. See In re Marriage of Garrity, 226 Cal. Rptr. 485, 489 n.8 (Ct. App. 1986); Spires v.
Spires, 743 A.2d 186 (D.C. 1999); Alves v. Alves, 262 A.2d 111 (D.C. 1970); In re
Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1997); Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50
(Wyo. 1993). Courts are similarly unwilling to enforce pre-birth custody agreements
between unmarried cohabitants. See, e.g., In re Custody of Wendy, 898 N.E.2d 889 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2008).
38. See, e.g., Spires, 743 A.2d at 190 (“[T]he parents cannot by their agreement deprive
[the court] of power to control the custody and maintenance of the child.” (quoting Emrich v.
McNeil, 126 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1942))).
39. Wood v. Wood, 168 A.2d 102, 104 (Del. Ch. 1961); see also, e.g., Littlefield, 940
P.2d at 1371 n.9.
40. 940 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1997).
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govern parenting plans made at the time of separation or divorce. 41 The
custody provision at stake in Littlefield had little in common with the types
of parenting plans that the statute envisioned. It was part of a more general
premarital agreement that the father had presented to his fiancée three days
before their wedding. The father was immensely wealthy—he had trust
funds worth more than $50 million—and, at the time of his marriage, his
future wife, as the court noted, had “a guitar, a pickup truck, her clothing,
and some furniture.” 42 Among the provisions in the premarital agreement
that he presented to her—and she signed—was that any child of the
marriage would spend equal residential time with both parents in the event
of divorce. It was this aspect of the agreement that the father sought to
enforce, along with what he argued was an implicit agreement that the
mother would remain in Seattle as a condition of custody. 43
Under the Parenting Act of 1987, 44 then in effect in Washington, courts
could only order equally shared residential custody if both parents
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to such an arrangement.45 The trial court
in Littlefield took the mother’s signing of the premarital agreement as
indicating her consent to equally shared custody, to which she strongly
objected at the time of separation. The court ordered that the child spend
equal residential time with each parent, as well as that the mother, who had
by then moved to California, relocate to Washington as a condition of
custody, and that she live no more than an hour from the father’s
residence. 46 In reversing the trial court, the Washington Supreme Court
emphasized that the Parenting Act did not make parenting agreements
enforceable. Instead, the Act provided that courts should consider such
agreements as one among several factors relevant to determining the
paramount concern in awarding custody—the best interests of the child. 47
The discussion of the custody agreements in Littlefield does not apply a
distinct standard to premarital custody agreements. Instead, it primarily
emphasizes the obligation of a custody court to override any parental
custody agreement that is at odds with a child’s best interests. But the
Littlefield court observes that a premarital custody agreement is unlikely to
meet the statutory requirement that a court consider only those custody
agreements that are “knowing and voluntary”:
The agreement in this case did not contemplate the needs of any particular
child . . . and was made without the knowledge of how either party would
act toward a child. Based on this record, we find it unlikely that these

41. See id. at 1368 (“The Parenting Act represents a unique legislative attempt to reduce
the conflict between parents who are in the midst of dissolving their marriage . . . . The
concept of a working ‘parenting plan’ is the primary focus of the Parenting Act.”).
42. Id. at 1363.
43. See id. at 1364.
44. 1987 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 460 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.002–.913).
45. See Littlefield, 940 P.2d at 1369 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.187(3)(a)(ii)
(1989)).
46. See id. at 1365 n.2.
47. See id. at 1371–72.
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parties could have knowingly provided for the parenting of a child at the
time the agreement was signed. 48

The court suggests here that any custody agreement made before a child is
born is unlikely to be sufficiently “knowing” for a court to consider it as an
important factor in awarding custody, let alone for a court to enforce it. To
be “knowing,” the court indicates here, a custody agreement must be based
on the needs of a particular, existing child, as well as on the relationship of
each parent toward that child.
Littlefield thus demonstrates both the judicial reluctance to enforce
custody agreements made ex ante—especially before a child is born—and
some of the good reasons for that reluctance: the custody agreement in
Littlefield was problematic in a number of ways. The agreed-to custody
arrangement was unlikely to protect the child’s interests, and in fact
arguably was likely to inflict harm on the child by exposing him to constant
conflict. The agreement was adverse to the mother, who was the child’s
primary caretaker and would likely have been awarded primary physical
custody absent any agreement. And the agreement was obtained under
unfair conditions that brought into question the mother’s ability to freely
and knowingly consent to its terms: it was presented to her shortly before
her wedding as part of a premarital agreement drafted by the attorney of her
much wealthier fiancé, at a time when she had significantly fewer resources
available to protect her interests.
But the fact that a premarital custody agreement may be unfairly
obtained, or may contain terms that would harm a child, is not necessarily
reason to dismiss premarital custody agreements generally. It is, instead, an
argument for ensuring that such agreements are not enforced if they are
obtained under duress or undue influence or if they contain terms that will
be harmful to a child. As Mary Anne Case has argued in the context of
enforcing agreements in an ongoing marriage, the very inequity of some
such agreements argues for making courts the appropriate forum for
determining whether they are to be enforced.49 The prospect of legal
enforcement will encourage couples to bring such agreements into courts of
law instead of before religious tribunals or other nonlegal forums, 50 thereby
giving courts an opportunity to review the agreements and—as the court did
in Littlefield, and could have done even without reference to the bestinterests standard—reject them as oppressive to the more vulnerable spouse
and potentially harmful to the children involved.
Thus, custody case law periodically involves premarital or postnuptial
contracts in which a wife has agreed to cede custody to her husband in the
event of divorce, as part of a more general agreement by the wife to
subjugate herself to her husband. This was the situation in Spires v.
Spires, 51 discussed by Case, where, after marriage but several years prior to
48. Id. at 1371 n.9.
49. Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 225, 247–49 (2011).
50. See id.
51. 743 A.2d 186 (D.C. 1999).
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divorce, a wife agreed to submit to her husband in all respects during their
marriage, including by “conduct[ing] herself in accordance with all
scriptures in the Holy Bible applicable to marital relationships germane to
wives and in accordance with the husband’s specific requests.” 52 She also
agreed, in the event of breach, to cede to her husband both complete
custody of their children and possession of all marital property.53
Similarly, in Moran v. Moran, 54 a would-be husband and wife agreed to be
married (an agreement the court refused to enforce) under the laws of
religion rather than of the state, and the “wife” bound herself, inter alia, to
give her “husband” sole custody in the event that their relationship
dissolved, as part of a more general program of wifely subjugation. 55
These agreements bring to light the extent to which private premarital
custody agreements, like private marital agreements more generally, may
contain troubling terms. However, the custody terms in each of these three
agreements—in Spires, Moran, or Littlefield—would be unlikely to be
enforced even if we granted sufficiently greater deference to such
agreements than we currently do. Each contains terms that seem
detrimental to the children in question (either by separating children from
their primary caretaker or by imposing shared residential custody between
highly conflicted parents), and all three agreements were arguably the
product of sufficient pressure to vitiate a finding of voluntary and knowing
consent.
While in each of these cases the parties seem to have settled their claims
regarding property division and support, roughly half of the states will
supervise premarital agreements on such matters for both procedural and
substantive fairness before permitting enforcement. 56 This suggests that
contract law—especially, for instance, as it has been modified to apply to
premarital or postmarital contracts—is well-equipped to facilitate greater
enforceability of premarital custody provisions than we currently permit,
while still ensuring sufficient oversight of such agreements to protect
children from harm and to prevent enforcement of those that are the product
of undue pressure or duress.
2. Custody Agreements Made at Separation or Divorce
a. Generally
Most custody agreements are arrived at after the parental relationship has
dissolved. The traditional rule in most jurisdictions is that courts are not
bound by parents’ custody agreements even when reached at the time of
separation or divorce, and instead must look to the welfare of the child. In a
52. Id. at 188 n.2.
53. See id. at 188.
54. 933 P.2d 1207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
55. See id. at 1209–10 (refusing to enforce a custody provision in a private contract
purporting to create a marital union).
56. See Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL
LAW. 249, 264 (2010).
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typical formulation of this rule, “No agreement of the parties can bind the
court presiding over custody matters to a disposition other than that which a
weighing of all the factors involved shows to be in the child’s best
interest.” 57
Even where separation agreements regarding custody are not binding,
however, courts can consider them in awarding custody, and often award
custody in accordance with the parents’ agreement, particularly where
neither parent has decided to contest the agreement at the time the court
makes its order. A number of custody decisions have emphasized the
importance of considering the wishes of the parents in awarding custody,
even while holding that the ultimate decision about custody rests with the
trial court’s determination of the child’s interests.58
There are two main approaches to considering such agreements. Under
the more prevalent approach, followed by the majority of the states, courts
will enforce custody agreements made by divorced or separated parents
only if to do so is consistent with the child’s interests. Here, an agreement
may be a factor to consider in assessing children’s interests, but is given no
deference. 59 A substantial minority of states, on the other hand, require
courts to enforce such agreements unless they find that to do so is adverse
to the child’s interests.60 Under this approach, the parental determination is
57. Hutter v. Hutter, 839 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Friederwitzer v.
Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765, 768 (N.Y. 1982)).
58. See, e.g., Z.S. v J.F., 918 N.E.2d 636, 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“Though the wishes
of the parent are to be given great weight, it is the duty of the trial court to determine if any
agreement is in the best interests of the child.” (quoting In re Paternity of T.G.T., 803 N.E.2d
1225, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004))); Wist v. Wist, 503 A.2d 281, 282 n.1 (N.J. 1986) (holding
that while the trial court was required to consider the parents’ custody agreement in
assessing the child’s best interests, “[w]hatever the agreement of the parents, the ultimate
determination of custody lies with the court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction as
parens patriae” (quoting Sheehan v. Sheehan, 118 A.2d 89, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1955))).
59. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(1)(a) (2006) (providing that parents’ wishes as
to custody are simply one factor to be considered in assessing children’s best interests);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(3) (West 2001) (requiring court to determine whether parents’
agreed-upon joint custody arrangement is in child’s best interests); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.270(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2010) (providing that parents’ wishes as to custody are simply
one factor to be considered in assessing children’s best interests); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.375(2)(1) (West 2003) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(a) (West 2009)
(same); Zahl v. Zahl, 736 N.W.2d 365, 373 (Neb. 2007) (“[A] trial court has an independent
responsibility to determine questions of custody and visitation of minor children according to
their best interests, which responsibility cannot be controlled by an agreement or stipulation
of the parties.”).
60. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(f) (West 2009) (providing that
parenting plan agreed to by both parents “shall be approved by the court . . . unless the court
finds that such plan as submitted and agreed to is not in the best interests of the child”); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-3202 (West 2011) (presuming that parents’ custody agreement is in the best
interests of the child); Keen v. Keen, 629 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
parental custody agreement should be enforced unless adverse to child’s interests); Watson
v. Watson, 46 So. 3d 218 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (“If the parents agree who is to have custody,
the court shall award custody in accordance with their agreement unless the best interest of
the child requires a different award.”); Luce v. Cushing, 868 A.2d 672, 676 (Vt. 2004)
(holding that parental custody agreements entered into voluntarily are enforceable unless
facts and circumstances establish that an agreement is not in the best interests of the child).
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given greater deference. A number of states, moreover, have found that
courts can agree with the parents regarding custody without holding a full
hearing about the child’s interests, which increases the likelihood that the
courts will not have the information or inclination to review the agreement
carefully. 61 But courts in all of these states nonetheless retain the authority
to refuse enforcement of the parents’ agreement on the basis that the child’s
interests require a different custodial arrangement.
Only one state, West Virginia, follows the recommendation of the ALI to
give greater deference to parental custody agreements reached at separation
The West Virginia/ALI approach provides for the
or divorce. 62
enforcement of such agreements—termed “parenting plans”—unless a court
finds that an agreement was not knowing or voluntary or that enforcement
will impose harm on the child. 63 Even under the more deferential West
Virginia/ALI approach to parental custody agreements, however, this
deference seems limited to situations where parents have agreed to a
parenting plan and then jointly asked the court to incorporate the plan into a
court order. The West Virginia statute, following the ALI, indicates that a
“prior agreement” regarding custody—an agreement to which one of the
parents presumably no longer wants to adhere—is not enforceable, but
instead only a factor for courts to consider in the event that the parents
cannot agree on custody. 64

61. See, e.g., Koron v. Melendy, 523 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (“[I]n
cases where the parties are in agreement regarding custody and visitation and present the
court with such an agreement, the trial court need not expressly articulate each of the best
interest factors.”); Luhman v. Beecher, 424 N.W.2d 753, 755 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
that court does not need to engage in fact-finding to accept stipulation modifying custody).
62. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-201(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2009); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 (2000).
63. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-201(a)(2); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08. West Virginia is the only state to
have adopted the ALI approach to child custody. Along with giving more deference to
parental custody agreements, the ALI approach adopted by West Virginia rejects the bestinterests approach to custody itself in favor of the approximation rule, under which courts
allocate custody in a manner that approximates the time each parent spent performing
caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents’ separation. See PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 (adopted by W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 48-9-206(a)). Among the goals of the approximation standard is to provide a
predictable background rule that, by reducing the uncertainty of litigation and allocating
parental bargaining power in a manner consistent with parents’ expectations, encourages
parental agreements with respect to custody while minimizing strategic behavior, on the
theory that negotiated custody agreements are more likely to be satisfactory to parents, and
to reduce conflict between them, than judicially-imposed arrangements. See Elizabeth S.
Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 643–56
(1992) (contending that the approximation approach to custody, with its predictability and its
mirroring of parental preferences, would encourage custody settlements while reducing the
opportunities for strategic behavior that might disadvantage the parent more invested in
obtaining custody).
64. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.08(e) (adopted by W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 48-9-206(a)(5)). Moreover, the commentary to the ALI explicitly rejects
enforcement of premarital or marital custody agreements, indicating that the provision
encouraging enforcement of parenting plans “does not govern agreements made during or
before marriage.” See id. § 206 cmt. a.
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Indeed, a court’s decision to reject the parents’ custody agreement often
occurs when one of the parents has contested the arrangement that he or she
formerly agreed to. Sometimes, a court may reject an earlier agreement on
the basis that it has proved “unworkable,” as courts have done, for instance,
where parents initially agreed to offer each other the option to babysit for
their child before making any other caretaking arrangements, but one of the
parents found this arrangement too cumbersome to carry out, 65 or, more
typically, where parents have agreed to share decision-making authority but
have not been able to do so without generating conflict.66
Some contested custody agreements are unenforceable on constitutional
or public policy grounds. Thus, the majority of courts have refused to
enforce agreements regarding children’s religious upbringing, on the basis
that to do so would infringe on the resistant parent’s First Amendment right
of free exercise. 67 A minority of jurisdictions, on the other hand, find that
the First Amendment does not prohibit the enforcement of agreements
concerning religion, and will enforce religious upbringing agreements—and
take them into account in awarding custody—where to do so is consistent
with a child’s interests. 68 Courts have refused as a matter of public policy
to enforce certain agreements that express prejudice or stereotypes about
race or gender, such as an agreement conditioning a mother’s visitation on
her not having African-American male companions in the child’s
presence, 69 or an agreement allocating custody on the basis of gender alone,
with girls going to the mother and boys to the father. 70
More often, courts refuse to enforce contested custody agreements
simply on the basis that enforcement would not be in the children’s
interests. Sometimes the court finds fault with the details of the agreedupon arrangement rather than with the custody award itself. In one case, for
instance, the court refused to enforce an agreement under which the
children were given the right to have the final say about whether each of
65. See Keen, 629 N.E.2d at 939, 941.
66. See, e.g., Howard v. Fortuna, No. A-6304-06T3, 2009 WL 2031060, at *6 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (upholding modification of consent judgment giving father
shared decision-making authority, where parents demonstrated continued hostility and
conflict).
67. See, e.g., Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“The great
weight of legal authority is against enforcement of such [religious training] agreements over
the objections of one of the parties.”); see also In re Marriage of Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
339, 347 (Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to enforce religious upbringing agreement); McLaughlin
v. McLaughlin, 132 A.2d 420, 421–22 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1957) (same); Sotnick v. Sotnick,
650 So. 2d 157, 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (same); In re Marriage of Bennett, 587
N.E.2d 577, 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (same); Hackett v. Hackett, 150 N.E.2d 431, 439–40
(Ohio Ct. App. 1958) (same).
68. See, e.g., Rownak v. Rownak, 288 S.W.3d 672, 674–75 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008)
(enforcing agreement to raise child in Protestant church, where incorporated into divorce
judgment); Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (App. Div. 1982) (finding religious
upbringing agreements generally enforceable unless adverse to child’s interests); see also
Stevenot v. Stevenot, 520 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that for a religious
upbringing agreement to be enforceable, it must be in writing and must contemplate postdivorce status).
69. See Turman v. Boleman, 510 S.E.2d 532, 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
70. See Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 54 (Wyo. 1993).
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their parents could have a romantic partner in their presence, finding that it
was neither appropriate nor beneficial to give children the power to veto
their parents’ romantic arrangements. 71
In other instances, a court may find that it is in a child’s interests to live
with the parent who agreed to forgo primary physical custody, or to have
more or different visitation than the parents initially agreed to. A number
of early judicial decisions to reject custody agreements when awarding or
modifying custody rested on the court’s determination that the mother’s
“promiscuous” behavior rendered maternal custody adverse to her
children’s interests. 72 Other grounds for rejecting parents’ custody
agreements have included a finding that one or the other parent has a “bad
temper,” 73 that the parents were too conflicted to carry out an agreement to
share custody, 74 or that a parent had entered into a same-sex intimate
relationship. 75
In the situation where parents come to court in agreement about custody,
courts are apt to approve the parents’ agreement. However, courts can—
and sometimes do—reject a custody arrangement even at a time when both
parents agree to it. Thus, for instance, a court might reject the parents’
proposed visitation schedule, and instead impose the standard schedule
recommended for a comparable situation, on the basis that the parents’
arrangement is not appropriate given the age and developmental needs of
their children. 76 Courts are especially resistant to custody arrangements
that require too much back-and-forth for the children 77 and, at the other
extreme, to arrangements where one parent forgoes custody or visitation
rights altogether. 78 Courts have also consistently held that parents cannot
bargain away their children’s right to child support, 79 or agree to forgo all
parental rights in exchange for a waiver of child support. 80

71. See Giangeruso v. Giangeruso, 708 A.2d 1232, 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997).
72. See, e.g., Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1982)
(removing custody from mother despite earlier agreement in part because she had an
overnight male guest); Forbes v. Forbes, 672 P.2d 428, 430 (Wyo. 1983) (awarding custody
to father because shared custody arrangement harmed children where mother engaged in
numerous “affairs”).
73. See Forbes, 672 P.2d at 430.
74. See, e.g., Hanson v. Spolnik, 685 N.E.2d 71, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
75. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding transfer
of primary custody to father, despite agreement that mother would be primary custodian, on
basis of mother’s same-sex relationship).
76. See, e.g., Kelley v. Kelley, 656 So. 2d 1343, 1346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(upholding trial court’s rejection of parents’ custody agreement).
77. See, e.g., Peek v. Berning, 622 N.W.2d 186, 193 (N.D. 2001) (“Generally, it is not in
the best interests of the child to bandy the child back and forth between parents in a rotating
physical custody arrangement.”).
78. See, e.g., Blisset v. Blisset, 526 N.E.2d 125, 129 (Ill. 1988) (refusing to enforce
agreement terminating paternal visitation); see also In re Marriage of Goodarzirad, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 203, 207–08 (Ct. App. 1986) (same).
79. See, e.g., Ortman v. Ortman, 695 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (App. Div. 1999) (“Because it
is the right of every child to be supported by his or her parents, caution should be taken to
ensure that the rights of children are not bargained away by their parents.”).
80. See, e.g., Blisset, 526 N.E.2d at 129.
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b. Agreements Regarding Modification of Custody
The rules governing deference toward parental custody agreements work
in tandem with the rules governing modification of custody. Once a
custody order has been issued, the courts retain continuing jurisdiction to
modify custody until the child reaches the age of majority. 81 A few states
make it relatively easy for a parent to reopen the question of custody,
permitting modification upon a showing that a change in custody is in the
child’s best interests.82 More typically, a parent wishing to modify custody
must meet an initial evidentiary burden before a court will revisit the
custody arrangement. This initial burden often involves establishing both a
substantial change of circumstances and that this change renders it against a
child’s interests 83—or in some cases harmful to a child’s welfare 84—to
continue in the existing arrangement. State statutes or case law may also
provide that certain events automatically establish the change of
circumstances necessary to trigger a new best-interests analysis. For
instance, Michigan law provides that, where both parents share legal
custody, a parental move more than 100 miles away from a current place of
residence requires a court to determine whether it is in the child’s best
interests to remain in the custody of the relocating parent.85
The prevailing rule is that the same modification standard applies to all
custody orders regardless of how they were arrived at, such that judicial
custody decrees that incorporate an agreement of the parties are subject to
the same modification standard as custody decrees that are the product of an
adversarial hearing. 86 However, some states give less deference to a
81. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.510(1)(a) (West 2010) (“[T]he court
may . . . . [d]uring the pendency of the action, at the final hearing or at any time thereafter
during the minority of any of the children of the marriage, make such an order for the
custody, care, education, maintenance and support of the minor children as appears in their
best interest.”); Guss v. Guss, 472 A.2d 790, 792 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (asserting “[t]he
continuing jurisdiction of the Superior Court over the custody of minor children of a
dissolved marriage”).
82. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.510(1).
83. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.135(10) (West 2003); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.09.260(1) (West 2005). Many jurisdictions place more stringent restrictions on
modification for the first two years following the initial custody order. See, e.g., 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/610(a) (2009) (“[N]o motion to modify a custody judgment may be made
earlier than 2 years after its date, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of
affidavits that there is reason to believe the child’s present environment may endanger
seriously his physical, mental, moral or emotional health.”).
84. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.18(d)(iv) (West 2006) (providing that, in the
absence of a parental agreement to the contrary or other special circumstances, custody can
be modified only upon a finding that “the child’s present environment endangers the child’s
physical or emotional health or impairs the child’s emotional development and the harm
likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change
to the child”).
85. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.31(4) (West 2011).
86. See, e.g., Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 934 (Fla. 2005) (“A decree for
purposes of the substantial change test includes both a decree that has incorporated a
stipulated agreement concerning child custody and a decree awarding custody after an
adversarial hearing.”); Sally Burnett Sharp, Modification of Agreement-Based Custody
Decrees: Unitary or Dual Standard?, 68 VA. L. REV. 1263, 1265 (1982). However, some
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custody decree arrived at by stipulation of the parties. 87 Thus, for instance,
the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that where a child custody decree
is the product of the parents’ agreement, modification can occur upon a
showing that the child’s interests require a change in custody, whereas
custody orders that result from litigation can be modified only upon a
showing of a substantial change of circumstances. 88
One issue that arises in the modification context is whether parents can
make enforceable agreements that govern future modifications of the initial
custody arrangement. Some parents try to contract around the default
modification rules. Thus, for instance, in jurisdictions that make it easier to
modify a parentally-agreed-upon custody arrangement than a judicially
imposed one, parents may agree that should either of them wish to modify
their agreed-upon custody arrangement, that parent must meet the heavier
burden of proof that would typically apply only to court-ordered custody. 89
Other parents, by contrast, provide in their initial custody agreement that
custody can be modified under a less stringent standard than would
ordinarily apply. 90 For instance, in a 1999 Minnesota case, when the
prevailing modification standard made it relatively difficult to modify
custody—a court was required to find the child endangered by the existing
arrangement in order to revisit the issue of custody—the parents had agreed
to make modification easier by stipulating that a court could order a change
of custody upon finding that to do so would be in the child’s best
The Minnesota Supreme Court found the agreement
interests. 91
unenforceable, on the basis that a parent cannot contract around the
prevailing modification standard.92 The legislature responded by enacting a
courts have held that stipulated custody arrangements approved by court order are subject to
a lesser modification standard—modification upon best interests rather than upon a change
in circumstances—if the parents did not intend their arrangement to constitute a final
custody determination. See, e.g., Montenegro v. Diaz, 27 P.3d 289, 295 (Cal. 2001) (“[A]
stipulated custody order is a final judicial custody determination for purposes of the changed
circumstance rule only if there is a clear, affirmative indication the parties intended such a
result.”).
87. See, e.g., Glaser v. McFadden, 731 N.Y.S.2d 576, 579 (App. Div. 2001) (“When the
existing custody arrangement arises out of a stipulation between the parties, that arrangement
‘is entitled to less weight than a disposition after a plenary trial.’” (quoting Carl J.B. v.
Dorothy T., 589 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (App. Div. 1992))).
88. Stavig v. Stavig, 774 N.W.2d 454, 458 (S.D. 2009) (“When a judgment and decree
of divorce is based upon the parties’ agreement, custody may be modified in subsequent
proceedings without the necessity of a ‘substantial change in circumstances’ . . . [such that]
‘the party seeking modification must only show that the best interests and welfare of the
child requires a change of custody.’” (quoting Hulm v. Hulm, 44 N.W.2d 303, 305 (S.D.
1992))).
89. See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 899 So. 2d 726, 729 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (enforcing
parental stipulation making custody modification subject to the heavy burden of proof that
under state law applied only to custody orders based on judicial consideration of evidence of
parental fitness).
90. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 591 P.2d 1043, 1043 (Colo. App. 1979)
(refusing to enforce agreement that modification of custody arrangement would be governed
by the best-interests standard rather than by the prevailing standard, which required a change
of circumstances before the child’s best interests could be considered).
91. See Frauenshuh v. Giese, 599 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 1999).
92. See id.
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statute that explicitly permitted parents to agree that custody could be
modified upon a showing that to do so would be in a child’s best interests,
rather than under the default standard requiring that a court find a child to
be endangered before ordering a change of an existing arrangement. 93
Parents may also attempt to provide for a change in custody upon the
occurrence of a certain event. A number of such agreements involve
parental relocation. Sometimes the agreements are meant to prevent the
custodial parent from relocating by either prohibiting relocation altogether94
or providing that custody will be transferred to the noncustodial parent
should the custodian relocate out of a particular county, state, or region.95
Parents contemplating relocation have also used agreements to set the terms
of such relocation, for instance by delineating areas within which relocation
can occur without an alteration of custody; 96 by prohibiting relocation
without permission of the other parent 97; or by setting forth a procedure for
arriving at future agreements in the event of relocation.98
Some parental custody agreements provide for an automatic change in
custody once the child reaches a certain age. In some cases, for instance,
the parents initially agreed that the mother would have custody during the
child’s younger years, and that the child would then begin living with the
father upon reaching a predetermined age. 99 Other parental custody
agreements have used automatic reversion provisions to monitor or control
a parent’s behavior, such as by providing that custody would revert to the
father if the mother should fail to attend alcohol abuse counseling, 100 or that

93. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.18 (West 2006).
94. See, e.g., Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d 417, 418–19 (Fla. 1993); Moore v. McIntosh,
128 So. 3d 985, 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
95. See, e.g., Zeller v. Zeller, 640 N.W.2d 53, 59 (N.D. 2002) (refusing to enforce
agreement that custody would automatically change from mother to father if mother moved
out of state); Guss v. Guss, 472 A.2d 790, 792–93 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (same).
96. See, e.g., Frizzell v. Frizzell, 597 N.Y.S.2d 513, 515 (App. Div. 1993) (refusing to
enforce agreement providing that mother residing in Albany could only relocate to Iowa,
Boston, Washington, D.C., and New York City, where father had already relocated to Iowa
and mother wanted to relocate to California).
97. See, e.g., Porter v. Fryer, 530 N.Y.S.2d 327 (App. Div. 1988) (permitting mother to
relocate and to retain custody despite agreement providing she would not relocate without
father’s consent).
98. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 263 P.3d 49, 51 (Alaska 2011) (involving agreement
providing that “[i]f a parent moves in the future, which the parents agree will occur
eventually, they will have to create a parenting agreement for different communities. Until
they have that agreement the children cannot be moved from their current community”).
99. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Jacobsen, 735 P.2d 627, 627–28 (Or. Ct. App. 1986)
(refusing to enforce stipulated dissolution judgment that child would live with mother from
infancy through the age of twelve, and that custody would then transfer to father); Knutsen
v. Cegalis, 989 A.2d 1010 (Vt. 2009) (refusing to enforce what the father contended was an
agreed-upon court order providing that the child would remain with his mother until starting
kindergarten and would then live with his father); Herstine v. Herstine, No. 13873, 1994 WL
37209 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1994) (refusing to enforce separation agreement providing for
transfer of custody to mother after one year of initial residence with father).
100. See Mundon v. Mundon, 703 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to
enforce agreement providing that custody would revert to father if mother violated
conditions related to alcohol abuse and related counseling).
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a mother would lose visitation rights should she expose her children to
African-American male companions. 101
Courts have largely refused to enforce agreements providing for an
automatic change of custody upon an agreed-upon event, even where the
agreement has been incorporated into a court order. As the Vermont
Supreme Court explained in refusing to enforce what the father contended
was an agreement providing that custody would switch automatically from
the mother to the father when the child started kindergarten, “changes in
custody must be based on real-time determinations of a child’s best
interests.” 102 It went on to note that there was no way to know in advance
how the child, the parents, and the relationships between them would
develop over the years after the agreement was entered into, and that any
number of new developments could affect the best-interests calculus at the
time the child stood to enter kindergarten. 103 The dissent argued that
refusing to enforce such agreements would make parents more reluctant to
compromise and would increase litigation. 104 The majority, however,
found it irrelevant that the father had acquiesced to the initial arrangement
only upon the condition that the child start living with him upon starting
school, because “a court is not bound by that agreement when the evidence
demonstrates that the best interests of a child requires a different result.” 105
Courts have been similarly reluctant to enforce agreements that attempt
to bypass the usual rules of parental relocation by providing for automatic
transfer of custody should a parent move beyond a certain agreed-upon
geographical boundary. 106 However, some courts have applied a more
stringent standard to a custodial parent’s request to relocate where the
parents had agreed that relocation would not occur.107 Similarly, while
101. See Turman v. Boleman, 510 S.E.2d 532, 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to
enforce agreement on the basis both that it relied on an impermissible racial classification
and that it was at odds with the preference for a child’s continued contact with the
noncustodial parent).
102. Knutsen, 989 A.2d at 1014 (citing cases in other jurisdictions refusing to enforce
automatic custody transfer provisions); see also Mundon, 703 N.E.2d at 1133 (refusing to
enforce agreement providing that custody would revert to father if mother failed to meet
conditions relating to alcohol abuse, and holding that “[d]ivorcing parties are free to
anticipate many future events and contingencies in maintenance and property
agreements. . . . But where provisions are made in the interest of the support and custody of
children, as opposed to those which merely set forth rights in property, our legislature and
sound public policy dictate that the trial court must play a role”).
103. Knutsen, 989 A.2d at 1014.
104. Id. at 1018 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1017.
106. See, e.g., Guss v. Guss, 472 A.2d 790, 792–93 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984); Scott v. Scott,
578 S.E.2d 876 (Ga. 2003); Zeller v. Zeller, 640 N.W.2d 53 (N.D. 2002).
107. See, e.g., Moore v. McIntosh, 128 So. 3d 985, 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (“When
the parties’ settlement or visitation agreement expressly prohibits a move, thus establishing
that the parties had previously litigated the issue, the party who seeks to relocate must show
a substantial change in circumstances to justify the relocation.”); Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d
417, 420 (Fla. 1993) (“[I]n cases where the final judgment incorporates a prohibition against
the relocation of the child thereby reflecting that the issue was litigated, the parent with the
primary residential responsibility must show a change of circumstances in order to justify the
relocation.”).
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courts typically will not enforce a provision for an automatic change in
custody should a parent move or should a child reach a certain age, some
courts have enforced provisions for judicial reevaluation of custody upon
the occurrence of such events. 108
c. Agreements to Arbitrate Custody
In many states, special rules also govern the arbitration of custody
disputes. 109 These rules can affect the enforceability both of agreements to
arbitrate 110 and of the custody determinations that result from arbitration.111
Agreements to arbitrate in some cases delegate decision making to religious
tribunals. 112 Parents may also agree to defer to the decision of a mutually
agreed-upon expert, such as a child psychologist. 113
Some states prohibit arbitration of custody disputes altogether. These
states refuse to enforce agreements to arbitrate custody and prohibit courts
from taking the results of arbitration into account in their determination of
custody. 114 In states that permit the arbitration of custody disputes, there is
significant variation in the deference accorded to the custody decision
arrived at by the arbitrator. Some states either permit115 or require courts to
review such determinations de novo to ensure that the custody award is in
the child’s best interests, on the theory that parents cannot preempt the
power of the state to protect children’s interests.116 Other states grant
108. See, e.g., Arrabal v. Hage, 19 So. 3d 1137, 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
(enforcing agreement providing for the automatic reevaluation of custody upon the child
entering sixth grade, where the prevailing modification standard required a substantial
change in circumstances before custody could be reevaluated).
109. See generally E. Gary Spitko, Reclaiming the “Creatures of the State”: Contracting
for Child Custody Decisionmaking in the Best Interests of the Family, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1139 (2000) (reviewing current approaches to enforcing agreements to arbitrate
custody and arguing for greater enforcement of such agreements).
110. See, e.g., Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 744 (App. Div. 1993) (refusing to
compel arbitration of custody despite parental agreement to arbitrate).
111. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Kovacs, 633 A.2d 425, 437 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (holding
that court could not adopt rabbinical court’s custody award without making an independent
determination that this award was in children’s best interests).
112. See, e.g., id. at 425; Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 740 (involving parental agreement to
arbitrate custody in rabbinical court).
113. See, e.g., M.F.M. v. J.O.M., 889 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (involving
parental agreement to be bound by custody recommendation of child psychologist).
114. See Kelm v. Kelm, 749 N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ohio 2001) (refusing to enforce agreement
to arbitrate custody and noting that “[a] two-stage procedure consisting of an arbitrator’s
decision followed by de novo judicial review ‘is certain to be wasteful of time and expense
and result in a duplication of effort’” (quoting Nestel v. Nestel, 331 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (App.
Div. 1972))); see also Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 744 (refusing to enforce agreement to
arbitrate custody); Crutchley v. Crutchley, 293 S.E.2d 793, 794 (N.C. 1992) (same).
115. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Popack, 998 P.2d 464, 469 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding
that custody can be submitted to arbitration, but that court retains jurisdiction to reconsider
custody de novo upon the request of either party).
116. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 620 A.2d 1161, 1166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (remanding for
determination of whether arbitrator’s determination was adverse to children’s interests);
Kovacs, 633 A.2d at 437 (holding that trial court erred by adopting custody determination of
religious tribunal without making independent determination that this custody outcome was
in the children’s best interests); Harvey v. Harvey, 680 N.W.2d 835, 836 (Mich. 2004)
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greater deference to an arbitrator’s custody determination, for instance by
requiring that a parent show a threat of harm to a child in order to obtain
judicial review of an arbitrator’s custody award. 117
d. The Trend Toward Parenting Plans and Shared Custody
Against the backdrop of the longstanding judicial reluctance to enforce
custody agreements, several states have recently adopted special rules that
give greater deference to certain types of custody arrangements that are
seen as promoting parental cooperation, such as parenting plans and
agreements to share custody. Parenting plans are similar to custody orders
but typically include more detail than a traditional custody order; for
instance, a state may require a parenting plan to specify the procedures by
which parents will communicate with one another about their children 118 or
resolve future disputes. 119 The term “parenting plan” was intended to
replace the winner-takes-all label of “primary custodian” and to encourage
both parents to remain involved in their children’s lives. 120 Under recent
legislation designed to promote the use of parenting plans, a number of state
custody statutes now provide that if both parties agree to such a plan, then
the court must approve of the plan unless it makes factual findings
supporting the conclusion that the plan is not in the best interests of the
child. 121 These statutes permit courts to override parenting plans on the
basis that they are adverse to a child’s interests but create a presumption
that any such agreement is in the child’s best interests.
Some states also give greater levels of deference to parents’ agreements
to share custody jointly, instead of allocating primary custody to one or
another parent. 122 The national move toward encouraging parents to submit
parenting plans was driven by the goal of inducing both parents to
(holding that parents cannot circumvent the court’s custody jurisdiction by agreeing to abide
by the determination of a referee or arbitrator).
117. See, e.g., Fawzy v. Fawzy, 973 A.2d 347, 350 (N.J. 2009).
118. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.02(C)(7) (2013).
119. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705(2)(a)(3) (West 2006).
120. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 1.1.II cmt. A (2000)
(“As parenting plans move parents toward richer and fuller plans for the child, the
limitations of traditional ‘custody’ and ‘visitation’ terminology become apparent. These
traditional terms represent, and help to perpetuate, an adversarial, win-lose paradigm of
divorce.”); Peter V. Rother, Balancing Custody Issues: Minnesota’s New Parenting Plan
Statute, 57 BENCH & B. MINN. 27, 27–28 (2000) (characterizing parenting plan legislation as
designed to promote parental cooperation and to replace the “all or nothing” approach to
custody).
121. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(f) (West 2009) (“If both parents
consent to a parental responsibility plan under this section, such plan shall be approved by
the court . . . unless the court finds that such plan as submitted and agreed to is not in the
best interests of the child.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705(3)(a) (“Upon the request of both
parents, a parenting plan must be created in lieu of an order for child custody and parenting
time unless the court makes detailed findings that the proposed plan is not in the best
interests of the child.”).
122. See generally J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared Parenting:
Custody Presumptions in Law and Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213 (2014) (assessing trend
toward presumptions favoring joint custody).
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participate in childrearing after separation and divorce, as well as to work
with one another in determining an optimal arrangement. 123 A related
development was a shift in attitude toward joint custody (sometimes now
called “shared parenting”). 124 Joint custody can consist of joint legal
custody, which entails shared parental authority to make significant
decisions about a child; joint physical custody, which entails shared
physical custody of the child; or some combination of both. 125 Once
disfavored, joint custody is today encouraged by many states, especially
where parents agree to it, on the basis that, as articulated by the California
Family Code, “it is the public policy of this state to assure that children
have frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents
have separated or dissolved their marriage, or ended their relationship.”126
Thus, a number of states have enacted statutes that favor joint custody
agreements by creating a “presumption affecting the burden of proof” that
joint custody is in the child’s best interests if the parents agree to it, 127 or,
more forcefully, by providing that where parents agree to joint custody, a
court must order it unless it determines on clear and convincing evidence
that joint custody is not in the child’s best interests. 128 Other states, by
contrast, give courts discretion to accept an agreed-upon joint custody plan
as long as a court finds it to be in a child’s best interests, but do not require
courts to give any particular deference to such a plan.129
A number of courts, however, have resisted the statutory trend requiring
them to extend greater deference toward certain types of agreements that
promote parental cooperation in the aftermath of separation or divorce, such
as parenting plans or joint custody agreements. The judicial habit of
exercising unbounded discretion when overseeing custody arrangements
123. See id. at 226.
124. See Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L.
REV. 497, 497 (1988) (critiquing trend toward presumptive or judicially-imposed joint
custody).
125. See DiFonzo, supra note 122, at 217 (noting that “[a] number of scenarios have been
swept under the joint custody umbrella,” and arguing that “the joint custody-sole custody
distinction is best viewed along a continuum, not as a sharp divide”).
126. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(b) (West 2004). See generally Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D.
Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in
the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 397–98 (2008).
127. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(c) (West
2009).
128. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a(2) (West 2011); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-3-101(a)(2)(A)(i) (West 2014). Florida goes further, and creates a strong presumption
of shared custody regardless of whether the parents agree. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West 2006) (“The court shall order that the parental responsibility for a
minor child be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental
responsibility would be detrimental to the child.”).
129. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 109(D) (West 2001) (“The court shall issue a
final plan . . . based upon the [joint custody] plan submitted by the parents, separate or
jointly, with appropriate changes deemed by the court to be in the best interests of the child.
The court also may reject a request for joint custody and proceed as if the request for joint
custody had not been made.”); Haas v. Bauer, 804 N.E.2d 80, 87 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)
(interpreting statute as requiring court to determine whether joint custody agreement
facilitates child’s best interests).
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has been hard to break. Thus, for instance, an appellate court in Wisconsin
held that a family court could reject the parents’ postjudgment agreement to
modify custody, reaching this result by interpreting a statutory provision
that “the court shall incorporate the terms of the stipulation into” its revised
custody order as indicating that the family court “may” incorporate the
parents’ stipulation into its order but was not required to do so.130 The
court reasoned that, despite the clear statutory language indicating that
parents’ agreements to transfer custody should be enforced without further
review, “the consequences would be absurd if [the statute] were read to
prohibit an examination of the best interests of the child.”131 As a New
Jersey court explained in reaching a similar conclusion, “[t]he best interests
of the child must serve as a polestar that guides the statutory analysis.” 132
B. Parentage Agreements
To understand the function of custody agreements and to assess the
judicial reluctance to enforce such agreements, it is helpful to place custody
agreements within the context of all agreements that purport to allocate
parental rights. Parental agreements form a spectrum. At one end of this
spectrum are custody agreements—that is, agreements that set forth
custodial and visitation rights among those who already possess the status
of legal parent. At the other end of the parental agreement spectrum are
parentage agreements—that is, agreements by which parents and would-be
parents redefine parental status altogether, by creating or terminating
parental rights. In the middle of the spectrum are hybrid agreements, such
as parentage agreements that both create parental status and set the terms of
custody and visitation should the parents’ relationship dissolve.
With parentage agreements as with custody agreements, courts are often
troubled by the use of contract law to make binding decisions about the
parent-child relationship, and object that parental contracts should not be
permitted to trump the judicial assessment of children’s welfare. This
section discusses current judicial approaches to three types of parentage
agreements: co-parenting agreements, gamete donation agreements, and
surrogacy agreements. Despite continued resistance to parentage by
contract, there is a growing trend toward the enforcement of certain types of
parentage agreements.
1. Co-Parenting Agreements
In recent decades, a new body of case law has arisen regarding the
enforceability of co-parenting agreements. Courts had been asked for more
than a century to enforce agreements by which parents transferred rights
over their children to third parties, with most refusing to do so, and a

130. In re Paternity of S.A. II, 478 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
131. Id.
132. Parks v. Poulter, No. A-1947-08T3, 2010 WL 1329484, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Apr. 1, 2010).
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minority finding the agreements enforceable if in the children’s interests.133
While some jurisdictions have applied this earlier case law to co-parenting
agreements, 134 the two types of agreements differ in important respects.
The earlier agreements, which I will call third-party custody transfer
agreements, purported to transfer custody rights altogether from the parent
to a third party, such as a grandparent or an adoptive parent. Co-parenting
agreements, by contrast, do not purport to terminate the custodial rights of
the original legal parent. Their goal in most cases is instead to share
parental rights between the legal parent and a second parent, thus creating a
parent-child relationship analogous to that of a traditional nuclear family.
Much of the recent case law on co-parenting agreements involves
agreements between unmarried same-sex couples. 135 In many of these
cases, the couple agrees to jointly share rights and responsibilities toward a
child that one of the partners intends to conceive, or already has conceived,
through assisted reproductive technology. Co-parenting agreements are
also entered into with increasing frequency by stepparents.136 In both
situations, the goal of the agreement is to extend parental rights and
obligations to a functional or intended parent who might otherwise have no
legal status as the child’s parent. These co-parenting agreements, unlike
third-party custody transfer agreements, create parental status for a party
without terminating the custodial rights of an existing parent.
In a number of instances, the co-parenting agreements that have surfaced
in the case law have features that resemble premarital custody agreements.
Such agreements are perhaps best described as a hybrid of an agreement to
parent a child together during the parents’ relationship and an agreement
that both parents will continue to have legal rights to the child in the event
that the parents separate. 137 While some co-parenting agreements of this
nature merely indicate that both intended parents will have continued legal
ties to the child in the event of separation, others include provisions that

133. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Masitto v. Masitto, 488 N.E.2d
857, 860 (Ohio 1986) (awarding custody to grandparents over father on basis that “[t]he
parents’ agreement that custody of their child should be given to a third person is
enforceable ‘subject only to judicial determination that the custodian was in every way a
proper person to have the care, training and education of the child’” (quoting Rowe v. Rowe,
97 N.E.2d 223, 225 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950))).
134. See A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 664 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (citing cases upholding
custody transfers to third parties as basis for finding that co-parenting agreements are not per
se unenforceable); In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Ohio 2002) (citing Masitto for
proposition that co-parenting agreements are enforceable if in a child’s best interests).
135. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660
S.E.2d 58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d at 241.
136. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Garrity, 226 Cal. Rptr. 485, 486 (Ct. App. 1986)
(refusing to enforce premarital agreement that each party would act as parent to the other
party’s children); In re Marriage of Engelkens, 821 N.E.2d 799, 801, 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(refusing to enforce parental agreement to grant visitation with stepparent).
137. See, e.g., E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 889 (involving co-parenting agreement executed
before and after child’s birth, and expressing both intent to co-parent and intent for
nonbiological parent to retain her parental status should the parties separate).
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specify the custody, visitation, and support arrangements that will apply
should separation occur. 138
The goal of including a custody-in-the-event-of-dissolution provision in a
co-parenting agreement is distinct from that of doing so in the premarital
custody context, in that the signatories to a co-parenting agreement are
concerned, as those to a premarital custody agreement typically are not, that
both parents continue to have some legal right to their intended child in the
event that their relationship dissolves. Nonetheless, it is significant that the
parties to these hybrid co-parenting agreements—like those to premarital
custody agreements—are concerned about disputes that might arise between
them should their relationship deteriorate, and have attempted to employ
contract law to ensure that their own ex ante decisions about their children’s
interests prevail over whatever they might feel ex post.
A related category of co-parenting agreements consists of those that
resemble custody agreements between divorcing or separating couples.
These agreements are reached between co-parents at the time their
relationship dissolves or during a conflict that arises post-dissolution. 139
Some such agreements may be the product of a consensus on the part of the
co-parents that they should both have continued ties to a child going
forward, and thus constitute an ex ante attempt of the legal parent to selfbind, and thereby to protect the expectations of (and thus perhaps to
encourage continued investment by) her co-parent. In other cases, the legal
parent may have agreed to a custody arrangement in the face of a threat to
litigate, such that the agreement may evidence not a collaborative decision
about the child’s interests going forward so much as a decision to avoid the
costs and risks of litigation.
The states vary widely in their response to co-parenting agreements.
Only a few jurisdictions have published case law declaring that courts can
directly enforce such agreements. 140 The enforcing state with the most
clearly developed law on the subject is Ohio. When faced with attempts to
enforce co-parenting agreements, Ohio courts have applied the state’s rule
regarding parental transfers of custody to third parties, under which
“[p]arents may waive their right to custody of [a child] and are bound by an
agreement to do so.” 141 Under this approach, Ohio has found agreements to
share custody with a same-sex co-parent enforceable as long as the agreedto arrangement is in the child’s best interests. 142
138. See, e.g., Mason, 660 S.E.2d at 61 (noting that “Parenting Agreement” executed
when child was three years old, and when co-parents’ relationship was intact, “set forth
provisions relating to . . . custody, visitation, and financial support should the women’s
relationship terminate”).
139. See, e.g., Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (involving right of de facto
parent to enforce visitation agreement arrived at by the parties during post-dissolution
litigation).
140. See Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d at 247 (agreement enforceable if in best interests of child);
A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663–64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (same).
141. Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d at 249 (citing Masitto v. Masitto, 488 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio
1986)).
142. See id. (remanding to trial court for determination of whether enforcement of coparenting agreement between same-sex parents was in children’s best interests).
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Ohio places significant limits, however, on the enforceability of coparenting agreements. It distinguishes between parentage and custody,
holding that agreements can reallocate custody but cannot create parental
status. 143 Moreover, the cases recognizing such agreements have tended to
involve parents who are not in conflict, as was the situation in In re
Bonfield, 144 where the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the validity of a coparenting agreement in the context of an intact co-parenting relationship in
which the parents wanted judicial affirmation of their shared custodial
arrangement. In a subsequent case where the co-parents were in conflict,
the Ohio Supreme Court limited the practical significance of same-sex coparenting agreements by finding that any agreements by the legal parent to
share custody with her co-parent had been revoked, and finding it relevant
in this assessment that the legal mother had permitted the donor father to
play a role in the child’s life. 145
In most of the states that take co-parenting agreements into account in
allocating parental rights, courts do not enforce the agreements, but instead
consider them as a factor relevant to assessing parental rights under a theory
of de facto parentage. Under the de facto parentage test set forth by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Holtzman v. Knott 146 and adopted by a
number of states, a co-parenting agreement is some evidence of consent to a
functional parenting relationship, which, if established, in turn permits a
court to award the functional parent visitation with a child, as long as the
court finds visitation to be in the child’s best interests.147 Other states have
subsequently extended full parental status on the basis of de facto
parentage. 148
Under the de facto parentage approach, a co-parenting agreement alone
does not suffice to create parental status in the absence of functional
parenting. The result is that intended parents cannot protect their
143. See id. at 248 (limiting recognition of co-parenting agreement to enforcement of its
custody provisions, and refusing to deem co-parent the full legal “parent” of the children she
had raised with her partner since birth).
144. 780 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 2002).
145. See In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ohio 2011).
146. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
147. See id. at 421 (providing that functional parent can claim right to visitation where
(1) biological or adoptive parent consented to petitioner’s formation of a parent-like
relationship with child; (2) petitioner and child lived together in same household;
(3) petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood, including contribution toward child’s
support; and (4) petitioner has been in a parental role for a sufficient length of time to have
developed a parental bond with the child); see also E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892–
94 (Mass. 1999) (upholding award of visitation to de facto parent under best-interests test
and finding it proper for trial court to consider co-parenting agreement as evidence of: intent
to co-parent, absence of financial compensation for parental relationship, and biological
parent’s ex ante assessment of child’s interests); cf. Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 61,
72–73 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding shared custody award to a same-sex co-parent under
third-party visitation statute, where the co-parent had entered into a co-parenting agreement
with the birth mother and had acted as a functional parent); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d
959 (R.I. 2000) (holding that, under state paternity statute, nonbiological same-sex co-parent
had standing, on basis of de facto relationship with child, to enforce visitation agreement).
148. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 562 (Colo. App. 2004); C.E.W. v. D.E.W.,
845 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me. 2004); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005).
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expectations against the possibility that their relationship will dissolve
before both parents have had the chance to develop a functional relationship
with the child. For instance, where the nonlegal parent decides to walk
away from her intended child shortly after the child is born, she cannot be
held to her agreement to help support that child, even if the child was
conceived with the expectation of that support. This was the case in T.F. v.
B.L., 149 where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which had
previously recognized de facto parenthood and had permitted consideration
of a co-parenting contract as a factor in determining de facto parenthood,
refused to enforce parental support obligations on the basis of what it
referred to as “parenthood by contract.” 150 The Massachusetts court
reiterated its resistance to parenthood contracts in the subsequent case of
A.H. v. M.P., 151 holding that, because “parenthood . . . can[not] be
conferred by a private agreement,” 152 a court could not award visitation
rights on the basis of a co-parenting agreement where the co-parent trying
to enforce the agreement had lived with and cared for the child but had not
taken on a sufficient proportion of caretaking responsibilities to merit de
facto parental status.153
Several jurisdictions have refused to recognize co-parenting agreements
altogether, often along with a refusal to recognize de facto parentage. 154 In
these jurisdictions, then, functional co-parents alleging an agreement to coparent are left without any basis for asserting parental rights or enforcing
parental obligations. Other states that deny rights to de facto parents,
however, have noted in so doing that the petitioners did not rest their
arguments on an agreement to co-parent, thus suggesting that such an
agreement might provide a viable basis for extending parental rights and
obligations. 155
2. Gamete Donation Agreements
There is a widespread consensus that an agreement by an anonymous
donor of gametes—whether in the form of sperm or ova—to relinquish
parental status is binding and enforceable. In most states, largely as a
matter of statutory law, anonymous donors terminate their parental status by
agreeing to donate their gametes to intermediaries who then provide them to
149. 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004).
150. See id. at 1248–49.
151. 857 N.E.2d 1061 (Mass. 2006).
152. Id. at 1074 (quoting T.F., 813 N.E.2d at 1254 (Greaney, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
153. See id. at 1072–73.
154. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to
enforce co-parenting agreement or to adopt theory of de facto parentage).
155. See White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 15, 22–23 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (declining to
adopt theory of de facto parentage, and noting, in denying mother’s petition for child
support, that she had not preserved for appeal her argument that the co-parents had entered
into an enforceable contract to share parental rights and responsibilities); Stadter v. Siperko,
661 S.E.2d 494, 496 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) (declining to adopt theory of de facto parenthood,
but noting without comment that “there was no written pre-separation agreement concerning
appellant’s parental rights”).

96

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

intended parents. 156 While such laws were originally drafted to address
anonymous sperm donation, many states have since updated their statutes to
include ova donation as well, and others have achieved the same result
through case law. 157
Because of the consensus on anonymous gamete donation—as well as
the infrequency of attempts by anonymous donors to contest their waiver of
parental status—most of the case law on gamete donation involves
parentage disputes between mothers and known sperm donors. Many states
apply the same rules to sperm donors regardless of whether they are known
or anonymous. Under a typical statutory provision, donation of sperm for
the purpose of artificially inseminating a married woman other than the
donor’s wife through a physician-directed procedure terminates the donor’s
parental status. 158 Some states either extend this rule to the donation of
sperm to an unmarried woman 159 or make no reference to the recipient’s
marital status. 160 A few further provide that a donor to a recipient other
than his wife can retain parental status where the donor and recipient enter
into a written contract to this effect, but that in the absence of such a
contract the donor has no parental rights or obligations. 161
A number of cases have arisen in which mothers and known sperm
donors have reached parentage agreements in derogation of a state’s default
rules on the subject. Some of these agreements provide that a donor of
sperm to an unmarried woman will retain his parental status even where the
state statutory regime provides otherwise. In some of the cases, the donor
was an acquaintance of the woman, and they had agreed to raise a child
together, sometimes in conjunction with the woman’s female partner; in
others, the donor and recipient were in an intimate, but unmarried,
relationship. In both situations, courts have largely, but not uniformly,
decided to enforce the agreements providing the donor with parental
status. 162
156. See NAOMI CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL
REGULATION 93–96 (2009).
157. See id.
158. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-702 (2009) (“A donor who donates to a licensed
physician for use by a married woman is not a parent of a child conceived by means of
assisted reproduction.”).
159. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(c)(1) (2009).
160. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-775 (West Supp. 2009) (“An identified or
anonymous donor of sperm or eggs used in A.I.D., or any person claiming by or through
such donor, shall not have any right or interest in any child born as a result of A.I.D.”); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (West 2008) (“A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by
means of assisted reproduction.”).
161. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West 2013) (“Unless the donor of semen
and the woman have entered into a written contract to the contrary, the donor of semen
provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the
donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the father of a child thereby conceived and
shall have no rights or duties stemming from the conception of a child.”).
162. See In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (finding, in a dispute between
a known sperm donor and an unmarried biological mother, that the “agreement and
subsequent conduct are relevant to preserving the donor’s parental rights despite the
existence of the statute” terminating them); Browne v. D’Alleva, No. FA064004782S, 2007
WL 4636692, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2007) (holding with respect to dispute
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The judicial response to agreements purporting to terminate or limit a
known sperm donor’s rights in the absence of statutes providing for such
termination has been more mixed. 163 In the early case of Thomas S. v.
Robin Y., 164 an appellate court in New York recognized the donor as the full
legal father, granting his petition for an order of filiation, despite an
agreement prior to conception that he “would not assume a parental role”
toward the child. 165 Almost a decade later, another New York court
reached a similar conclusion in Tripp v. Hinckley,166 holding that a sperm
donor could not be limited to the terms of a preconception agreement
making the mother and her partner the custodial parents of the child, with
visitation to the father and his partner, but instead must be treated as a full
legal parent with the right to whatever custodial arrangement a family court
determined to be in the child’s best interests.167
Other states, by contrast, have enforced agreements by which known
donors have terminated their parental rights and obligations. In Leckie v.
Voorhies, 168 decided the same year as Thomas S., an Oregon court enforced
a written preconception agreement by which the donor relinquished his
rights to paternity and custody and agreed to retain only “limited visitation
rights” at “the convenience of” the mother and her partner.169 More
recently, in Ferguson v. McKiernon, 170 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
between known sperm donor and female couple that “if there is an agreement between the
parties about the donor’s parental rights and that he would have them, it would be a violation
of his due process right to apply the statute [terminating the donor’s rights] to him”);
McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 244–45 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that application of a
statute terminating a sperm donor’s parental rights would violate the federal Due Process
Clause if the donor could establish that he and the mother had entered into a pre-conception
agreement that the donor would retain paternal rights); L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 722
(Va. 2013) (finding that despite the statutory termination of sperm donor’s rights where he is
not married to the mother, “[d]ue process requires that unmarried parents . . . be allowed to
enter into voluntary agreements regarding the custody and care of their children”); see also
In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 919 (Tex. App. 2005) (finding that a sperm donor had
standing to adjudicate paternity despite a statute terminating his parental rights, while
declining to address relevance of pre-birth co-parenting agreement to this determination).
But see In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1044 (Kan. 2007) (refusing to recognize parental status
of donor who claimed oral agreement to retain parental status, where statute required such an
agreement to be in writing); In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33, 36–37 (Tex. App. 2006) (refusing
to recognize donor’s parental status on basis of alleged pre-birth agreement that he would
play a role in the child’s life, where statute provided for termination of donor’s parental
status and donor had not executed an acknowledgment of paternity).
163. In jurisdictions with statutes terminating paternal rights when a licensed physician
performs the insemination, a number of courts have refused to enforce contracts purporting
to terminate parental rights in situations where insemination did not follow the statutorily
mandated procedure. See, e.g., E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 20 A.3d 1171, 1176–77 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 2011) (refusing to enforce agreement to terminate donor’s parental status with
respect to child born of self-administered assisted reproductive technology, where donor and
mother joined to request such termination).
164. 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
165. Id. at 361.
166. 736 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507–08 (App. Div. 2002).
167. See id.
168. 875 P.2d 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
169. Id.
170. 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).
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enforced an oral agreement by which a known donor terminated his parental
rights and obligations, where the mother decided five years after her twins’
birth to bring an action for child support.171 The court emphasized the
value of enabling a woman to conceive a child using “sperm from a man
she knows and admires, while assuring him that he will never be subject to
a support order and being herself assured that he will never be able to seek
custody of the child.” 172
The court in Ferguson not only enforced the agreement relinquishing the
father’s paternal status, rejecting the lower court’s decision that it violated
public policy, but held that enforcement should not hinge on any analysis of
the children’s best interests. The court acknowledged that the children in
this case would be disadvantaged by enforcement of the agreement, which
would deprive them of financial support. But it found that the agreement
should be enforced nonetheless, without reference to the children’s
interests. 173
This privileging of a contractual agreement over children’s interests
represents a significant departure from the custody case law, as well as from
much of the case law on co-parenting agreements. As we have seen, to the
extent that courts will enforce co-parenting agreements or consider them in
determining parental status under a theory of de facto parenthood, any
award of custody or visitation on this basis requires a finding that such an
award is in the child’s best interests. The Ferguson court was willing to
overlook the children’s interests in the name of facilitating certainty,
stability, and predictability in their parents’ arrangements, under the theory
that promoting those goals would be beneficial both to the children
involved and to children generally. In much of the case law on custody and
other parentage agreements, however, there is no escaping the possibility of
a best interests assessment that will undermine parents’ and children’s
expectations about their future.
3. Surrogacy Agreements
Surrogacy, in which a woman agrees to carry a pregnancy for the
intended parent or parents, falls into two categories. In traditional
surrogacy, the surrogate’s own ova are fertilized through artificial
insemination, and she then carries the resulting pregnancy to term. In
gestational surrogacy, the surrogate is impregnated with fertilized ova from
another woman, either an intended mother or a donor. Because gestational
surrogacy requires in vitro fertilization, the procedures involved are both
more complex and more expensive than those required for traditional
surrogacy.
In the absence of any legislation addressing surrogacy, courts have
uniformly refused to enforce traditional surrogacy agreements that purport

171. Id. at 1248.
172. Id. at 1247.
173. See id. at 1248.
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to terminate parental rights prior to conception or birth.174 Courts have
generally been willing to approve a surrogate’s post-birth consent to
adoption by the intended parents.175 But where the surrogate has instead
changed her mind about relinquishing her biological child, courts have
consistently declined to enforce the surrogate’s preconception agreement to
terminate her parental rights. In In re Baby M, 176 the highly publicized
1980s surrogacy dispute in which the surrogate refused to relinquish her
rights to her child as she had contracted to do, the New Jersey Supreme
Court proclaimed that even if the mother was capable of knowingly
consenting to terminate her parental rights to her unborn child in exchange
for financial compensation, “[t]here are, in a civilized society, some things
that money cannot buy.” 177 The Baby M court declined to enforce the
agreement on a number of grounds, among them that parents cannot by
contract circumvent the jurisdiction of the judiciary to ensure that any
custody arrangement agreed to by parents is in the best interests of the
child. 178
Courts have been more receptive toward gestational surrogacy
agreements, both where the ovum was provided by the intended mother179
and where it was obtained from a donor. 180 Not all states have found such
agreements enforceable, however, and some that have refused to enforce
such agreements have awarded parental status to the surrogate, particularly
where there was no intended mother with a genetic tie to the child.181 In
New Jersey, for example, a court following the lead of Baby M refused to
enforce a woman’s preconception agreement to relinquish her rights to the
child she carried to term, where the child was conceived through a donated
ovum and the sperm of her brother’s partner. 182 The contract was deemed
unenforceable, and the surrogate was found to be the legal mother of the
child to whom she had given birth.183
A growing minority of jurisdictions, including Virginia, 184 Florida,185
Illinois, 186 and Arkansas, 187 have enacted legislation rendering certain
174. See, e.g., In re Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 895, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); R.R. v.
M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796–97 (Mass. 1998); A.L.S. v E.A.G., No. A10-443, 2010 WL
4181449, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010).
175. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Girl, L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (Sur. Ct. 1986).
176. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
177. Id. at 1249.
178. Id. at 1248 (“Worst of all, however, is the contract’s total disregard of the best
interests of the child.”).
179. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993); Culliton v. Beth Israel
Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1137 (Mass. 2001); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d
760, 764 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).
180. See, e.g., In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 286 (Ct. App. 1998); Raftopol v.
Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 797 (Conn. 2011); J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 743 (Ohio 2007).
181. See, e.g., A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD-09-1838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
Dec. 23, 2009) (awarding maternal status to gestational surrogate who agreed to carry the
biological child of her brother’s partner).
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (2008 & Supp. 2013).
185. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (2010).
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gestational surrogacy agreements enforceable. In a number of these
jurisdictions, the agreement is enforceable only if the intended parents meet
a number of statutory requirements, including establishing a medical need
for surrogacy 188 and, in some states, obtaining judicial preconception
Some permit compensation to the
approval of the agreement.189
surrogate, 190 but others prohibit it. 191
Virginia and Arkansas also permit the enforcement of traditional
surrogacy agreements. 192 Virginia, however, in addition to requiring
judicial preapproval of such agreements,193 allows a surrogate who is also a
genetic parent to revoke her consent for up to 180 days after the final
attempt at conception, 194 thus negating much of the protection and certainty
that such an agreement provides to the child and intended parents.
Other states, by contrast, have enacted statutes prohibiting surrogacy of
any variety, rendering surrogacy agreements void 195 and, in some states,
subject to criminal penalties. 196 Moreover, despite a general trend toward
enforcement of gestational surrogacy agreements, there has been resistance
toward embracing a regime in which parentage is truly a matter of private
contract. Even in California, one of the jurisdictions most favorable toward
gestational surrogacy, courts have insisted that they do not enforce
gestational agreements when they award custody to the commissioning
parents but rather look to such agreements as evidence of intent to parent,
which is relevant under state parentage laws.197 California has rejected
making the parental status of children born through surrogacy hinge on an
assessment of the children’s interests, and in this sense favors private
ordering in creating parental status. 198 But California courts have
186. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1-75 (West 2009).
187. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2010).
188. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(8).
189. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(A).
190. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25(d)(3).
191. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(4); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(B)(4).
192. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160.
193. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(A).
194. See id. § 20-161(B).
195. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-402 (2012); IND. CODE §§ 31-20-1-1, -2 (2014); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2009); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1418-05 (1991).
196. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.859 (criminalizing entry into or arrangement of a
compensated surrogacy agreement); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(1) (same).
197. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 289 (Ct. App. 1998) (“There
is a difference between a court’s enforcing a surrogacy agreement and making a legal
determination based on the intent expressed in a surrogacy agreement.”); see also Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (looking to a surrogacy agreement to determine intent
to parent and finding the agreement sufficiently consistent with public policy to take it into
consideration in assessing intent to parent, while refraining from directly enforcing the
agreement).
198. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 n.10 (characterizing parentage determination on the
basis of a child’s best interests as raising “the repugnant specter of governmental
interference in matters implicating our most fundamental notions of privacy”); Buzzanca, 72
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291 (rejecting proposition that parents who employ assisted reproductive
technology should be screened in the same way as adoptive parents).
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nonetheless resisted a regime of parenthood by contract, making clear that
surrogacy contracts are not enforceable per se, but are considered only
insofar as they have bearing on parental intent or other factors relevant to
parental status under the state’s parentage legislation. 199
Thus, courts are conflicted on the enforcement of agreements allocating
parental status, whether in the form of surrogacy agreements, gamete
donation agreements, or co-parenting agreements. While there is a trend
toward recognizing certain forms of such agreements, this trend is far from
uniform. And even courts that afford some recognition to parentage
agreements may express antipathy toward the notion of “parenthood by
contract.” 200 In the parentage case law as in the custody case law, courts
convey significant discomfort about the prospect of contractualizing
parenthood.
II. THE DIVERGENCE OF SCHOLARLY APPROACHES TO CUSTODY AND
PARENTAGE AGREEMENTS
In recent decades, there has been extensive scholarly treatment of the role
of contract in shaping rights and obligations within the family. The
scholarly literature on the contractualization of marriage, however, often
makes little mention of custody agreements; a typical move by those who
assess the enforcement of marital contracts is to indicate in passing that
different rules necessarily apply to contractual provisions regarding
custody, since these affect children. To the extent that the literature on
marital contracts addresses custody agreements, it tends to endorse the
judicial view that such agreements should not be enforced unless a court
finds enforcement to be in a child’s best interests—a standard that renders
custody contracts largely superfluous. Even those who otherwise favor
permitting family rights and obligations to be determined by private
agreement often argue that children must pose the limit to the
contractualization of family law.
By contrast, family law scholars who focus on the definition of
parentage—for instance, in the contexts of assisted reproductive technology
and same-sex parents—tend to be considerably more favorable toward
enforcing contractual arrangements. Opposition to enforcing parentage
contracts is strongest with respect to surrogacy, both traditional and
gestational, because of concerns regarding the exploitation of women, harm
to children, and the commodification of children and of parenthood. With
respect to other forms of parentage contracts, however, such as co-parenting
199. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289 (“In the case before us, we are not concerned,
as [the intended father] would have us believe, with a question of the enforceability of the
oral and written surrogacy contracts into which he entered with [the gestational surrogate].
This case is not about ‘transferring’ parenthood pursuant to those agreements. We are,
rather, concerned with the consequences of those agreements as acts which caused the birth
of a child.”).
200. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Mass. 2004); see also Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 289 (insisting that the court is not “enforcing” the surrogacy contract that it relies on to
determine parentage).
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agreements and gamete donation agreements, there is a widespread, while
not uniform, consensus that such contracts should be enforced.
This part explores the divergence in views about the merits of enforcing
custody agreements, on the one hand, and parentage agreements, on the
other. It reviews the objections to enforcing custody agreements and shows
that these apply with equal force in the parentage context. This part
concludes that the divergence in scholarly attitudes toward the two types of
agreements is incoherent, and employs the parentage literature to illustrate
both the advantages of enforcing custody contracts and the weaknesses of
the prevailing arguments against such enforcement.
A. The Marital Contracts Literature:
Scholarly Opposition to Custody Contracts
1. Increased Acceptance of Marital Contracts
Over the past thirty years, family law has become increasingly privatized.
By the late twentieth century, the progression “from Status to Contract” that
Henry Maine had described a century earlier had finally entered the
specialized domain of family relations.201 For most of the twentieth
century, courts and scholars resisted the encroachment of contract into the
family, insisting both that the state has an interest in determining the rights
and obligations of family members and that the arms-length and selfinterested nature of contractual negotiations is antithetical to the intimacy,
altruism, and mutual trust that should prevail between family members.202
Since the 1970s, however, both courts and scholars have moved toward
increasing acceptance of a contractualized approach to certain family rights
and obligations. 203
The trend toward the contractualization of the family began with the
availability of no-fault divorce, and later included an increasing willingness
to enforce both prenuptial agreements setting forth the financial rights and
obligations of spouses when marriage comes to an end and private contracts
between unmarried cohabitants.204 As recently as the late 1960s, no state
offered no-fault divorce, 205 and courts routinely refused to enforce
prenuptial agreements or agreements between unmarried cohabitants.206
The prevailing view was that because the state has an interest in marriage,
individuals should not be able to contract around the rights and obligations
that come with the status of being married, should not be encouraged to

201. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 141 (Dorset Press 1986) (1861).
202. See, e.g., Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 20 (Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting
contention that “spouses can be treated just like any other parties haggling at arm’s length”).
203. See generally Singer, supra note 1 (summarizing these developments); see also
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225
(1998) (describing the trend toward the contractualization of family law, and proposing
default marriage law rules consistent with the view of marriage as a relational contract).
204. See Bix, supra note 56, at 261–73.
205. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1470.
206. See id. at 1446, 1474.
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create private agreements that encourage divorce, and should not be able to
create a private alternative to marriage through private contract.207
Today, every state offers no-fault divorce. 208 At least half of the states
will enforce the financial terms of prenuptial agreements without secondguessing the fairness of such bargains,209 while the remainder of states will
enforce such agreements as long as the terms are both procedurally and
substantively fair. 210 And the majority of states will enforce both express
and implied agreements by which unmarried cohabitants determine their
financial rights and obligations toward one another.211
There are still significant limits on the contractualization of marriage,
even with respect to the financial rights and obligations of family members.
The reluctance to allow contract law in its purest form to enter into the
domain of family relations is exhibited, for instance, in the view of nearly
half of the states that prenuptial agreements should be enforced only if a
court ensures that a given agreement was fairly procured and makes
reasonable provisions for the less well-off spouse. 212 And even those
jurisdictions that are most favorable toward the enforcement of premarital
agreements typically do not permit the enforcement of terms that would
cause one party to require public assistance 213 or that diminish a child’s
right to support. 214
Moreover, while the developments of the past fifty years have enabled
individuals to govern the terms of exit from marriage or marriage-like
relationships, courts continue to be reluctant to enforce agreements that
govern the ongoing relationship. 215 And judicial views about the statedictated duties of spouses within an intact marriage often render contracts
for domestic services unenforceable, on the ground that spouses have a
preexisting duty to provide such services. 216
Nonetheless, family members are now able as never before both to exit
marriage at will and to use private agreements to dictate the financial terms
that will apply when their marriage ends. These exit terms, in turn, often
have a significant effect on the incentives, power dynamics, and
207. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 148–72
(1998) (describing initial resistance to private domestic agreements).
208. See Mary Patricia Byrn & Morgan L. Holcomb, Wedlocked, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1,
2 (2012).
209. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983). The Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act has been adopted in more than half of the states. See Barbara A.
Atwood, Marital Contracts and the Meaning of Marriage, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 14 & n.14
(2012).
210. See Bix, supra note 56, at 249, 264.
211. See id. at 272.
212. See id. at 264.
213. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6.
214. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(b) (“The right of a child to support may
not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement.”).
215. See generally Case, supra note 49 (advocating greater enforcement of such
agreements).
216. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 840–41
(2004).
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assumptions within an ongoing marriage.217 Thus, the contractualization of
marriage has the potential to reshape intact marriage as well.
A substantial contingent of family law scholars has embraced the
contractualization of marriage. 218 As many have noted, allowing contract
to dictate the terms of marital and marriage-like relationships promotes
diversity and pluralism of family forms, by providing individuals with the
autonomy to determine what their relationships should look like. 219 Such
scholars argue that if both spouses want to remain financially independent
during their marriage, and to individually retain whatever assets and earning
power each spouse accumulates, a regime of enforceable premarital or
marital contracts enables them to do so. If, by contrast, a couple would
prefer their marriage to take a more traditional form, with one spouse acting
as the breadwinner and the other as the stay-at-home spouse, a prenuptial
agreement can ensure that neither spouse is disadvantaged by such an
arrangement in a jurisdiction that prefers to promote egalitarian marriages
in which both men and women enter the workplace and acquire earning
power. 220
The power of contract goes beyond allowing legally recognized spouses
to design their own marital rights and obligations. It also enables adults
who cannot or do not wish to marry, such as same-sex couples in certain
jurisdictions, siblings, or friends, the power to form family ties without
regard to the state’s ideal of what a family should look like. 221 For this
reason, the increased willingness of courts to enforce agreements between
adults in an intimate relationship has been widely welcomed as facilitating
individual freedom to craft family forms that the state might, if given the
chance, reject. 222
Much of the continued scholarly resistance to the enforcement of marital
contracts—in particular, to the enforcement of prenuptial and postnuptial
agreements—rests on the potential unfairness of such agreements to the
more vulnerable spouse, with a particular emphasis on potential unfairness
to women. 223 Feminists have argued that women tend to have weaker
bargaining power than men, both before and within the marital union. Amy
217. See generally Amy Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of Marriage: Is There a Future
for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509 (1998).
218. See, e.g., Case, supra note 49; Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 1, at 464–65; Shultz,
supra note 12; Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397
(1992); Stark, supra note 1.
219. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 1, at 1491 (recommending a marriage law that “explicitly
contemplates varied, changing, contextualized forms of marriage”).
220. See, e.g., Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 1, at 464, 502 (describing how contract can
protect spouses in traditional marriages).
221. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 12, at 220–40 (describing liberating possibilities of
contractualizing family ties).
222. See, e.g., Bix, supra note 56, at 251 (“Just as we would not have government tell
people whether to marry or whom, whether to have children or how many, it seems but a
small step to say that individuals should have comparable freedom to select or modify some
of the terms of their domestic ties.”).
223. See generally Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 229 (1994) (arguing that enforcing such agreements exacerbates
gender inequality).
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Wax contends that women have less leverage than men within marriage in
part because of their lower value on the remarriage market; 224 other factors
that potentially disadvantage women in marital bargaining include lower
earning potential 225 and less aggressive negotiation styles. 226 As a result,
marital agreements entered into before or during the marriage will often
reflect women’s weaker bargaining position by setting forth terms that
disadvantage women and leave them vulnerable when the marriage
dissolves. 227 The status-based rules of marital property division and
spousal support are intended in large part to protect the dependent spouse in
the marriage, such as the wife who sacrifices her career to care for children
while her husband continues to progress in his career and develop his
earning potential. Pre- and postnuptial agreements often contract around
rules meant to protect the dependent spouse in this situation, leaving her
without protection when the marriage ends.228
Another common objection to enforcement of prenuptial agreements is
that it can be difficult for couples entering into marriage to be rational about
marital dissolution. One cognitive limit suffered by couples entering
marriage is an optimism bias; a well-known study by Lynn Baker and
Robert Emery found that even law students well-informed about the high
rate of divorce tend to believe that their own marriage will endure.229 A
second barrier to rational prenuptial contracting is the difficulty of
foreseeing the contingencies that might occur during the course of the
marital relationship. Given the potentially long-term nature of marriage,
spouses-to-be may have difficulty predicting the various events that might
occur during the course of their relationship, such as career changes,
unemployment, or illness of a spouse or of another family member. Such
contingencies may make agreements limiting spousal support or property
division significantly more onerous for one of the spouses than initially
anticipated. 230
224. See Wax, supra note 217, at 544–50.
225. See id. at 612.
226. See id. at 589 (describing arguments to this effect). But see Margaret F. Brinig,
Does Mediation Systematically Disadvantage Women?, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 5–
6, 10–11 (1995) (finding little support for the claim that women are more risk-averse and
altruistic than men such that they are inherently at a disadvantage in marital bargaining,
while noting that differences in earning power and hence in power within the marital
relationship can affect marital bargaining power).
227. See Kathryn Abrams, Choice, Dependence, and the Reinvigoration of the
Traditional Family, 73 IND. L.J. 517, 518 (1998) (“[W]e should question how choice is
produced within heterosexual unions, where power relationships are complicated and often
unequal.”).
228. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1549 (“[L]egal rules that grant unfettered discretion to
private individuals to structure the process of marital dissolution . . . may end up
empowering economically stronger family members at the cost of economically weaker
ones.”).
229. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
439, 445 (1993).
230. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract
Law, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 254–58 (1995) (arguing that courts implicitly recognize this
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Despite these objections, many scholars advocate enforcing marital
agreements allocating rights to property and support.231 A number of those
who agree that unfairness to women and problems of rationality pose
significant concerns have proposed mechanisms for addressing such
concerns while enabling couples to craft enforceable premarital or
postmarital agreements.232 For instance, some recommend implementing
procedural safeguards to ensure that the parties to premarital agreements are
free from undue pressure and well-informed of the rights and duties that
they are relinquishing and of the assets of their future spouse. 233 This
recommendation is often coupled with the proposal of some degree of
substantive review to prevent the enforcement of agreements that will inflict
injustice, particularly when this injustice is the result of events that were not
foreseen by the parties at the time the agreement was executed.234 Such
safeguards—which at once police marital bargains and provide mechanisms
to ensure their enforceability—have been endorsed by the ALI 235 and
adopted, in some form, by nearly half of the states. 236 Others have
suggested strengthening the bargaining power of vulnerable spouses by
changing the default rules of marriage, for instance by giving nonbreadwinners greater rights to spousal support or marital property, 237 or, as
Amy Wax proposes, by returning to a strong presumption of maternal
custody. 238 These proposals would facilitate premarital and marital
bargains by addressing the objection that women and men have unequal
bargaining power within the marital relationship.
aspect of bounded rationality when they refuse to enforce prenuptial agreements where
enforcement would be unduly burdensome as the result of unforeseen circumstances).
231. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 12, at 329–30 (arguing that extension of the contractual
ordering of marriage will best facilitate “private values and choices,” despite the risk that
some of these choices will be the product of a disparity in bargaining power); Stake, supra
note 218, at 415–29 (recommending that premarital agreements be both enforceable and
mandatory); Wax, supra note 217, at 651–52 (addressing possibility that enforcement of
antenuptial contracts might help to address the current inequality of bargaining power within
marriage); Williams, supra note 1, at 827 (advocating enforcement of postnuptial
agreements).
232. See, e.g., Brod, supra note 223, at 282 (arguing that “while premarital agreements
generally harm women, such agreements also serve beneficial purposes” and proposing a
combination of procedural and substantive mechanisms of review to mitigate against
potential unfairness while permitting enforcement); see also Howard Fink & June Carbone,
Between Private Ordering and Public Fiat: A New Paradigm for Family Law DecisionMaking, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 28–36 (2003) (proposing a declaratory judgment process by
which courts could declare ex ante that premarital agreements are sufficiently fair both
procedurally and substantively to merit enforcement).
233. See Brod, supra note 223, at 286–91 (proposing requirement that each party to such
an agreement be represented by independent counsel, “unless the agreement clearly attains
economic justice for the vulnerable spouse”).
234. See id. at 288 (arguing that “the more economically unjust the agreement, the more
demanding the court should be in determining whether the agreement was procured fairly”).
235. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.04–.05 (2000).
236. See Bix, supra note 207, at 151–58.
237. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, No-Fault Divorce and Child Custody: Chilling Out the
Gender Wars, 36 FAM. L.Q. 27, 42–43 (2002).
238. See Wax, supra note 217, at 641–42.
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2. Continued Resistance to Custody Contracts
Scholarly support is significantly weaker when it comes to the
enforcement of marital agreements about child custody, particularly those
entered into either prior to or during marriage. Family law scholarship on
marital contracts largely either sidesteps the topic of custody agreements or
recommends that these be treated differently from contracts allocating
rights to property and support. 239 The consensus is that custody agreements
are exceptional, because these affect the rights of third parties—children—
who are not parties to the marital bargain and in whose welfare the state has
an interest. 240 Some extend this analysis to all marital contracts that
potentially affect children, including those regarding property division and
spousal support, as well as the right to exit from marriage, arguing that
here, too, the private right to contract should be limited by state concerns
about children’s welfare. 241 But few question the prevailing view that, at a
minimum, parents should not be permitted to employ custody agreements to
circumvent the judicial power to ensure that custody arrangements coincide
with children’s best interests. 242
239. See, e.g., Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 1, at 475 (proposing widespread
enforcement of marital agreements, but not with respect to custody provisions, on the basis
that “[t]here are some consequences of divorce—such as child custody where the child’s
interests must be protected—that do require judicial supervision”); Jeffrey Evans Stake,
Paternalism in the Law of Marriage, 74 IND. L.J. 801, 807 (1999) (“[W]e agree that children
cannot protect themselves, and therefore must be protected by the state. We do not propose
to change current law regarding children . . . .”); Williams, supra note 1, at 830 (proposing
enforcement of postnuptial contracts with the exception of provisions relating to child
custody or child support).
240. See Scott & Scott, supra note 203, at 1323 (noting that “children are not parties to
the contract and the state has an important interest in their welfare”); Singer, supra note 1, at
1552 (“Children’s interests may . . . be threatened by the shift from public to private ordering
of the process for resolving family disputes. Children are, quite literally, unrepresented third
parties . . . .”); Stark, supra note 1, at 1525 (proposing that in a regime where parents would
be able to enforce premarital “Marriage Proposals” setting forth the rules and principles that
would govern property division and custody at divorce, these would presumptively reflect
their children’s best interests, but “[c]ustody . . . would still be subject to a judicial
determination of the ‘best interest’ of the child at divorce”).
241. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1553–55 (proposing “two-tier family law regime” under
which private ordering is more limited in families with children).
242. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. The only recent scholarship directly
advocating enforcement of custody agreements rests primarily on parents’ constitutional
right to make fundamental decisions about their children’s custody. See generally Linda
Jellum, Parents Know Best: Revising Our Approach to Parental Custody Agreements, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 615 (2004) (arguing for greater deference to parents’ custody agreements, on
the basis both that parents are best positioned to make such decisions and that they have a
constitutional right to do so); see also Spitko, supra note 109 (arguing that greater deference
to parents’ agreements to arbitrate custody would help to protect parents’ autonomy and their
constitutional right to direct their children’s upbringing). Enforcement of custody
agreements was also advocated by Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser in their seminal
article about how default legal rules affect bargaining behavior in the context of divorce. See
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 957 (1979) (“We believe divorcing parents should be given
considerable freedom to decide custody matters—subject only to the same minimum
standards for protecting the child from neglect and abuse that the state imposes on all
families.”). At the same time, however, Mnookin and Kornhauser observed that there are a
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With respect to premarital custody agreements (there is little discussion
of postnuptial agreements relating to custody), 243 a further objection is that
parents are unlikely to be able to predict their children’s interests in one or
another custody arrangement before the children are born. Unpredictability
is a problem with all premarital agreements. But to some, it is especially
problematic for someone who may not yet be a parent to purport to know
what is best for a child who does not yet exist and does not yet have an
established relationship with either parent. 244
Perhaps the most powerful objection to premarital custody agreements is
that the very existence of such an agreement could be detrimental to a child.
One argument here is that a parent who has agreed to relinquish the right to
primary custody before a child is born might be less invested in the child as
a result. 245 However, the incentive effect of a premarital custody agreement
could also cut the other way—a parent who has agreed to forgo primary
custody of a child in the event of divorce might have a greater incentive to
make the marriage work, to the child’s benefit.246 The more intractable
problem is the possibility that a child’s relationship with a parent could be
harmed by the child’s knowledge that that parent had agreed, ex ante, to
forgo primary custody in the event of divorce. 247 This is indeed a risk of
premarital custody agreements. However, it is a risk that applies to any
premarital agreement; the very existence of such an agreement, after all,
indicates to a child that her parents have contemplated divorce—a reality
that might undermine a child’s sense of security and stability. Yet we
enforce (and thereby encourage) premarital agreements nonetheless.
Another concern with premarital custody provisions is that unequal
bargaining power might enable the stronger party to impose a one-sided
custody agreement as part of a premarital package that overwhelmingly
benefits one spouse to the detriment of the other. An example of such an
agreement is provided by the Littlefield case, in which the much older and
number of potential problems with bargaining for custody under the current legal regime.
See generally id.
243. See Williams, supra note 1, at 830 (excepting custody agreements from proposal for
greater enforcement of postnuptial contracts).
244. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 140 (arguing that intended parents cannot predict
interests of an unborn child); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08(e) cmt. i (2000) (“Along with the customary lack of
realism most couples share about the likelihood of a separation or divorce, adults on the
brink of marriage can be expected to be limited in their ability to evaluate their child’s needs,
judge the other parent’s ability to meet the child’s needs, or gauge their own interests.”).
The ALI Principles indicate that it is more appropriate for a court to take into account a
custody agreement that was made after a child was born, or one that the parents agreed to ex
ante but adhered to during their marriage. See id. But the ALI declines to render such
agreements enforceable. See id.
245. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 127–28.
246. A potential problem here would be the possibility that a parent would be trapped in
an abusive marriage by the fear of losing custody—a possibility that this Article addresses in
its proposal in Part IV.
247. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 127–28; Stake, supra note 218, at 436 (noting that
“learning of their parents’ contingent allocation might cause emotional injury to the children
by making them think that one parent does not care about them”).
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wealthier husband-to-be presented his future wife with a premarital
agreement that, in the course of providing the husband with every
protection that an attorney could devise, mandated a joint custody
arrangement, with equally shared residential custody, for any children of the
marriage. 248 Where, as here, a premarital agreement is the product of an
extreme power imbalance, its custody provisions may not be the product of
careful deliberation regarding a child’s future interests, but might instead
have been unilaterally imposed by the stronger party to create as much
leverage as possible in the event of separation or divorce. And even where
some negotiation of custody terms occurs, the power imbalance might
hamper the ability of the parent more likely to be invested in the child’s
interests to make agreements that are beneficial for that child.
The problem of unequal bargaining power is also emphasized by scholars
concerned with the enforcement of custody agreements made at separation
or divorce. Here, a common focus of scholarly attention is the likelihood
that the parent more invested in custody will trade access or custody for
property or support. 249 Scholars to make this objection have built on
Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser’s argument that the parent who is
more invested in maintaining custody will often be so risk averse with
respect to the custody outcome that, under the indeterminate and
unpredictable best-interests standard, she will forgo rights to property or
support in order to avoid even a small possibility of losing sole custody.250
While there is some debate in the scholarly literature about whether it is
true as an empirical matter that parents will trade custody for money,251
many contend that it is, and either oppose enforcement of custody
agreements on this basis 252 or argue for changing the default rules of

248. See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
249. See Scott & Scott, supra note 203, at 1244 (describing criticism that “in bargaining
over divorce, parents are free to decide their children’s future in a negotiation in which
custody and support are the currency of exchange. The withdrawal of the state from its
historic role in setting the terms of marriage and supervising the decisions of parents for their
children thus harms the welfare of children”); Singer, supra note 1, at 1552–53 (discussing
frequency of “bald-faced trade-off[s] of access to the children for support payments”).
250. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 242, at 978–79 (analyzing ways in which
the uncertainty of the current default custody rule affects the bargaining power of the
spouses); Scott, supra note 63, at 643–56 (arguing that the indeterminate best-interests
standard encourages trade-offs between money and custody, which in turn increase the
likelihood that divorce bargaining will facilitate strategic behavior, increase bargaining costs,
and undermine the financial security of children).
251. See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 154–61 (1992) (concluding from empirical study
of divorce decrees that “most divorce decrees do not reflect a trade-off between custody and
money”); Brinig, supra note 226, at 10 (noting that “[t]here has been little empirical testing
of Mnookin and Kornhauser’s ‘trading’ theory”); Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide
Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV.
401, 513 (1996) (finding no evidence of custody-money trade-offs in settlements tracked as
part of empirical study of judicial decision making in New York).
252. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 1, at 1550–56.
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custody law to make such trade-offs, and related strategic behavior, less
likely. 253
Where parents exchange custody for money, this disadvantages children
materially, in that the children who live with a primary custodial parent will
suffer from the loss of property along with the parent who gave up her right
to that property in exchange for custody. 254 This exchange also raises
commodification concerns, as is most evident in those rare cases where
divorcing fathers agree to forgo visitation altogether in exchange for a
mother’s agreement to relinquish all rights to child support. The scholarly
sentiment against enforcing such agreements rests in part on the view that it
is harmful to children’s self-image to permit what looks like the sale of
parental rights by the parent less interested in retaining custody. 255
Arguably, however, both the problem of unequal bargaining power and
the related problem of trade-offs between custody and property are more
likely to apply at dissolution than in the premarital context. This is both
because those entering into marriage tend to be less adversarial than those
divorcing and because the spouse who invests more in the child—to the
damage of her career prospects—is likely to have greater bargaining power
at the outset of her marriage, when she has not yet sacrificed her earning
power or agreed to have children or to care for them, than at dissolution.
By the time of divorce, the damage to earning power inflicted by unequal
roles in caretaking and other domestic chores—or by other sacrifices, such
as the tendency of the spouse with weaker earning power to leave her own
job in order to enable a higher-earning spouse to improve his or her career
253. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 761 (1988) (advocating a
return to the primary caretaker presumption, and noting that under the prevailing approach to
child custody, “many women bargain away needed property and support benefits to avoid
the risk of ‘losing’ their children”); Scott, supra note 63, at 652 (contending that replacing
the best-interests-of-the-child standard with the more determinate approximation approach,
which awards custody in proportion to the amount of time each parent spent caring for the
child while the parents’ relationship was intact, will help to “enhanc[e] the possibility that
parties will reach a cooperative agreement about custody independent of their bargaining
over property rights”); cf. Kay, supra note 237, at 42 (noting that the revised ALI approach
to spousal support, which emphasizes compensation rather than need and attempts to make
support awards less discretionary, provides an “important safeguard against the money-forchildren tradeoff” by reducing the uncertainty of spousal support awards and thus
“lessen[ing] the incentive to use children as a bargaining chip”).
254. See Singer, supra note 1, at 1550 (“Substantial evidence suggests that the common
divorce bargaining practice of a parent trading off financial claims for custody assurances
has contributed both to inadequate child support agreements and to the impoverishment of
children and their custodial parents after divorce.”). There is some evidence that the
increased uniformity and predictability of child support awards has reduced trade-offs
between custody and child support. See Ira Mark Ellman, A Case Study in Failed Law
Reform: Arizona’s Child Support Guidelines, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 137, 185 (2012) (“Before
support guidelines, support amounts were just one of several critical issues negotiated
between parties, and it was not uncommon for them to make tradeoffs between the child
support amount and other aspects of the divorce settlement, including custody arrangements.
The implementation of uniform guidelines that established the support amount in every case
helped eliminate that dynamic and removed one potential complication in reaching a
judgment on all divorce issues.”).
255. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 126–28.
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prospects—has already taken place. Moreover, at the outset of marriage, a
party can still walk away from the relationship and decide not to become a
parent with her intended spouse. Once a child is born, the parent no longer
has this option, and instead—precisely in proportion to her investment in
the child—may well be so averse to losing custody that she feels she has no
option but to agree to unfavorable terms.
Thus, to the extent that the objection to the enforcement of custody
agreements hinges on concerns regarding bargaining power and potential
trade-offs, it would seem that premarital and marital custody agreements
should be given more deference than those reached at dissolution. Both
scholarly opinion and judicial practice, however, take the opposite
approach. While there is resistance to enforcing any type of custody
provision, there is significantly greater support for enforcing separation
agreements regarding custody than there is for enforcing premarital custody
provisions. In fact, custody agreements made at separation or divorce are
routinely approved with minimal oversight 256 (but, significantly, are open
to reevaluation, subject to prevailing modification standards, in the event
that parents disagree down the road). This suggests that the unpredictability
objection, in conjunction with the child welfare objection—the notion that
parents or intended parents cannot make good decisions about the future
welfare of their children—are the most powerful factors behind the
reluctance to support enforcement of previously made custody agreements.
There has, in recent years, been some scholarly support for enforcing
custody agreements, even those entered into prior to marriage. Linda
Jellum, for instance, argues that parents have a fundamental constitutional
right to make decisions about their children, which is infringed by judicial
refusal to enforce custody agreements. 257 And Jeffrey Stake, in his proposal
for mandating prenuptial agreements between every couple entering
marriage, briefly discusses the advantages and disadvantages of including
custody in such agreements, and concludes that perhaps adherence to the ex
ante custody choices of future parents would be preferable to the current
best-interests standard. 258 However, Stake retracts that view in his
subsequent scholarship, arguing instead that custody should prove the
exception to the contractualized family law regime that he advocates.259
The vast majority of the scholarly literature on marital contracts either
gives the issue of custody agreements short shrift or endorses the prevailing
view that agreements about how and by whom children are raised must
pose the exception to spouses’ rights to enforce private marital contracts.
Perhaps the most telling rejection of custody contracting comes from
Katharine Silbaugh, who argues that it is unfair to enforce the monetary
256. See Sharp, supra note 86, at 1264.
257. See generally Jellum, supra note 242. A more limited proposal is offered by Gary
Spitko, who has advocated enforcing not custody agreements, but agreements to have
custody disputes submitted to private arbitration, again as a matter of protecting parents’
fundamental rights. See Spitko, supra note 242. The question of whether courts or arbiters
are better positioned to assess best interests is beyond the scope of this Article.
258. See Stake, supra note 218, at 435.
259. See Stake, supra note 239, at 807.
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terms of prenuptial agreements without enforcing the nonmonetary terms—
and thus that such contracts should be unenforceable altogether. Silbaugh
powerfully demonstrates that parents have a strong stake in their children’s
custody, such that “if [custody] cannot be the proper subject of a
contract . . . , a parent is left without the ability to protect her most profound
interest in the family.” 260 Her argument in part is that under the current
approach, where premarital property agreements are largely enforced but
premarital custody agreements are not, we may be strengthening the
bargaining power of the more monied spouse, given that premarital
agreements tend to be more favorable toward such a spouse than the
background law of support and property division. The result is that a
primary caretaker, for instance, will have even less leverage to negotiate
custody terms than she would otherwise have.
Silbaugh acknowledges that the problem she identifies could be
addressed by rendering custody provisions—and other nonmonetary terms
of premarital agreements—enforceable. 261 Thus, she notes that permitting
contractual entitlement to custody could help prevent the situation described
by Mnookin and Kornhauser, where the parent most invested in custody
will trade custody for property or support in order to avoid the uncertainty
of litigation. 262 But she nonetheless rejects enforcement of custody
contracts, in part for the reasons discussed above—the commodification
concern; the possibility that parents will agree to custody arrangements that
are worse for a child than what a court would devise; and that “there is little
reason to privilege the parties’ understanding of what is best for not-yetliving children” over the ex-post determination of “even a fallible court.”263
If Silbaugh’s argument illustrates the prevailing objections to enforcing
custody agreements, it also demonstrates the damage inflicted on children
and parents alike by the current approach. Silbaugh proposes that we refuse
to enforce marital contracts altogether, given the unfairness, and potential
harm to children, of enforcing monetary provisions alone. 264 But courts
largely continue to enforce the monetary provisions of premarital contracts
while refusing to enforce terms related to custody. The result is that what
prevails today is the very regime that Silbaugh recommends against, one in
which marital contracts—and the privatization of family relations—are
increasingly accepted and enforced, with exceptions carved out for
contracts related to custody. As Silbaugh demonstrates, this lopsided
system is blind to the “family economy,” and ignores the extent to which
childrearing, children’s interests, and parental investment—as well as the
power of the parent most invested in a child’s interests to bargain in ways
that benefit that child—are profoundly implicated by the monetary aspect of
marital arrangements.265
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 90.
See id. at 128.
See id.
Id. at 140.
See id. at 128–29, 133–35.
See generally id.
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B. The Parentage Literature: Scholarly Support of Parentage Contracts
The scholarly literature on parentage is more favorable than the marital
contracts literature toward enforcing agreements concerning parental rights
and obligations. Parentage scholars are not unanimous on the advisability
of permitting parental status to be created by contract, and often stop short
of recommending a wholly contractualized approach to parenthood. But
scholars in this field have noted the advantages of parentage contracts and
the extent to which these can help to address the central concern of twentyfirst century parentage law: providing stability and certainty at a time when
the law of parentage is in flux as never before.
Much of the focus of current parentage scholarship is on determining the
parentage of children born through assisted reproductive technology. An
overlapping field of concern is establishing the parentage of children who
are raised by same-sex partners, single parents, or multiple (i.e., more than
two) parents. In both of these areas, there is considerable concern about the
uncertainty and potential instability faced by intended parents and their
children at a time when the default rules governing parentage may fail to
provide clear guidance about parental status, or may set forth rules that are
at odds with the lived experience of functional families.
Many parentage scholars are currently engaged in devising mechanisms
to assure intended parents who hope to create a family through assisted
reproductive technology that their parental status will be recognized and
enforced. Some have argued for a contract-based approach to the parentage
of children born through assisted reproductive technology, such that the
parental status of such children, in contested situations, would be
determined with reference to bargained-for parental intent. 266 As Marjorie
Shultz has argued, a default rule making bargained-for intent determinative
of parental status has a number of advantages. It reduces uncertainty for
prospective parents; 267 gives parental status to those who have carefully
planned to raise children (and thus will presumptively be good parents);268
and provides a gender-neutral basis for determining parenthood, instead of
dictating parental status based on stereotypical assumptions about gender
roles. 269
A contractual approach to parentage is only one of many proposed
approaches to determining the parental status of children born through
assisted reproductive technology. Other suggestions in the recent parentage
literature include defining parentage with reference to parental intent;270
266. See generally Ertman, supra note 5; Shultz, supra note 5; Katherine M. Swift,
Parenting Agreements, the Potential Power of Contract, and the Limits of Family Law, 34
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913 (2007). See also Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The
History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1
(2004) (advocating extending contractual approach to parenthood beyond the context of
assisted reproductive technology).
267. See Shultz, supra note 5, at 323–24.
268. See id. at 343.
269. See id. at 379–95.
270. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a “Parent”? The Claims of
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1991); Richard F. Storrow,
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looking at parental consent; 271 protecting functional parentage in addition to
formal parentage; 272 unbundling parental rights and responsibilities;273 or
some combination of these possibilities. 274 As Courtney Joslin has
observed, not all intended parents will have the resources to draft a formal
contract allocating parental rights. 275 Joslin for this reason recommends
looking to consent to parent, broadly defined, instead of requiring a
contract; she argues that a consent-based approach to parentage would
enable parents to allocate rights and obligations prior to birth, whereas a
functional approach would not. 276 But, along with many scholars who
recommend non-contractual approaches to determining parental status for
children born of assisted reproductive technology, she has no objection to
looking to a written agreement as evidence of parental intent and
determining parentage accordingly277 (with the caveat that she would not
permit an intended parent to contractually limit her rights and obligations
toward the child). 278
Despite the relatively favorable attitude of the parentage literature toward
recognizing parental intent in determining parental status, there are a
number of scholars who oppose the enforcement of parentage contracts.
The primary reasons for this opposition are threefold: that parentage
contracts may be at odds with children’s welfare; that the contractualization
of parentage commodifies children, to their detriment; and that certain
forms of assisted reproductive technology exploit women.
The child welfare argument has been made prominently by Marsha
Garrison, who argues for applying the same parentage rules to children born
of assisted reproductive technology that we do to children born through
traditional means. 279 Significantly, Garrison makes this argument by
drawing on the opposition to custody contracts in the marital contracts
literature and case law. She observes that we do not permit the enforcement
Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to
Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002).
271. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 6, at 1222 (advocating extending “the consent = legal
parent rule to all children born through assisted reproduction”); Polikoff, supra note 6, at
234.
272. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L.
REV. 879 (1984); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and
Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV.
419 (2013) (recommending that functional parenthood be recognized as a distinct category
of parental status, and proposing a registration system as one basis for establishing status as a
functional parent).
273. See, e.g., Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 272, at 475–77 (proposing that
parental rights and obligations be disaggregated for functional, but not for formal, parents).
274. See, e.g., Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to
Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 433, 448 (2005).
275. See Joslin, supra note 6, at 1221–22.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 1225–26 (stating that although “the parties should be encouraged to enter
into written consents,” her “proposal does not mandate written consent”).
278. See id. at 1221–22.
279. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2000).
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of custody agreements for traditional families, on the basis that children’s
interests are thought to be paramount to such agreements, and argues that
parentage contracts should be granted no more deference than custody
contracts, because they are no more likely to be aligned with children’s
interests. 280 In Garrison’s view, placing children first requires refusing to
recognize parentage contracts and instead determining parentage as we
would if the child had been born without assisted reproductive technology,
applying the usual rules of maternity and paternity where possible and
extending the principles underlying those rules where necessary. 281 Her
argument is that these rules are designed to benefit children, in part by
assuring that they will be raised by two parents with care and support
obligations. 282
The more widely voiced objection to parentage contracts hinges on two
concerns that overlap both with one another and with the concern about
child welfare: commodification and the exploitation of women. While
both of these concerns have implications for many forms of assisted
reproductive technology (including, for instance, ova donation, which may
entail both some health risks to the donor and the exchange of money for
gametes), 283 they are voiced most commonly with respect to the practice of
surrogacy. During the early years of surrogacy, Margaret Radin argued that
the practice of paying women to bear children for others harms
personhood—and thus human flourishing—by treating both children and
women’s gestational labor as mere commodities.284 Others have echoed the
notion that surrogacy commodifies children by treating them as the objects
of monetary exchange, likening surrogacy to a baby market.285 There have
been a number of responses to the commodification concern. Some argue
that the exchange of money for a surrogate’s services should be permitted,
because monetary exchange is not necessarily at odds with intimacy and
human dignity. 286 Others advocate limiting compensation for surrogacy in
order to distance the practice from baby-selling, such that surrogates are
compensated for their labor, but not for parting with their genetic
offspring. 287

280. See id. at 892–94.
281. See id. at 896.
282. See id. at 882–89. Garrison would thus, for instance, apply traditional paternity law
to accord sperm donors to unmarried women all the rights and obligations of fatherhood,
regardless of a contract terminating the donor’s parental status, in order to provide such
children with two parents rather than one. See id. at 896–97, 903–912.
283. See Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1654
(2008) (advocating limits on compensation to ova donors on non-commodification grounds,
but recommending that some compensation be permitted, because the procedures involved
take time to complete and entail “a certain amount of medical risk”).
284. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1909–11
(1987).
285. See MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES 102–23 (2001).
286. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491,
526–27 (2005); Ertman, supra note 5.
287. See Hasday, supra note 286, at 514–15 (describing this approach).
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With respect to surrogate mothers, scholars have objected both that
surrogacy exploits such mothers by coercing them to sell their children—or
their reproductive labor—under conditions of scarcity, 288 and that a woman
cannot rationally consent to terminate her maternal rights prior to giving
birth, because she cannot know ex ante how she will feel about terminating
her rights once the child is born. 289 One oft-voiced response to these
objections is that restricting women from agreeing to surrogacy contracts on
the basis that they cannot freely consent to such contracts reinforces the
stereotypical notion that women are less able than men to make rational and
autonomous decisions and more prone to be governed by emotions and
other irrational factors.290
Despite these concerns, there is increasing scholarly support for
enforcing surrogacy agreements, especially where there are limits in place
to protect surrogates who have a genetic tie to the child. 291 While some
scholars would enforce even traditional surrogacy agreements, 292 others
continue to have reservations about permitting a mother to terminate her
parental rights to her genetic child prior to birth. 293 And there are some
scholars who argue that a gestational surrogate forms a parental bond with
her child by virtue of carrying the child through pregnancy, and that she
should be deemed a parent accordingly. 294
But apart from the fraught area of surrogacy—and in particular, the
question of whether a genetically related surrogate should be permitted to
terminate her parental rights prior to birth—parentage scholars are largely
favorable toward permitting intended parents to establish their parental
status by agreement. 295 There is only minimal objection to permitting the
288. See Radin, supra note 284, at 1909–11, 1917; see also SHANLEY, supra note 285, at
107–10.
289. See, e.g., Margaret Friedlander Brinig, A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy:
Comment on Richard Epstein’s Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81
VA. L. REV. 2377, 2388 (1995).
290. See Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, in
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 173 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990) (“It would seem to be a step
backward for women to argue that they are incapable of making decisions.”); Shultz, supra
note 5, at 355 (arguing that refusal to enforce surrogacy contracts treats women as “nonautonomous persons”).
291. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 286, at 527 (describing mechanisms to facilitate the
enforcement of surrogacy agreements); Yehezkel Margalit, In Defence of Surrogacy
Agreements: A Modern Contract Law Perspective, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423
(2014); Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate
Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2367–72 (1995); MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 48–57 (1993).
292. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2337 (1995); Shultz, supra note 5, at 367–69.
293. See, e.g., TREBILCOCK, supra note 291, at 48–57; Brinig, supra note 289, at 2381.
294. See, e.g., Susan Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 282–84 (2006) (arguing for a
presumption of maternity for gestational surrogates, on the ground that gestation is a form of
functional parenting).
295. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 6, at 1222 (advocating determining parentage of children
born through assisted reproductive technology by looking to parental consent); Polikoff,
supra note 6, at 234, 243–46 (advocating both recognition of intent to parent in determining
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sale of gametes, for instance, and terminating the parental status of those
who sell their eggs or sperm; 296 though some scholars call for greater
regulation of gamete donation, their emphasis is largely on whether to
permit anonymous donation or to impose other limits on the mode and
frequency of donation. 297 Relatively few advocate prohibiting the sale of
gametes altogether.298 Scholarly support for enforcing the intentions of
known gamete donors (that is, those who do not sell their sperm, but donate
it to an acquaintance or relative) is similarly strong. Despite some
disagreement on this point, many argue for respecting the intentions of
known donors and intended parents, both where the parties agree to
terminate the donor’s parental status entirely and where they agree to
preserve a limited role for the donor in the child’s life.299 The consensus is
that we should respect the intended parents’ plans for the children they have
arranged to bring into the world, both to provide those children with
emotional and financial certainty and stability and to ensure respect for a
diversity of family forms.
C. Bringing Together the Custody Literature and the Parentage Literature
Why is it that the marital contracts literature continues to resist the
contractualization of custody, while the parentage literature increasingly
embraces the move toward contract? This section argues that, while there
are differences between the two types of agreements, the divergence in
scholarly attitudes is largely unfounded.
This section begins by
demonstrating the overlap and interaction between custody agreements and
parentage agreements. It then addresses the objections to each type of
agreement, showing that these are largely similar, and have no greater force
in the custody context than in the parentage context.
1. Collapsing the Distance Between Custody and Parentage Agreements:
The Role of Custody Agreements in Parentage Disputes
There are some significant differences between custody contracts and
parentage contracts that help to explain the radical distance between
the parentage of children born through assisted reproductive technology and enforcement of
agreements to provide a limited parental role to a donor of gametes).
296. But see Garrison, supra note 279, at 903–12 (advocating imposition of parental
status on known or anonymous sperm donors where a child is conceived by a single woman).
297. See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 156, at 114–29 (advocating that parental status of
children born through gamete donation be determined with reference to parental intent, but
that the market in gametes be regulated to prohibit anonymity); Gaia Bernstein, Regulating
Reproductive Technologies: Timing, Uncertainty, and Donor Anonymity, 90 B.U. L. REV.
1189 (2010) (recommending against limits on anonymous gamete donation).
298. But see Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted
Procreation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human Sperm
and Eggs, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 257, 271–73 (2002) (objecting to the sale of gametes);
Garrison, supra note 283, at 1654 (recommending limiting the amount of compensation
permissible for gamete donation).
299. See, e.g., Polikoff, supra note 6, at 245–46; Nancy D. Polikoff, The Deliberate
Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is It an Option for Lesbian and Heterosexual
Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 375, 393 (1996); Shultz, supra note 5, at 340–41.
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scholarly attitudes toward each type of contract. The stakes are arguably
higher in the parentage context, in that a parentage dispute is more likely to
raise the possibility that a would-be parent will lose her parental rights and
obligations entirely, as occurs when a court refuses to enforce a coparenting agreement. Parentage scholars are currently engaged in devising
mechanisms to protect children from the worst-case scenario in which they
lose all contact with, or right to support from, a functional parent. A classic
custody dispute, by contrast, tends to involve the amount of time that
children spend with each parent, rather than whether a parent will be
permitted any contact with the child at all. The children of parents involved
in custody disputes typically retain contact with and a right to support from
both parents, regardless of whether a court enforces any custody agreements
into which their parents might have entered. Thus, the need for parentage
contracts may be greater than that for custody contracts.
However, custody contracts can have important implications as well, for
parents and children alike. A custody agreement may determine which
parent maintains primary contact with a child, raising the child for most of
the year, and which parent is instead relegated to visitation on holidays and
summers—thus largely limiting the child’s contact with one or the other
parent. It may limit the right of a parent to relocate while retaining custody
of the child, or may provide for parental freedom to relocate—possibilities
that may have a major influence on the child’s future and her contact with
the noncustodial parent, and may alternately permit or prevent a parent from
remarrying, moving closer to family and friends, obtaining an education, or
advancing her career.
Moreover, custody agreements play an increasingly significant role in
parentage disputes. Intended and existing co-parents will often draft
agreements that spell out their rights and obligations in the event that their
relationship dissolves, such as which parent will maintain primary custody,
which parent will have visitation, and the contours of both visitation and
support. In a number of parentage disputes, the continuation or termination
of one parent’s relationship with the child has hinged on the presence or
absence of such an agreement, as well as on the court’s decision regarding
whether to enforce the agreement. 300
Scholars of both parentage and custody would thus do well to keep in
mind the potential interplay between the two categories of agreements.
Scholars of marital contracts should consider the role of custody contracts
in parentage disputes, which may differ significantly from their role in the
300. See, e.g., A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663–65 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (permitting coparent to assert custody rights based on settlement reached when co-parents’ relationship
dissolved); Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 67–68 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (citing coparenting agreement providing for shared custody in the event of dissolution of co-parents’
relationship as evidence that the legally recognized parent intended for her co-parent to
continue her relationship with their child should the co-parents separate); Rubano v.
DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 966 (R.I. 2000) (permitting co-parent to enforce post-dissolution
visitation agreement, and looking to such agreement as one among several factors in finding
that the co-parent had the de facto parental status that was a predicate to the court’s
jurisdiction to enforce the visitation agreement).
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typical marital economy that many such scholars address. Custody
contracts at the same time provide a potentially useful tool for parentage
scholars engaged in developing mechanisms for protecting the expectations
of families that diverge from the traditional form of two married parents and
their biologically related children.
2. Collapsing the Distance Between Custody and Parentage Agreements:
Objections to Enforcement
As we have seen, scholars largely support the enforcement of parentage
agreements and resist the enforcement of custody agreements. However,
objections to enforcing the two types of agreements are sufficiently similar
to render the divergence in approach incoherent. This section discusses the
three primary objections to the enforcement of custody agreements and
shows that these apply with equal force in the parentage context: the
unpredictability objection, the duress objection, and the child welfare
objection. It addresses the extent to which these concerns play out
differently in the custody context than in the parentage context, but
concludes that these differences do not justify the current divergence in
attitude toward the two types of agreement.
a. The Unpredictability Objection
One of the strongest objections to the enforcement of custody agreements
is that parents cannot predict the custody arrangement that will be in their
child’s interests at a future point. The unpredictability objection is raised
most forcefully with respect to custody agreements that are entered into
before the children are born, such as custody provisions of premarital
agreements. To use the language of contract law, the argument is that
premarital custody agreements are not the product of rational consent—and
therefore should not be enforced—because the contracting parties cannot ex
ante have sufficient information to make a rational decision about children
who do not yet exist. 301 The unpredictability objection is also levied at
custody agreements made at separation or divorce; courts and scholars alike
have argued that the difficulty of predicting how a child will develop
weighs against permitting separating parents to craft a custody arrangement
that will bind themselves, and courts, down the road.302
The unpredictability objection is also raised in connection with the
enforcement of premarital agreements generally. Some argue that it is
difficult for intended spouses to make rational decisions about any aspect of
301. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362, 1371 n.9 (Wash. 1997)
(questioning whether premarital custody agreement respecting a child not yet born can ever
be voluntary and knowing); Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 140 (“[T]here is little reason to
privilege the parties’ understanding of what is best for not-yet-living children.”).
302. See, e.g., Guss v. Guss, 472 A.2d 790, 793 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984) (“A child’s best
interests . . . cannot be prospectively determined.”); Knutsen v. Cegalis, 989 A.2d 1010,
1014 (Vt. 2009) (“[C]hanges in custody must be based on real-time determinations of a
child’s best interests . . . .”).
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the dissolution of their marriage, and therefore that even premarital
agreements regarding property should not be enforced. 303 But the
unpredictability objection is given most credence in the context of custody
agreements. A majority of jurisdictions will enforce premarital agreements
as to property. 304 But none will enforce premarital or marital custody
agreements or post-dissolution agreements that attempt to dictate custody
arrangements into the future. 305
In the parentage context, by contrast, the child-oriented unpredictability
objection is largely absent from discussions of parentage agreements. Few
scholars object to parentage agreements on the basis that it will be difficult
for intended parents to know ex ante the types of relationships that they will
have with their unborn children, and thus which of multiple possible
parentage arrangements will be in those children’s interests. The scholarly
consensus here is that children and parents alike will be better off if parents
are permitted to clarify parental status ex ante, instead of waiting until the
child is born and seeing what sort of relationship develops. In other words,
the consensus is that children’s interests are better served by enforcing
parental ex ante intent than by making parental status hinge on an ex post
assessment of parental suitability. 306 Scholars largely agree that children
benefit from stability and certainty in their relationships with their parents,
and that mechanisms such as parentage agreements will therefore protect
children’s interests by reducing the likelihood that a child’s parentage will
be contested and brought into question after the child has been conceived or
born, or after a child has developed a relationship with, or financial
dependency on, an intended parent.307
There is little discussion in the parentage scholarship of the dangers of
enforcing a parental intent that is formed before it can be determined
whether it will be in a particular child’s best interests to be raised by one or
another parent. The literature on assisted reproductive technology favors
looking to ex ante parental consent or intent to determine parental status,
and does not, for the most part, contend that parental status should instead
hinge on an ex post assessment of the parents’ fitness to raise a child.308 As
many have observed, parents are generally permitted to procreate without

303. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 231–38 and accompanying text.
305. See supra Part I.A.
306. See, e.g., Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik Ives, Which Came First the Parent or
the Child?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 330–31 (2010) (contending that ex post determination
of parental status is adverse to children’s interests).
307. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 6, at 1182 (arguing that recognizing ex ante intent to
parent is necessary to protect children’s financial interests); Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has
One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian
Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 353–54 (2002) (arguing that recognition of maternity on
the basis of petition filed prior to or after birth will best protect children’s relationships with
lesbian co-parents).
308. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 6, at 1225 (“[T]he law should provide that an individual
who consents to alternative insemination by a woman with the intent to be a parent of the
resulting child and with the consent of the woman is a parent of the resulting child.”).
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any state assessment of their children’s interests. 309 The scholarly
consensus is that children’s interests are best protected by rules that look to
ex ante intent in determining the parentage of children born through assisted
reproductive technology. 310
To the extent that the parentage literature raises the unpredictability
objection to the enforcement of parentage agreements, this objection is
typically framed in parent-oriented rather than child-oriented terms, and is
made primarily with reference to surrogacy contracts. A number of
scholars argue that a woman cannot rationally consent ex ante to give up a
child after birth, because she cannot predict the emotions that she will
experience during pregnancy and birth. This argument is raised both with
respect to traditional surrogacy and with respect to gestational surrogacy,
and seems to hinge on the relationship that develops between surrogate and
child during the pregnancy. 311 The objection is parent-focused in that there
is relatively little discussion of the possibility that the child will be better
off remaining with the surrogate who developed an emotional tie to the
child; the argument is couched largely in terms of fairness to the mother
who consented to terminate her maternal rights without accurately
predicting how she would feel about doing so once the child was born.
This solicitude for the parent’s ex-post regrets is primarily reserved for
gestational mothers, and rests largely on the characterization of pregnancy
and giving birth as emotional in a way that other experiences are not. Thus,
the unpredictability objection is not typically raised with respect to gamete
donation. While a donor of ova or sperm might perhaps regret her decision
to terminate parental rights to a genetic child, the scholarly literature is
largely in favor of enforcing gamete donation agreements, and there is little
objection to enforcement of such agreements on the ground that a donor
could not accurately predict how he might feel after the child has been
born. 312
Scholarly objection to enforcement of parentage contracts on the basis of
unpredictability is thus largely limited to the special case of gestational
mothers. The majority of parentage scholars, moreover, do not see childcentered unpredictability as a barrier to enforcing parentage agreements.
While the marital contracts literature takes for granted that parents cannot
rationally consent to decisions about future custodial arrangements for their
children (whether unborn or already in existence), the parentage literature
makes the opposite assumption—namely, that parents and would-be parents

309. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 n.10 (Cal. 1993) (rejecting
determination of parentage of child born through gestational surrogacy on the basis of a bestinterests analysis); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (“Parents are not
screened for the procreation of their own children . . . .”) (emphasis omitted); Shultz, supra
note 5, at 341–42 (“Even under conventional legal rules, children do not get a say in who
their parents will be, or for that matter, in whether they will be conceived or born.”).
310. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 6, at 1225 (explaining why the consent equals legal
parentage rule protects children’s interests).
311. See supra notes 288–89 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 298–99 and accompanying text.
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have sufficient rational capacity to make decisions about the parentage of
their children, including children who do not yet exist.
b. The Duress Objection
Another objection against enforcing custody agreements is that parents
may enter into such agreements in situations that exert sufficient pressure
on one of the parties to vitiate her ability to freely consent to the
arrangement. For example, in the scenario often cited to oppose the
enforceability of prenuptial agreements, a bride may be presented with a
premarital contract on the eve of her wedding, and may sign the contract
despite aversion to its terms because she lacks the fortitude to cancel the
wedding at that late date.313 The pressure on the party presented with a
premarital agreement is often exacerbated by the power dynamic between
the parties; the party presenting the prenuptial agreement will often be older
and significantly wealthier than the party asked to sign it. This was what
happened, for instance, in Littlefield, where the bride signed a prenuptial
agreement drafted by the attorney of her much wealthier groom. 314 The
agreement in that case favored the groom in various ways, including in its
provision for fully shared custody between the spouses in the event of
divorce. 315
One response to the duress objection is that, under contract law, a parent
who is coerced into agreeing to a custody provision can argue for voiding
the contract on the basis of duress. Nonetheless, there is concern among
family law scholars that parents (or future parents) may agree to such
contracts under pressure that is insufficient to vitiate enforcement under the
duress standard, but suffices to undermine the parent’s ability to reject the
proffered agreement or to have a say in crafting its terms. Moreover, as
Howard Fink and June Carbone have pointed out in their proposal to
provide for ex ante judicial approval of premarital agreements, any
mechanisms that are proposed to make premarital agreements more likely to
be enforced—even those designed to ensure that such agreements meet a
minimal standard of procedural and substantive fairness—strengthen the
bargaining position of the more powerful party by providing a blueprint for
creating an enforceable bargain. 316
While the duress objection and the concern about unequal bargaining
power are valid, in the context of custody agreements, this objection is most
applicable to precisely those agreements that courts are most likely to
enforce—custody agreements entered into at separation or divorce. Courts
routinely enforce such agreements, even though the pressure on parents is
often greater at dissolution than before a child has been born. Before birth,
the parent-to-be has the leverage of refusing to have a child in the first
instance if custody terms are not acceptable. Once the child has been born
313.
314.
315.
316.

See supra notes 223–28 and accompanying text.
In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1997).
See supra notes 40–50 and accompanying text.
See Fink & Carbone, supra note 232, at 33–35.
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and the parents’ relationship has dissolved, a parent’s desire to retain
custody of a child can exert tremendous pressure on that parent. As some
have contended, this pressure weighs most heavily on the parent who is
more invested in the child—it is precisely this parent who will be most
averse to even the slightest risk of losing a bid for custody. The result is
that the parent who has a stronger desire for custody, and thus typically a
closer bond with the child, will often trade off rights to property division
and spousal support in order to obtain custody, to the detriment of custodial
parent and child alike. 317
Moreover, to the extent that duress is a particular concern in the context
of custody agreements, we can address that concern by better policing for
duress than we currently do, rather than refusing to enforce custody
agreements altogether. While no such mechanism can entirely remove the
possibility that custody agreements will be the product of unequal
bargaining power, this Article, in its proposal in Part IV, presents protective
mechanisms that can help to prevent the enforcement of bargains that are
the product of duress and undue pressure while enabling parents to craft
non-coerced custody agreements that will govern in the event that the
parents’ relationship dissolves. There are a number of situations in which
parents may enter into custody agreements that are the product, not of
duress, but of reasoned decisions about what will be best for their children
if their relationship does not last. Parents are more likely to think
reasonably about their children’s interests at a time when they are still
cooperating with one another, whether this is prior to marriage, prior to the
children’s birth, or at some later point during the children’s lives when the
parents’ relationship is still intact. 318 Where they indeed do enter into such
a custody agreement, and there is no evidence of coercion or undue
pressure, then the duress objection should not prevent enforcement of the
agreement. In fact, given the trend of judicial deference to separation
agreements, enforcing premarital custody agreements is the best way to
protect custody outcomes from being driven by the pressures that apply
when a parental relationship dissolves.
The incoherence of the duress objection to custody contracts comes into
focus when we compare discussions of duress in the parentage literature.
The duress objection to parentage contracts, much like the unpredictability
objection, is focused largely on surrogacy. Parentage scholars who oppose
enforcement of surrogacy agreements often express concern that surrogates
will enter into such agreements under financial pressure. While all
contracts are entered into under conditions of scarcity—an employee
typically agrees to an employment contract, for instance, because she needs
the wages—the concern with surrogacy contracts is that these are
exploitative, in that they may induce a woman to agree to take actions she
317. See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text.
318. See Scott & Scott, supra note 203, at 1323 (“[F]rom the ex ante perspective of the
hypothetical bargain, parents’ interests can generally be assumed to be aligned with those of
their future children, an assumption that probably cannot be made ex post in the context of
the divorce itself.”).
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might greatly regret—put herself at risk of bodily harm, and relinquish
rights to a child—on the basis of financial need.319
In response to concerns about surrogacy agreements entered into under
duress, a number of scholars who support surrogacy have proposed special
mechanisms to insure that only surrogacy contracts entered into with full
volition are enforced. These include limiting the compensation that
surrogates can receive for their services; eliminating compensation for
surrogacy altogether; and providing each surrogate with independent legal
counsel to ensure that her decision to enter into a surrogacy agreement is
voluntary and well-informed. 320 Scholars make such proposals on the
theory that it is possible, and desirable, to facilitate surrogacy agreements
that are voluntary and rational, instead of proscribing all such agreements
on the basis that some of them might be entered into under duress. There is
no reason not to take a similar approach to custody agreements, particularly
those that currently meet the greatest resistance—agreements entered into
before the children are born. While indeed it is possible that some future
parents might enter into custody agreements out of fear of a cancelled
wedding or of losing their mate, it is also possible that future parents might
enter into a prospective custody agreement on a level playing field,
particularly when there are no trade-offs involved between custody and
money.
The duress objection is raised with significantly less frequency against
other forms of parentage contracts, such as gamete donation agreements.
Despite the fact that donors of sperm and ova often sell their gametes for
financial gain, the majority of parentage scholars do not express concern
that these donors faced undue pressure in deciding to relinquish their
parental status.
The scholarly consensus is that gamete donation
agreements should be enforceable, despite the fact that they involve
decisions by genetic parents to relinquish rights to their unborn children in
exchange for payment. 321
To the extent that the parentage scholarship criticizes the exchange of
parental rights for payment in gamete donor agreements, the concern is less
with the potential for duress than with commodification, an objection that is
levied against surrogacy agreements as well. The concern here is that
permitting parental status to be exchanged for money harms children in
both a practical sense and an expressive one by treating them as objects to
be bought and sold, and creating a market in which the desirable genetic
traits of future children are sold to the highest bidder. 322
The commodification objection is levied against custody agreements as
well. 323 Custody agreements rarely explicitly involve the exchange of
319. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 284, at 1909–11.
320. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 286, at 526–27 (making proposals to this effect).
321. See supra notes 298–99 and accompanying text.
322. See Shanley, supra note 298, at 271–73.
323. Courts often employ a rhetoric of commodification to justify their refusal to enforce
custody agreements. See, e.g., McClain v. McClain, 716 P.2d 381, 385 (Alaska 1986) (“A
child is not a chattel to be bargained away for consideration.”).
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custodial rights for money. In some limited situations, a parent will agree
to sever his parental rights in exchange for a waiver of his support
obligations. However, an agreement to terminate parental rights goes
beyond the scope of a custody agreement, and is better characterized as a
parentage agreement. When a custody agreement properly understood (that
is, an agreement that allocates parental rights) is entered into prospectively
between adults who contemplate having children, there is unlikely to be
even an implicit trade-off between custody and property, except insofar as
the prospective parents may wish to make arrangements ensuring support of
their future children. Custody agreements entered into at divorce may, as
we have seen, involve implicit trade-offs of custody for property and
spousal and child support. But these trade-offs are not a necessary part of
any custody arrangement, and thus the custody provisions can—and this
Article argues should—be severed from the rest of the parents’
agreement. 324 We can further protect against such trade-offs by refusing to
enforce custody arrangements that seem to be the product of an exchange of
custody for money. 325 This would prevent the enforcement of any custody
agreement that would amount, in either an expressive sense or a practical
one, to the sale of a child.
The limited discussion of the duress objection in the parentage literature
suggests that the possibility of duress should not pose an insurmountable
objection to enforcement of custody contracts. Strikingly, the duress
objection is rarely raised with respect to the category of parentage
agreement that most resembles a custody agreement: co-parenting
agreements. Where intended parents agree to raise a child together and to
share parental rights and obligations, scholars largely agree that such an
agreement should be enforced.326 Typically, the parties to a co-parenting
agreement include at least one parent who has legally recognized parental
status and another who does not.327 Thus, one parent agrees to extend
parental rights to the other, who in turn agrees to take on parental
obligations. In some cases, the co-parenting agreement includes provisions
governing the custodial arrangement in the event that the parental
relationship dissolves.
There is little discussion in the parentage literature of the likelihood that
a co-parenting agreement will be made under duress. The assumption, to
the contrary, is that parties who agree to a co-parenting arrangement do so
in order to protect their expectations and those of the children they intend to
raise together. While co-parents may then contest such an arrangement
when their relationship dissolves—thus giving rise to the question of
whether the co-parenting agreement is enforceable—it was entered into at a
time when the parents were in accord, such that even parents who contest

324.
325.
326.
327.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See supra notes 266–78 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing relevant cases).
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the enforceability of a co-parenting agreement rarely argue that it was the
product of duress. 328
The significant difference between a co-parenting agreement and a
custody agreement between two parents who already have legal rights to a
child is that the co-parents have a need that the others do not to ensure that
both parents are legally recognized. But co-parenting agreements are often
driven in part by the intended co-parents’ desire to ensure that they will
each retain rights to their children should their relationship dissolve. In this
respect, the power dynamic between two prospective co-parents does not
significantly differ from that between prospective parents who will be
legally recognized even in the absence of any agreement, but have decided
to set forth the custodial arrangement that will govern if their relationship
dissolves. Just as a number of intended co-parents decide to spell out their
custodial plans in the event that they separate, 329 intended parents who have
no reason to doubt their legal rights to their future children may decide to
do the same. There is no reason to think that either of these types of
custody agreements is especially likely to be the product of duress. And
there is good reason to believe that parents who enter into a custody
agreement at a time when they are in harmony are especially likely to do so
freely, driven not by pressure or fear but by a desire to protect both their
own plans as parents and what they imagine to be the best interests of their
future children. 330
c. The Child Welfare Objection
The most commonly voiced, and most powerful, objection to enforcing
child custody agreements is that these may be contrary to the interests of the
child. “Parties cannot by agreement relieve the court of its obligation to
safeguard the best interests of the child. . . . In issues of custody and
visitation the question is always what is in the best interests of the children,
no matter what the parties have agreed to.”331 This is the repeated mantra
of courts that consistently refuse to enforce such agreements, 332 and it is
widely accepted by a number of marital contracts scholars. 333 Since
children cannot be parties to custody agreements, yet are deeply affected by
them, it is argued that courts should retain the discretion to override such
agreements in the name of the children’s interests. 334
Much of the concern about unpredictability and duress is driven by
concern about child welfare. Scholars and courts alike object to enforcing
custody agreements made ex ante in large part because they are concerned
that parents cannot accurately determine their children’s interests in
328. See supra Part I.B.1.
329. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
330. See Scott & Scott, supra note 203, at 1323.
331. P.T. v. M.S., 738 A.2d 385, 396–97 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1999) (quoting
Giangeruso v. Giangeruso, 708 A.2d 1232, 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997)).
332. See supra Part I.A.
333. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text.
334. See supra Part I.A; supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text.

2014]

CONTRACTUALIZING CUSTODY

127

advance. 335 Similarly, reluctance to enforce a custody agreement made
under undue pressure stems in part from the concern that such an agreement
is not the product of a cooperative and reasoned decision about the
children’s interests.
The best-interests-of-the-child objection is raised in the parentage context
as well. 336 But it is given significantly less credence here than in the
custody context. Some courts and commentators that have rejected the
intent-based approach to parental status have suggested that the parentage
of children born through assisted reproductive technology should be
determined instead with reference to a judicial assessment of those
children’s interests. 337 And even some scholars in favor of defining
parentage with reference to intent have expressed support for screening
parents prior to engaging in assisted reproductive technology in order to
protect children’s interests.338 The majority of parentage scholars to have
considered the matter, however, reject the best-interests approach to
determining the parental status of an existing child in situations other than
adoption. 339 With respect to both assisted reproductive technology and coparenting agreements, parentage scholars largely agree that parental status
should be determined with reference to parental intent, perhaps in
combination with parental function, rather than by applying the bestinterests standard, particularly where the intended parents decided ex ante
to bring a child into the world and to raise the child together.
The reluctance of parentage scholars to recommend including a bestinterests assessment as an element of parentage determinations helps to
illustrate the problems of doing so in the context of custody agreements.
Parentage scholars largely reject a system in which the government would
have the power to determine who is fit to raise children.340 As the
parentage literature is well aware, such state supervision of parentage under
335. See supra Part I.A; supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text.
336. See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 254–62 (2006)
(arguing that children’s interests should factor into determinations of legal parenthood, such
that the state should refuse to assign parental status to the biological parents of newborns
who seem especially likely to be unfit parents).
337. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 798 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “the best interests of the child, rather than the intent of the genetic mother, is
the proper standard to apply in the absence of legislation” to determine the parentage of a
child born through gestational surrogacy).
338. Schultz, supra note 5, at 370 (conceding that “screening of prospective surrogates
and parents might be required to protect the interests of children”).
339. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L.J.
1, 54 (1997) (“The child’s best interest should not be relevant at the stage of identifying the
parents; rather, it should be relevant only at the stage of determining custody”); David
Meyer, The Constitutionality of “Best Interests” Parentage, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
857, 875–79 (2006) (enumerating concerns about best-interests approach to parentage);
Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 277 (1975) (arguing against permitting the
state to terminate parental rights under the “indeterminate and discretionary” best-interests
standard).
340. Cf. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 n.10 (majority opinion) (determining parentage on the
basis of children’s best interests “raises the repugnant specter of governmental interference
in matters implicating our most fundamental notions of privacy”).
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the indeterminate best-interests standard could prevent family formation by
intended parents who do not fit the state’s view of what a parent, and a
family, should look like. 341 Imposing a state-directed best-interests
assessment as a predicate of parentage for any intended parent engaging in
co-parenting or assisted reproductive technology could very well limit the
diversity of family forms, or withhold legal recognition from parents of
whom the state does not approve. 342 Where a relationship with a child has
already developed, the possibility that the state will refuse to recognize
parental status on the basis of an assessment of the child’s interests
undermines the security and stability of the parent-child bond.
Similar objections can be raised against the state use of the best-interests
standard to supervise parents’ custodial arrangements. Some scholars, such
as Naomi Cahn, have argued that it is more problematic to make parental
status hinge on a best-interests assessment than to do so with respect to
custody. 343 She proposes that courts determine parentage without any
reference to children’s interests, taking as inclusive an approach to
parentage as possible, and then allocate custody by assessing the children’s
best interests. 344 While this Article agrees about the dangers of determining
parentage with reference to a child’s best interests, it argues that the
application of the best-interests analysis to custodial arrangements is
problematic as well. A court empowered to award, alter, or terminate
custody with reference to the best-interests standard has significant power
to shape, and limit, how and by whom children are raised, and how their
caretakers live their lives. The result, in the custody context as in the
parentage context, is a level of insecurity that is detrimental to children’s
welfare.
Why is it widely accepted that custody agreements must give way to a
judicial assessment of children’s interests, while support for imposing the
same requirement when determining parentage is significantly more
limited? As Marjorie Shultz observes in her discussion of parentage
contracts, “under conventional legal rules, children do not get a say in who
their parents will be.” 345 Thus, she argues, it is not clear why children’s
inability to consent to parentage agreements should prove problematic.346
The same is true with respect to custody. Children do not have a say in who
raises them, and the state generally cannot supervise how and by whom
children are raised unless parents put their children at risk of harm. Why,
then, should a custody agreement be subjected to judicial supervision in the
name of children’s interests?
The reason that we currently permit courts to award custody in
accordance with children’s interests is that there is no other basis for doing
so when two parents with equal legal rights to a child fight for custody. In
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

See Shultz, supra note 5, at 347–52.
See id.
See Cahn, supra note 339, at 48–59.
See id.
See Shultz, supra note 5, at 341.
See id. at 341–42.
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the absence of any preference for one parent over another, courts have long
looked to children’s interests to award custody in the event of parental
dispute.
But when parents have contracted for a child’s custody, there is no need
for a court to engage in the best-interests assessment—the parents have
provided a contractual alternative. There may well be arguments for
considering children’s interests despite the existence of any such
contractual arrangement. These arguments must address, however, why
children’s interests should be permitted to override a custody agreement but
not other barriers to judicial intervention, such as a parentage contract or the
protection provided to parents through the intact family status that derives
from some combination of marital status and biological relatedness. If the
child welfare concern suffices to override parental intent in the form of a
custody agreement, why should it not override parental decisions about
children in other contexts as well?
This Article argues that the discrepancy between the parentage literature
and the marital contracts literature on this point underscores the incoherence
of insisting that custody contracts alone must give way to judicial
determinations of children’s interests. The Article does not argue—as some
other scholars have 347—that we should enforce custody agreements in the
name of protecting parents’ constitutional rights to raise their children as
they see fit. It does not frame the issue as pitting parents’ rights against
children’s interests. It argues, rather, that it is in the interests of children
themselves for custody contracts to be enforced. As this Article now
discusses, custody contracts—much like parentage contracts—would enable
parents to provide their families with a level of stability, security, and
freedom from the threat of government intervention that would serve the
welfare of children and parents alike.
III. WHY CUSTODY CONTRACTS SHOULD BE ENFORCED
This part will use the perspective of parentage contracts to demonstrate
that the benefits of enforcing custody contracts outweigh the concerns
discussed in Part II. It argues that the primary benefit of custody contracts
is their potential—in conjunction with parentage contracts more broadly—
to provide all families with intact status, and thus put an end to our current
two-tier system of family law.
Part III.A demonstrates that we currently have two different systems of
custody and parentage law: one for traditional families that are deemed
“intact,” and another for families that are deemed non-intact. While intact
families are given considerable autonomy and protection from state
intervention, non-intact families are subject to a level of intervention and
insecurity that is harmful for parents and children alike. In an age when
marriage can no longer suffice to keep families “intact,” custody contracts
347. See Jellum, supra note 242, at 644–54 (making a constitutional argument for
enforcing parental custody agreements); Spitko, supra note 109, at 1189–97 (making a
constitutional argument for enforcing parental agreements to arbitrate custody).
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offer a mechanism for ensuring families the stability and certainty that
marriage no longer guarantees.
Part III.B then discusses other advantages to enforcing custody
agreements. Part III.B draws on the parentage literature to demonstrate that
enforcement of custody contracts can help to promote gender neutrality and
diversity of family forms. Enforcement of custody contracts will also
promote respect for parental autonomy, although such autonomy should be
seen as secondary to children’s welfare.
A. The Best-Interests Standard
and Our Two-Tier Approach to Family Law
1. The Best-Interests Standard and the Bias Against Non-Intact Families
When a relationship between two legal parents disintegrates, in the
absence of any enforceable contract that will govern care and upbringing of
the children, a court will determine custody with reference to the children’s
best interests. 348 The family law literature, in the areas of both custody and
parentage, has widely rehearsed the problems with the best-interests-of-thechild standard. The best-interests standard is at once deeply subjective and
open-ended, with the result that it affords judges an enormous amount of
discretion. 349 Compounding the problem is the difficulty of determining, in
many instances, which of myriad possible custodial arrangements between
equally fit parents will best serve a child’s interests. This inquiry tends to
be future-oriented, in that courts will try to assess which custodial
allocation will produce the best adult outcome for a developing child.350
Courts are often uncomfortable engaging in such an analysis, which some
have compared to gazing into a crystal ball. 351 But when the best-interests
standard applies, courts are obliged to engage in this analysis, and, in so
doing, will often weigh every possible detail of the parents’ and children’s
lives in an effort to accurately respond to a question that does not admit of
any clear answer.
The difficulty of determining children’s best interests, along with the
judicial discretion that the standard affords, render judicial decisions about
child custody wildly unpredictable. Scholars have long critiqued the
348. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of Children’s
Rights: The Search for a Just and Workable Standard, 33 FAM. L.Q. 815, 815–16 (1999).
349. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 339, at 59 (“[T]he best interest standard . . . is
indeterminate and biased in administration.”); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the
Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987) (“[T]he [best interest] principle is
indeterminate, unjust, self-defeating, and liable to be overridden by more general policy
considerations.”); Mnookin, supra note 339, at 203 (“Because what is in the best interests of
a particular child is indeterminate, there is good reason to be offended by the breadth of
power exercised by a trial court judge in the resolution of custody disputes.”).
350. See Sarah Abramowicz, Beyond Family Law, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 293, 312
(2012) (“The best-interests analysis of child custody law is focused . . . on the connection
between childhood experience and the adult self.”).
351. See, e.g., In re C.B., 618 N.E.2d 598, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“[D]eciding what is
in a child’s best interest is difficult, if not impossible to predict without a crystal ball or the
gift of foresight.”).
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unpredictability that the best-interests standard creates; 352 the result of this
unpredictability, as Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser have argued, is
that a parent strongly invested in maintaining custody of a child may be so
adverse to even a small risk of losing custody that, rather than permit a
court to determine a child’s best interests, she will trade off rights to
property and support in exchange for custody. 353 Mnookin considers the
possibility that the best-interests standard is so flawed, and its effect on
bargaining incentives so problematic, that we might be better off if judges
flipped coins to determine custody arrangements. 354
Moreover, as June Carbone has noted, child custody decisions at divorce
have now become “ground zero in the gender wars.” 355 In the era of nofault divorce, custody decisions are often the only opportunity courts have
to pass judgment on parents’ behavior and morality. 356 As a result,
wronged spouses may channel their anger into contesting a child’s custody
and use that opportunity to obtain vindication and revenge. And courts may
use custody decisions as an opportunity to scrutinize and condemn
culturally contested behavior that is often out of the judiciary’s reach, such
as non-marital cohabitation or same-sex intimacy. 357
Families that are subject to the unpredictable and open-ended bestinterests-of-the-child standard thus face a perpetual threat of litigation that
carries the possibility of extensive state intervention in their intimate lives.
Courts applying the best-interests standard will often infringe upon parents’
autonomy, and their constitutional rights, to an extent unimaginable in any
other area of law. Judges can, and do, award custody, or change an existing
custody arrangement, on the basis of parents’ religious practices, speech
acts, lifestyle, and musical preferences.358 They can also order parents to
engage in or refrain from engaging in certain activities as a condition of
custody. 359 Courts awarding custody have prohibited parents from having
352. See generally Mnookin, supra note 339 (contending that the difficulty of predicting
how one or another custodial arrangement will affect children, the lack of consensus on the
values that should govern custody decision-making, and the paucity of binding precedent
that might constrain judicial decision-making regarding custody combine to create an
indeterminate standard that makes the outcome of litigation difficult to predict).
353. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 242, at 979.
354. See Mnookin, supra note 339, at 290–91 (considering coin toss approach to
determining custodial rights, on the ground that the best-interests standard “may yield
something close to a random pattern of outcomes,” and that the coin toss approach is less
costly and helps to avoid the pain associated with litigating custody, but noting that the coin
toss approach seems unacceptable because it undermines the symbolic and participatory
values of adjudication); see also Elster, supra note 349, at 42–43 (considering coin toss as a
possible method for determining custodial rights and noting that while such an approach
would weaken the bargaining power of the more invested parent, it would benefit children
by reducing protracted litigation).
355. See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS 193 (2000).
356. See id.
357. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Judging Families, 77 UMKC L. REV. 267, 288–
98 (2008) (discussing judicial consideration of non-marital cohabitation in custody decisionmaking and noting potential for polarization on this issue along partisan lines).
358. See Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 633–43 (2006).
359. See id.
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romantic partners stay overnight,360 banned parents from discussing their
religious views with their children, 361 and required parents to take children
to church, 362 among other prohibitions and requirements.
For such families, the threat of intervention posed by the best-interests
standard is ongoing, and lasts until a child reaches the age of majority. A
number of jurisdictions have formulated rules that limit judicial authority to
modify custody without good cause. Nonetheless, under a typical
modification standard, as long as one parent can show a significant change
of circumstances affecting a child’s interests, the court is empowered to
conduct a full-fledged best-interests-of-the-child analysis and to change
custody accordingly. 363 As a number of courts have noted, circumstances
often change as children develop and as parents move on with their lives,
making changes to their careers, education, and personal relationships.364
A parent subject to a custody order thus can never rest assured that her
parenting decisions will not be held to the microscope, and brought into
question, at some future point. The best-interests-of-the-child standard thus
destabilizes families subject to its rule and undermines both parents’ and
children’s sense of security.
While many scholars have criticized the best-interests standard, few have
observed the extent to which it creates a two-tier system of family law.365
(As a number of scholars have noted, we also have a two-tier system of
family law based on economic privilege; 366 this Article agrees with that
assessment, while seeking to illustrate another, often overlapping dimension
in which we treat certain families differently from others.) Families that are
deemed intact—such as traditional families headed by married parents and
their biological children—are given significant freedom from state
intervention. The parents within such families are permitted to raise their
children as they see fit, and do not face state-imposed penalties for their
parenting decisions unless they put their children at risk of serious harm.
The children, for their part, are provided the security that comes from being
360. See, e.g., Muller v. Muller, No. 259271, 2005 WL 2810399 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 27,
2005).
361. See Volokh, supra note 358, at 636–37 n.20 (collecting cases).
362. See, e.g., Johns v. Johns, 918 S.W.2d 728, 731 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996).
363. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.b.
364. See, e.g., Knutsen v. Cegalis, 989 A.2d 1010, 1014 (Vt. 2009) (“Mother and father
could choose to relocate, change careers, enter into romantic relationships, or even have
more children. All of these changes would properly contribute to a best interests
calculus . . . .”).
365. But see Volokh, supra note 358, at 673–711 (demonstrating that families subject to
custody orders are subjected to greater levels of state intrusion into freedom of speech and of
religion than are intact families).
366. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A History of the Bifurcated Law
of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299 (2002) (demonstrating that parents who receive aid
from programs that are associated with dependency, such as AFDC and TANF, are subjected
to a much greater level of state intervention than are families who receive other forms of
state aid, such as Social Security benefits); Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public
Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113 (2011); Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System
of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 257–58
(1964).
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raised by parents who are not at perpetual risk of losing their right to
custody of their children. Subjecting intact families to the level of state
intervention to which we routinely subject non-intact families would be
unthinkable.
Many family law scholars who address child custody—even those who
criticize the best-interests standard—tacitly approve of this two-tier system.
For example, Katharine Bartlett, in one of the early pieces advocating rights
for third parties who form relationships with children, limits her proposal to
families that have been “interrupted” in some way. 367 (A similar distinction
is currently built into a number of current third-party visitation statutes that
accord more deference to parents in an “intact” family than to single or
divorced parents. 368) Bartlett writes that
The decline of the nuclear family may mean that the fabric of social
relationships is torn, but the patch must fit the tear. Statutes allowing . . .
visitation over the objections of parents of intact families are too great an
intrusion on parents who have managed to raise their children in
traditional nuclear families. 369

The language here indicates an approval of traditional nuclear families that
have “managed” to remain intact—and an assessment of other families as
“torn” or “broken”—that justifies greater incursions into parental autonomy
where families are not intact. The implication is that if parents can simply
work harder at staying married, they can protect themselves from the
intrusions to which less successful families are subject.
Framing parents as deserving of punishment—or of lesser protection—
because they have failed to keep their families intact suggests that these
“torn” and “broken” families are less deserving of dignity and protection
than “intact” families. This, in turn, harms the welfare of the children in
such families, for reasons both practical and expressive. Children raised
within these “torn” families are subjected to a level of insecurity and
parental anxiety that is unlikely to be beneficial. In cases where the absence
of an enforceable agreement results in protracted and repeated litigation,
increased hostility and conflict between a child’s parents may impede the
child’s course of development. On an expressive level, children within
such families are denied the dignity in their relationships with their parents
that is afforded to children within intact families.
The number of families that are intact, in the form of two married parents
and their biological or adopted offspring, is rapidly dwindling. This is in
367. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need
for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879, 946 (1984).
368. See, e.g., OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 43, § 109.4(A)(1)(c) (West 2001 & Supp. 2014)
(limiting orders for grandparent visitation against the wishes of one or both parents to
situations in which “the intact nuclear family has been disrupted” by the divorce, separation,
death, or incarceration of the child’s parent or parents); id. § 109.4(B) (“Under no
circumstances shall any judge grant the right of visitation to any grandparent if the child is a
member of an intact nuclear family and both parents of the child object to the granting of
visitation.”).
369. Bartlett, supra note 367, at 958 (footnote omitted).
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part the result of the decline in marriage, the rise of single or unmarried
parenthood, and the prevalence of divorce.370 But strengthening marriage
and making it available to all can no longer suffice to render families
intact—marriage no longer provides an adequate remedy to the problem of
non-intact family status. For today it is increasingly the case that even if
two parents “manage,” as Bartlett puts it, to marry and to remain married,
their family may never enjoy the intact status that will grant them protection
from court interference.
Whenever a family engages in assisted
reproductive technology, or decides to share some aspect of childrearing
among more than two parents—and whenever one or more adults decide to
raise children outside of marriage—the family will face a risk of being
deemed non-intact, and subjected to court intervention accordingly.
2. A Historical Example of the Dangers of Judicial Discretion
In order for custody agreements to adequately address the problem of
non-intact status, it is necessary that they be given significantly greater
deference than they currently are. To illustrate the need for greater
deference to custody agreements, this section examines the historical
example of the custody dispute between activist Annie Besant and her
separated husband, which arose from one of the first Anglo-American
statutes that purported to permit separating parents to bind themselves
through custody agreements. In re Besant 371 demonstrates that as long as
courts can override parents’ custody contracts in the name of children’s
interests, such contracts will do little to provide non-intact families with the
stability, certainty, and freedom from state intervention that intact families
enjoy.
In 1873, the British Parliament enacted legislation that for the first time
explicitly permitted courts to enforce custody provisions in deeds of
separation. 372 Until then, the prevailing Anglo-American rule had been that
courts would not enforce a contract transferring or otherwise limiting
parental rights, on the ground that parents did not have the power to transfer
rights that they held only for their children’s benefit. 373 Courts were
especially adamant about refusing to enforce agreements where a father
agreed to give custodial rights to the mother. 374 Despite the rule that
370. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Disintegration of Families and Children’s Right to Their
Parents, 10 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 10–16 (2011) (discussing decline in marriage rate,
increase in divorce rate, and rise in single and unmarried parenthood).
371. (1879) 11 Ch. 508 (Eng.).
372. See Custody of Infants Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 12 (Eng.).
373. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 1 Barb. Ch. 639, 642 (N.Y. Ch. 1846) (refusing to enforce
custody provision of separation deed); People ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399, 411 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1842) (same); Talbot v. Shrewsbury, (1840) 41 Eng. Rep. 259, 263–65 (Ch.)
(same); see also Andrews v. Salt, (1873) 8 Ch.App. 622, 636 (Eng.) (“We think that a father
cannot bind himself conclusively by contract to exercise, in all events, in a particular way,
rights which the law gives him for the benefit of his children, and not for his own.”).
374. See, e.g., Cook, 1 Barb. Ch. at 641 (refusing to enforce separation agreement giving
mother custodial rights); Mercein, 3 Hill at 419 (discussing social perils that would follow
from permitting father to allocate custodial rights to mother, including increased acceptance
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custody contracts were not enforceable, parents employed them nonetheless
throughout the nineteenth century, both in England and in the United
States. 375 When custody arrangements broke down, parents repeatedly
went to court to enforce the custody agreements that had sanctioned these
arrangements, only to be told that such agreements could not be
enforced. 376
It was against this backdrop of the turn toward private ordering on the
part of parents, and the judicial refusal to enforce such agreements, that
Parliament enacted the 1873 Custody of Infants Act, 377 which permitted
courts to enforce custody provisions in separation deeds. The statute
explicitly instructed courts that transfers from fathers to mothers should be
enforceable: “No agreement contained in any separation deed made
between the father and mother of an infant or infants shall be held to be
invalid by reason only of its providing that the father of such infant or
infants shall give up the custody or control thereof to the mother.”378
The statute included the caveat, however, that “no Court shall enforce
any such agreement if the Court shall be of opinion that it will not be for the
benefit of the infant or infants to give effect thereto.” 379 In this regard, the
1873 Custody Act is similar to many current American statutes regarding
the enforceability of custody agreements. 380 As in most jurisdictions today,
this best-interests exception renders custody agreements largely
superfluous, in that courts are free to ignore them and to instead impose a
custody arrangement in accordance with their own assessment of a child’s
best interests.
The Besant case, the first major case to apply the 1873 Custody of
Infants Act, was decided in 1879 and involved a custody dispute between
Annie Besant and the husband from whom she had separated five years
earlier, the Reverend Frank Besant.381 Annie separated from her husband
when she first began to realize the extent of her atheist beliefs and decided
that she could no longer accept the sacraments of the Church of England.
Annie’s husband, who was a vicar in the Church of England, told her that
he would not accept her into his home unless she would attend communion
of separation between married spouses); Talbot, 41 Eng. Rep. at 259 (refusing to enforce
separation deed giving mother custody of daughter until age ten).
375. See supra notes 373–74.
376. See supra notes 373–74; see also Abramowicz, supra note 28, at 58–62 (describing
the refusal by nineteenth-century English courts to enforce contractual transfers of parental
rights).
377. Custody of Infants Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 12 (Eng.).
378. Id. § 2.
379. Id.
380. See discussion supra Part I.A.
381. See In re Besant, (1879) 11 Ch. 508 (Eng.). For a reading of the Besant case as
indicative of a return to greater deference to paternal rights in England of the 1870s and
1880s, as well as of a tendency to limit custody awards to mothers deemed deserving, see
Danaya C. Wright, The Crisis of Child Custody: A History of the Birth of Family Law in
England, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 175, 257 (2002) (“If fathers were going to lose their
paternal rights in favor of mothers, the courts were going to ensure that only those
‘deserving’ mothers . . . those who fully adopted traditional norms and values, would be
allowed to keep custody.”).

136

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

at his church. She refused, and they separated.382 Taking advantage of the
newly enacted 1873 law rendering custody agreements enforceable, the
lawyers for Annie and her husband drew up a legal separation deed
providing that Annie would have custody of their three-year-old daughter,
Mabel, for eleven months of the year, and that her husband would have
equivalent custody of their young son, with each parent given one month’s
visitation per year with the noncustodial child.383
The custody arrangement set out in the separation deed lasted five years.
Frank expressed unhappiness with Annie’s activities during this time, trying
to stop her from publishing atheist and feminist tracts using his last name.
But he abided by their custody agreement, until, in 1877, Annie published a
pamphlet on birth control, for which she was arrested and indicted on
charges of obscenity. In response, Frank went to court to regain custody of
their daughter, who had been raised by her mother from the age of three and
was at the time almost eight years old.384
As the father’s counsel correctly pointed out in the ensuing litigation,
under the 1873 Custody Act newly permitting the enforcement of custody
provisions in separation deeds, the court was free to ignore the deed entirely
in the name of the child’s interests. In arguing that it was in his daughter’s
best interests to be transferred to his custody, the father argued that
there cannot be a doubt that the future welfare of this child will be
prejudiced by her being brought up in association with persons who hold
the opinions which her mother professes and advocates—opinions which
are looked upon by most people as wrong, and by her own sex as
perfectly shocking. 385

The court agreed with this assessment, and ordered the girl removed from
her mother’s custody and transferred to that of her father.386
What is striking about the Besant court’s justification for rejecting the
parents’ custody agreement is that the opinion carefully disavows
ideological bias even while basing its custody determination on just such a
bias, a double-move often seen in custody decisions today. The court
repeatedly insists that it has no position on Annie’s atheism, yet clearly
condemns her and removes her daughter from her care for this very reason:
Not only does Mrs. Besant entertain those opinions which are reprobrated
by the great mass of mankind (whether rightly or wrongly, I have no
business to say, though of course I think rightly), but she carries those
speculative opinions into practice as regards the education of the child. 387

Here the court insists that it is neutral as to Annie’s religious views despite,
in the same breath, condemning her for teaching those views to her child.

382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

See ANNIE BESANT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 101–29 (1893).
See id. at 205–44.
See id.
Besant, 11 Ch. at 517.
See id. at 508.
Id. at 513.
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The court makes a similar double-move when it casts Annie’s atheism as a
violation of gender norms that will cause her to be socially stigmatized:
She has endeavored to convince others, by her lectures and by her
pamphlets, that the denial of all religion is a right and proper thing to
recommend to mankind at large. It is not necessary for me to express any
opinion as to the religious convictions of others, or even as to their nonreligious convictions; but I must, as a man of the world, consider what
effect on a woman’s position this course of conduct must lead to[; it must]
cut her off, practically, not merely from the sympathy of, but from social
intercourse with, the great majority of her sex. 388

The court here once again condemns Annie for her atheism, and removes
her child from her custody because of it, even while insisting that it is
neutral as to her “non-religious convictions.” 389
The kind of disavowal we see here—where a court insists on its
neutrality about religious and political views, even while basing its custody
decision on those very views, on the ground that they will alienate a child
from her community—persists today in myriad custody decisions that take
religion, education, ideology, and morality into account in awarding child
custody. Indeed, the application of the best-interests standard today is just
as prone to judicial bias in favor of majority views—along with disavowal
of that bias—as it was in England of 1879.
The tendency of courts to disavow their reasons for awarding custody
makes it difficult for parents to confront, or to protect against, the role of
ideological bias in determining custody. A recent custody decision from
Michigan, Ulvund v. Ulvund, 390 provides an instructive modern example of
such disavowal, and of its potential to disrupt parent-child ties despite a
parent’s efforts to conform to judicial norms. 391 After the couple in Ulvund
divorced, sharing joint physical custody of their youngest child, the mother
entered into a lesbian relationship. At issue was the trial court’s decision to
modify custody by awarding primary physical custody to the father after
five years during which the child had spent the majority of time living with
his mother. In making its determination that such a modification of custody
was in the child’s best interests, the trial court took the mother’s sexual
orientation into account even while claiming that it was doing nothing of
the sort. The appellate court affirmed the trial court decision, finding that
the trial court did not hold the mother’s sexual orientation against her. It
reached this conclusion even though, in assessing the list of statutory bestinterests factors, the trial court repeatedly found the mother’s sexual
orientation relevant to its evaluation. When the court assessed each parent’s
ability to continue the child’s religious upbringing, for instance, it
acknowledged that both father and mother were religious, and that both
attended church and would take the child to church. 392 But it found in
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

Id.
Id.
No. 224566, 2000 WL 33407372 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2000).
See generally id.
See id. at *3.
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favor of the father on the religion factor, because “although plaintiff attends
church, she will eventually have to deal with the conflict between church
doctrine and her choice of a homosexual lifestyle.” 393 Then again, when
considering the “catch-all” factor that is included in most custody statutes,
the trial court found against the mother not, it insisted, because of her
sexual orientation, but because she and her partner had decided not to
express physical affection for each other in the child’s presence, while the
father testified that he and his new wife did “express affection for each
other in their home.” 394 The court decided that it was better for the children
to witness physical affection, and thus that this factor also weighed in favor
of the father. 395
The court’s disavowal of evident ideological bias in Ulvund—one of
many similar decisions that go largely unnoticed—is similar to that of the
court in the Besant case. Just as Annie Besant lost custody of her daughter
on the basis of her atheism despite the court’s insistence that it could not
express an opinion on a parent’s religious preference, the Michigan mother
lost custody on the basis, in large part, of her sexual orientation, even as the
court insisted that it was neutral on the matter. The Ulvund case illustrates
the chilling effect that this type of unacknowledged judicial bias can have
on parenting. Reading between the lines, it seems that the mother in
Ulvund might have attempted to shape her conduct in a manner that would
meet the court’s approval. Some courts have found physical affection
between two women or two men to count against them in a custody
determination. 396 Perhaps, then, the mother in Ulvund refrained from being
affectionate with her partner in front of the child because she feared losing
custody. The court then turned this protective behavior against the mother
and made it a basis for awarding custody to the father.
Where courts assess best interests for purposes of awarding custody, they
take into account not only each parent’s ties to the child, but a host of other
factors, many of which judge each parent from the perspective of a
culturally contingent understanding of what is best for children.397 Courts
awarding custody thus routinely intervene in parents’ behavior to an extent
that would never be tolerated in an intact family. As the Besant and Ulvund
393. Id.
394. Id. at *4.
395. See id.
396. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (citing evidence
that mother and female partner exhibited physical affection in front of child in support of
decision to transfer custody from mother to father); Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-11, 1988
WL 30173, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (same); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d
102, 108 (Va. 1995) (citing evidence that mother and female partner exhibited physical
affection in front of child in support of decision to transfer custody from mother to
grandmother).
397. For example, a number of jurisdictions instruct courts to consider each parent’s
ability to further a child’s religious upbringing when determining the child’s interests. And
many jurisdictions also provide that courts assessing children’s interests should take into
account each parent’s “moral fitness,” a category that explicitly invites award of custody to
the parent who better conforms to prevailing norms. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.13(d)(3)(f) (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(f) (West 2011).
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cases illustrate, the result is not only to deny custody to parents who fail to
conform to community norms, but also to create a chilling effect on the
behavior of any parent—even one in an intact family—who has any fear of
one day coming before a custody court.
Custody contracts have the potential to protect families such as the
mother and child in Ulvund, or Annie Besant and her daughter in
nineteenth-century England, from the destabilizing effect of living in an
arrangement that the state no longer deems intact. As the Besant case
illustrates, contract can only provide this protective effect if it is given
adequate deference. As long as courts awarding custody can override
parents’ agreements in the name of children’s interests, parents on the
wrong side of a state’s normative views may find it impossible to provide
their children with the stability, certainty, and freedom from state oversight
that are granted to traditional marital families as long as they remain intact.
B. Advantages of Enforcing Custody Agreements
Enforcing custody agreements would provide a number of advantages.
Most significantly, enforcement of custody agreements would help to
protect non-intact families. Enforcement of custody agreements would also
provide related benefits, including promoting gender neutrality, fostering a
diversity of family forms, and conveying respect for parental autonomy.
1. Enforcing Custody Agreements Would Protect
Against the Two-Tier System That Disadvantages Non-Intact Families
This Article advocates enabling all parents to employ contract to afford
their families the protections afforded to intact families. Where a family
has availed itself of contract to create an approximation of intact status even
when the parents’ relationship dissolves, we should treat such families in
the same way that we do traditional, intact families. Doing so would
dismantle the two-tier system of family law and provide the children of
nontraditional families with the same protections afforded to the children of
traditional families.
Enforcing custody contracts would enable intended or existing parents to
create an alternative to the perpetual threat of state intervention in the name
of children’s interests should their relationship dissolve. The need for
enforceable custody contracts extends beyond traditional families
contemplating divorce. It extends, for instance, to the single woman who
raises her child with the help of a known sperm donor who has agreed to
limit his parental status to visitation; to the male couple that employs both a
gestational surrogate and an egg donor who has agreed to play a role in the
child’s life; and to any couple that agrees to jointly raise the legal child of
one partner.
Marriage cannot suffice to provide the intact status that families need.
The solution is to permit contract law to work alongside marriage to render
families intact. In some instances, custody contracts would serve as a gapfilling mechanism at a moment when the law is in transition, as is currently
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the case with the law of same-sex marriage and assisted reproductive
technology. But it is likely that there will always be a need for custody
contracts to help render families intact. Intended parents may wish to use
such contracts to maintain contact between a child and a biological donor;
others may wish to protect ties between a child and a stepparent. And
custody contracts will always be useful to those intended parents who
decide not to marry, or who marry but—like all couples—face the
possibility of one day ending their marriage with divorce. In all of these
situations, custody contracts could provide a powerful mechanism for
keeping the state out of the business of determining how and by whom
children are raised, or—if we believe that the state should play such a
role—for enabling all parents to avail their families of the same level of
protection and security that we afford to traditional intact families.
Some scholars oppose the enforcement of parental agreements on the
basis that such an approach privileges parental rights over children’s
interests. 398 The aversion to parenting contracts is linked to an aversion to
treating children like “chattel,”399 mere property to be transferred at the will
of parent-owners. Enforcement of custody contracts, however, like that of
parentage contracts, does not necessarily prioritize parents’ rights over
children’s needs. 400 With proper protections in place, such enforcement
can instead be seen as promoting child welfare, by providing the children of
non-intact families with the same dignity, relationship stability, and
freedom from uncertainty that is enjoyed by the children of intact families.
From the perspective of children’s interests in a stable and predictable
environment, enforcement of custody agreements no more privileges
parents over children than does recognition of marital status in determining
parental status.
2. Other Advantages of Enforcement
Enforcing custody contracts would also provide additional benefits, many
of which resemble those that parentage scholars have argued would
accompany the enforcement of parentage contracts.
398. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1820 (1993) (arguing that the
intent-based approach to parentage “suggests that power over children ought to be defined
by adults’ bargained for exchanges,” and advocating an approach to parentage grounded
instead in caregiving and stewardship as considered from the perspective of the child’s
experience and needs).
399. See, e.g., Rubano v. Dicenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 988 (R.I. 2000) (Bourcier, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that “a child is more than a mere chattel
whose fate may be decided by a contract between two consenting adults” to explain
disagreement with majority decision permitting award of parental rights on the basis of a
visitation agreement between same-sex co-parents).
400. For a critique of the scholarly and judicial tendency to either balance parents’
interests against those of children in the arena of child custody decision making or to
privilege the interests of parents, and an argument that child welfare should be the only
consideration here, see James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination and Children’s
Custody: A New Analytical Framework for State Structuring of Children’s Family Life, 54
ARIZ. L. REV. 79 (2012).
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Marjorie Shultz has argued that a contract-based approach to parentage
would promote gender neutrality in family law by enabling intended parents
to create families that diverge from the traditional two-parent model in
which the mother has the primary nurturing role. As she notes,
determinations of parentage often hinge on social norms about the relative
nurturing potential of women and men, and on the notion that women are
best equipped to raise children. A contract-based approach to parentage,
she contends, would permit parental status to be determined free from
potential bias about gender and parentage. 401
A contract-based approach to custody would similarly promote gender
neutrality in family law. Critics have long accused custody law of
promoting gender stereotypes and basing custody decisions on such
stereotypes. Some argue that custody law favors women as caretakers, to
the detriment of children’s bonds with their fathers, on the basis of the
stereotypical assumption that children should be raised by their mothers.402
Others contend that gender stereotypes work to deny custody to women
who fail to conform to those stereotypes. 403 The arguments that Shultz
makes in favor of enforcing parentage contracts apply to custody contracts
as well. Determining custody with reference to parents’ own ex ante
agreements would help to promote a gender-neutral approach to
determining parental rights and obligations. While parents may well make
traditionally gendered decisions about who should have custody of a child,
they would also be free to make decisions that do not conform to current
gender norms.
Proponents of parentage contracts also claim that these would promote a
diversity of family forms, while at the same time ensuring that children’s
relationships with their parents are protected regardless of whether their
parents conform to traditional norms. 404 The same is true of custody
contracts, which would free parents to create family forms that diverge from
the norm without risking a loss in custody. A custody contract could
protect against the possibility that custody would be determined, or
subsequently modified, on the basis of judicial preferences about family
forms, such as a preference for a married couple over a single parent, for a
married couple over an unmarried couple, or for opposite-sex rather than
same-sex parents.
Finally, just as enforcing parentage contracts expresses respect for the
autonomy of the contracting parties, the same is true of enforcing custody
contracts. Although it may be argued, as it has been in the context of
surrogacy agreements, 405 that vulnerable women may be pressured into
custody agreements that they will later regret, such an argument can be
401. See Shultz, supra note 5, at 397–98.
402. See, e.g., Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender and Justice: Florida and the Nation, 42
FLA. L. REV. 181, 191 (1990) (describing “widespread bias against fathers on the part of
some judges who do not perceive men as being capable or appropriate primary caretakers”).
403. See, e.g., Melissa L. Breger, The (In)visibility of Motherhood in Family Court
Proceedings, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 555, 565–87 (2012).
404. See supra notes 267–78 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 288–89 and accompanying text.
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refuted on similar grounds. As a number of scholars have observed, it is
paternalistic to assume that surrogacy agreements are necessarily either
coerced or insufficiently rational.406 It is similarly paternalistic to assume
that actual or intended mothers cannot make rational decisions about their
parental rights in the context of custody agreements.
The charge of paternalism should not cause us to refrain from protecting
vulnerable contracting parties, particularly where children’s interests are at
stake. The problems of duress and irrationality in custody contracting,
however, can be handled in much the same way as in premarital agreements
about property. Currently, such agreements are largely enforceable, and
roughly half of the states provide protections against both procedural and
substantive unfairness. 407 Concerns about custody contracts that are
obtained under coercive circumstances can be alleviated by developing
mechanisms to protect against duress or excessive pressure in custody
contracting. Several proposed mechanisms are discussed in Part IV. Such
an approach would help to ensure that custody agreements truly reflect the
parents’ assessment of their children’s interests, while facilitating
enforcement of such agreements where this requirement is met.
IV. CONTRACTING FOR CUSTODY: A PROPOSAL
Custody contracts have the potential to render our system of family law
more egalitarian. Currently, we have a two-tier system under which intact
families are given greater privileges and protections than non-intact
families. Intact families are granted significant deference in how children
are raised, which in turn provides the parent-child relationship with stability
and certainty. Non-intact families, by contrast, are subject to a perpetual
threat of state intervention in the name of children’s interests. The result is
to further destabilize precisely those child-parent relationships that are most
in need of protection.
Contracting for custody would enable parents to ensure that, even if their
relationship with one another dissolves, they will enjoy the same stability
and freedom from state intervention granted to traditional intact families.
All parents would benefit, ranging from those who contemplate marrying
and raising the couple’s own biological or adopted children to those who
intend to raise children in a family that does not fit this traditional model.
At a time when many marriages end in divorce, and many parents employ
assisted reproductive technology in order to create their families, marriage
is no longer a viable solution to rendering a family permanently intact.
Contract can fill the gap, providing structure and certainty where marriage
cannot.
This part concludes by presenting a model for facilitating the
enforcement of custody agreements while addressing concerns that have
been raised about enforcement, including the concern that custody
agreements may not be fully informed or voluntary and concerns about the
406. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text.
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need to protect children’s welfare, particularly where parents have failed
accurately to predict developments that have made an agreed-upon
arrangement adverse to a child’s welfare.
Part IV.A takes up the preliminary question of whether enforceability
should hinge on the time at which a custody agreement was formed. It
concludes that custody contracts should be given deference not only when
agreed to by separating parents, but also when parents are no longer in
agreement about custody. Part IV.B then discusses the ALI approach to
premarital agreements as a model for enforcing custody agreements. Part
IV.C builds on this model to present a proposal for enforcing custody
agreements subject to both procedural and substantive review.
A. Relevance of Time of Contract Formation
One issue that arises in the marital context is whether custody agreements
should be given more deference when they are agreed to at the point when
the parents’ relationship comes to an end. The current trend in custody
jurisprudence is to give greater deference to custody provisions in
separation agreements than to custody agreements made prior to or during
marriage. While, in most jurisdictions, all custody agreements can be
rejected by a court in the name of children’s interests, agreements arrived at
post-dissolution are much more likely to be enforced. This is so either
because post-dissolution custody agreements are given greater deference as
a formal matter, or because, in practice, courts are most likely to approve of
custody arrangements made at divorce or separation and to reject out of
hand any agreement made before a child was born or before the parents’
relationship dissolved. 408
While this Article suggests enforcing all custody contracts, it questions
the prevailing view that those arrived at post-dissolution should be given
the greatest deference. The rationale for such deference is that parents who
are divorcing are better able than intended parents to determine an
arrangement that is in their children’s interests. How, ask courts and
scholars, could an intended parent possibly know what is best for a child
who has yet to be born? 409 One response is that, if an agreed-to custody
arrangement is not in a child’s interests, the parents can, at the point when it
comes into play, renegotiate the original agreement. Another is that we can
develop sufficient protective mechanisms to protect children from being
harmed by enforcement of ex ante custody agreements without rendering
such agreements altogether unenforceable.
The potential utility of custody contracts would be greatest when they are
employed by parents or intended parents in anticipation of changes that
might occur in the future. Parents can employ custody agreements to
ensure that their own ex ante decisions will govern their children’s custody
should their initial arrangement fall apart. They may prefer that, in the event
that conflict arises, their parental rights will be determined by the decisions
408. See supra Part I.A.
409. See supra Part I.A.1.
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they made at a time when they were working together to plan their
children’s future, rather than by a court faced with competing claims by
potentially hostile parties.
Another reason for hesitating to favor separation agreements over
custody agreements made ex ante is that it is precisely at the point of
separation or divorce that the more vulnerable parent may have the least
leverage. Before a child is born, a potential parent can insist on a fair and
child-protective custody arrangement as a precondition to raising a child
with another intended parent. A parent can also insist on a custody contract
as a precondition for forgoing work or education in order to stay home with
a child or devote more time to a child. Such an arrangement might be
especially useful, for instance, in the event that a child has special needs
and requires more parental care than anticipated. At the point of divorce,
however, the parent who has devoted more time to raising the child may
have less leverage in arriving at a custody agreement. As discussed in Part
III, the indeterminacy of the best-interests standard makes it impossible to
predict with certainty how a court will decide a contested custody dispute.
Particularly in those jurisdictions that favor joint custody, the parent who
devoted less time to staying home with the child has little to lose by
pushing for the maximum custody award available. The result is that
parents may trade off rights to property and support in exchange for
custody, to the detriment of both the child and the primary custodial parent.
A related issue is whether custody agreements should continue to be
granted deference going forward, as a child develops during the years that
follow the initial dissolution of the parents’ relationship. Currently, the fact
of a prior custody agreement is given little weight in a proceeding to modify
an existing custodial arrangement. 410 While the modification standard itself
might be designed to favor the status quo, the same standard typically
applies regardless of whether parents arrived at the custody arrangement
themselves. 411 Here, however, as with custody agreements made prior to a
child’s birth, the value in such agreements is largely in their power to
provide certainty and predictability into the future. To protect families from
the destabilization and loss of autonomy that come with non-intact status, it
is essential that custody agreements retain their force over time.
Thus, we should facilitate enforcement of all custody contracts,
regardless of when they were formed. However, we should, at the same
time, attend to the concerns that have been expressed about the risks of
enforcing custody agreements. To do this, we must craft an enforcement
regime that will be sensitive to the pressures and informational weakness
that might apply to a custody contract depending on when, and in what
circumstances, it was entered into. Given the profound effect of such
contracts on children who did not consent to them, an appropriate
enforcement regime would also feature mechanisms to protect against
potential adverse effects on children’s welfare.
410. See supra Part I.A.2.c.
411. See supra Part I.A.2.c.
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B. The ALI Approach to Prenuptial Agreements
As a Model for Enforcing Custody Agreements
Many of the problems that arise with respect to the enforcement of
premarital custody contracts also arise in the enforcement of premarital
agreements regarding monetary terms. These include the possibility that
the contracting parties will experience, inter alia, uneven bargaining power;
cognitive limits (such as the optimism bias that accompanies the inception
of intimate relationships); and difficulty foreseeing how their own needs, as
well as their children’s needs, might develop over time. The primary
difference between prenuptial monetary agreements—which courts often
enforce—and prenuptial custody agreements—which they typically do
not—is that in the latter category, children’s lives are directly at stake.
Custody contracts thus raise the additional concern of how enforcement will
affect the child in question.
This Article proposes an approach to custody contracts that builds upon
the ALI recommendations on enforcing prenuptial agreements, with
changes and additions to reflect the special problems raised by custody
agreements. The ALI provisions on premarital agreements indicate that
these should not apply to agreements regarding custody. 412 Nonetheless,
the ALI approach to premarital agreements can be adapted to apply to
custody agreements as well. The ALI provisions on premarital agreements
were designed to facilitate ex ante contracting between intended or actual
family members while addressing the ways in which family relationships,
because of their intimacy, length, and frequent dependency, create problems
for contract law, such as unequal bargaining power, cognitive bias, and
unforeseeability. 413 The proposed adaptation of the ALI recommendations
for premarital agreements would build upon the ALI’s approach to these
issues while attending to the additional problems posed by contract terms
that directly affect the interests of children.
The proposed approach also builds upon the ALI provisions on parenting
plans made by separating or divorcing parents, which recommend
enforcement of such plans as long as they are knowing and voluntary and
are not harmful to the child. 414 This Article’s proposal differs significantly
from the ALI provisions on parenting plans, however, in advocating
enforcement not only of post-dissolution custody agreements that parents
jointly present to a court for approval, but also of prior (including
premarital or marital) custody agreements that at least one of the parents no

412. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.07 (2000) (providing that terms “allocating custodial responsibility
and decisionmaking responsibility for a couple’s children” are governed by the ALI
provisions on custody and parenting, rather than by the provisions on prenuptial
agreements). As Part I.A.2 discusses, the ALI recommendation on custody allocation is to
grant deference to custody agreements made at separation or divorce, but not to those made
during or before marriage. See id. §§ 2.06, 2.08, 2.09.
413. See id. § 7.05 cmt. b.
414. See id. § 2.06.

146

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

longer wants to enforce. 415 This, in turn, requires adjustments to reflect the
special problems raised by enforcing custody agreements made ex ante
rather than at the time of separation or divorce. It is in this respect that the
ALI provisions on premarital agreements provide a useful model.
The cornerstone of the ALI approach to premarital agreements—which
reflects the approach adopted by nearly half of the states416—is to permit
enforcement, while also policing such agreements more stringently than
other contracts, both procedurally and substantively. The ALI recommends
that the party arguing for enforcement of a premarital agreement must
establish that the agreement was both voluntary and well-informed.417
Once the procedural fairness of the agreement is thus established, the party
opposing enforcement must establish a substantive reason for doing so.
This requires showing both that one of various enumerated events has
occurred since the agreement was executed—a fixed number of years has
passed; a child has been born to or adopted by the parties; or there has been
an unanticipated change in circumstances with a substantial impact on the
parties and their children—and that, in light of such event, enforcing the
agreement would inflict a substantial injustice.418
Given the intrusion into parental autonomy and family stability that
results when courts are permitted to override parents’ custodial decisions,
an enforcement regime for custody contracts should focus judicial review
more heavily on the procedural rather than the substantive aspect of such
agreements. This would help keep the state out of decisions about how
children are raised, and would also let parents know ex ante what steps they
need to follow in order to create an agreement that will be enforced.
Nonetheless, given the importance of protecting children, we should include
some element of substantive review as well.
C. The Proposed Procedural and Substantive Review
of Custody Agreements
1. Procedural Review
Commentators have expressed concern that both premarital agreements
and divorce settlements are often the product of unequal bargaining power
that substantially disadvantages the more vulnerable and financially

415. Compare id. (“The court should order provisions of a parenting plan agreed to by the
parents, unless the agreement (a) is not knowing or voluntary, or (b) would be harmful to the
child.”), with id. § 2.08(e) (providing that courts determining whether to deviate from the
ALI approximation approach to custody in cases where parents cannot agree on a parenting
plan should “take into account any prior agreement . . . that would be appropriate to consider
in light of the circumstances as a whole, including the reasonable expectations of the parties,
the extent to which they could have reasonably anticipated the events that occurred and their
significance, and the interests of the child”).
416. See Bix, supra note 56, at 264.
417. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.04.
418. See id. § 7.05.
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dependent spouse. 419 They have argued, further, that courts often fail to
recognize the factors that might have vitiated a spouse’s ability to freely and
knowingly consent to such an agreement, and routinely enforce agreements
that were the product of undue pressure or duress. 420 If we are to enforce
custody agreements on the theory that the parents at the time of the
agreement worked together to determine an arrangement that they jointly
felt to be in their child’s interests, courts must be rigorous in ensuring that
the agreements were truly the product of free and informed consent. The
concerns about paternalism and freedom of contract that are often voiced in
opposition to rigorous policing of financial agreements between spouses do
not have the same weight in the context of custody agreements, because
children are not parties to such agreements, but are profoundly affected by
their parents’ custodial arrangements.
Procedurally, then, we should rigorously review custody agreements to
ensure that they are the product of informed consent, and that they were not
made under undue pressure or duress. The ALI approach to procedural
review of premarital agreements could be adapted to this end, with
modifications that address some of the special considerations that arise with
respect to custody agreements. As under the ALI premarital agreement
regime, the party requesting enforcement of a custody agreement should
have the burden of establishing that the agreement was obtained with the
fully informed and voluntary consent of the other party. The enforcing
party could create a rebuttable presumption to this effect by showing that:
(1) both parties were advised, and given the opportunity, to obtain
independent counsel; (2) in situations where such representation was not
obtained, the agreement clearly set forth both the full ramifications of the
agreement and each party’s rights in the absence of any agreement; (3) the
agreement, if premarital, was not presented within thirty days of the parties’
marriage; and (4) each party was given a period during which he or she
could subsequently opt out of the agreement.
These procedural
requirements largely track those of the ALI with respect to premarital
agreements. 421
If we want to make procedural review of custody agreements more
rigorous, we could make it more difficult for the party wishing to enforce
such an agreement to create a rebuttable presumption that the agreement
was fully informed and voluntary. For instance, we could provide for
application of the presumption only where each party to the agreement was
represented by independent counsel. This would help to ensure that
custody agreements are enforced only when they are the product of
informed and voluntary consent, but could put such agreements out of reach
of those who cannot afford this level of legal representation.
419. See, e.g., Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A
Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153 (1999).
420. See id.; see also Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 171, 199–201 (2013).
421. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.04.
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Another potential mechanism to help ensure that custody agreements are
enforced only when formed under procedurally sound conditions would be
to require the court to assess whether the terms of the agreement indicate
that it was obtained under undue pressure. A number of commentators have
recognized that unfair terms can often indicate that undue pressure was
applied when a contract was formed. 422 Thus, for example, where a future
spouse agrees to relinquish both her custodial rights and her rights to
property or support in the event of divorce, this could, depending on the
surrounding facts, constitute evidence that the agreement was the product of
sufficiently unequal bargaining power that its custody terms should not be
considered fully voluntary, and should not be enforced.
These requirements should apply to all custody agreements, premarital
and otherwise. The proposal in this respect diverges from the prevailing
approach to both parental custody agreements and spousal agreements
about property division and spousal support, which is to give the greatest
deference to those agreements made at separation or divorce. The rationale
for imposing heightened procedural scrutiny to premarital financial
agreements, but not to separation agreements on financial matters, is that
spouses are presumed to know that they are in an adversarial position at the
time their relationship dissolves, and thus are on notice that they need to
look out for their own interests.423 However, parents working together to
reach a mutually satisfactory arrangement regarding their children’s custody
may be under the impression that they are not in an adversarial position,
even if their relationship has already dissolved. Or, in cases that are clearly
adversarial, parents fearful of losing their children’s custody may feel
pressured to agree to a suboptimal arrangement rather than risk losing
custody altogether. A party contemplating parenthood can back out of a
relationship with a co-parent, and avoid the threat to deprive her of custody,
to an extent that an existing parent cannot. Thus, courts should be required
to scrutinize the procedural fairness of all custody agreements, including
those agreed to when parents separate.
Some additional potential protective mechanisms would apply with
particular force to the dissolution context. For instance, we could impose
the further requirement that the party seeking enforcement of a custody
agreement demonstrate that the custody agreement was not made in
exchange for financial compensation.
Under this requirement, an
agreement would fail on procedural grounds if one party could establish
that she agreed to waive her rights to alimony or support in exchange for a
right to custody, or that she agreed to waive some portion of her right to
422. The comments to the ALI provisions on parenting agreements make a similar
recommendation, noting that “a significant disparity between the provisions of the parents’
agreement and what the court would have ordered without the agreement will often be
probative of whether the agreement was truly understood and agreed to by both parties.” Id.
§ 2.06 cmt. b.
423. See Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of
Caution on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1414–24 (1984) (describing, and
contesting, the view that separation agreements require minimal procedural review because
spouses contemplating divorce are on notice that their positions are adversarial).
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custody in exchange for compensation. Significantly, any such showing
should also render the monetary aspect of the agreement unenforceable.
These rules, together, would help prevent intended or actual parents from
trading custody rights for money, whether as part of a transaction that
commodifies a child’s custody in the sense of “selling” custodial rights or
in a situation in which a parent takes advantage of the other parent’s
aversion to losing custody to extract an advantageous financial
settlement. 424
Another important mechanism to ensure that custody agreements are
enforced only when they are the product of free and informed consent
would be to require courts to recognize the extent to which domestic abuse
may impede a parent’s ability to freely consent to an agreement. Some
contend that courts do not adequately recognize the extent to which battered
spouses may feel pressure to agree to unfavorable divorce settlements.425
Courts reviewing custody agreements for procedural fairness should be
required to take such factors into consideration, perhaps by imposing a
presumption that a custody agreement reached by a spouse subjected to
emotional or physical abuse was not entered into with sufficient volition.
2. Substantive Review
The question of what sort of substantive review to apply to custody
agreements is a more difficult one. This Article proposes one possibility,
while hoping to start a conversation about other possible approaches. The
goal is to create a regime in which custody agreements are more
enforceable than they currently are, while still providing some protection
for children. The ideal level of substantive review would afford non-intact
families a level of freedom from judicial intervention that approaches as
much as possible the autonomy accorded to intact families, while
recognizing and addressing the special problems that might arise, and risks
that children might face, when parenting arrangements fall apart.
At the substantive level, we should, at a minimum, refrain from enforcing
a custody agreement where a court finds that to do so would likely be
detrimental to a child’s emotional, intellectual, or physical development.426
This approach would meet many of the current objections to the
424. Arguably, where a parent trades financial support for custody, the best outcome for
the child would be to sever the custody provision from the financial provision, and to enforce
the custody terms but not the financial ones. A parent who agrees to waive financial rights
in exchange for custody is likely the parent who is most committed to the child. For a
proposed mechanism to facilitate the severing of the custody terms of divorce settlements
from terms related to property and support, see Sarah Abramowicz & Michael Abramowicz,
Severable Settlements (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
425. See Bryan, supra note 419, at 1219–34.
426. This would resemble the ALI’s approach to the substantive review of parenting plans
made at separation or divorce, while extending that approach to custody agreements as to
which the parents no longer agree. The ALI rejects the prevailing view that parenting plans
should not be enforced unless a court finds them consistent with a children’s best interests,
and provides instead that such agreements should be enforced unless a court finds that
enforcement would be harmful to the child. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.06.
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enforcement of custody agreements, while greatly reducing the likelihood
of judicial intervention on the basis of unpredictable and subjective views
about childrearing. There would be a strong presumption that custody
agreements should be enforced, but a court would have the power to
override an agreement likely to inflict harm on the child.
An example of a custody provision likely to be detrimental to a child
would be a joint custody agreement that would be disruptive and
impractical, such as an agreement to rotate custody of an infant every two
months. 427 An agreement to equally share custody of a school-age child
could also be deemed harmful where, for example, the parents live in
different locations and the child would be required to change schools
repeatedly. Even where the parents live in close proximity to one another,
an agreement to share physical custody could be harmful if the level of
conflict and hostility between the parents is sufficiently high.
In certain predefined situations, we should presume that enforcement of a
custody agreement would be harmful. For instance, we could presume that
a child would be harmed by an award of custody to a parent who has
engaged in domestic violence, whether physical or psychological, and
regardless of whether it occurred in the child’s presence. Such a
presumption would in part serve to protect a parent against feeling forced to
stay in an abusive relationship out of fear of losing custody. 428 This
presumption would also protect the child. As scholars have long
contended, 429 and custody law increasingly recognizes, 430 a child can be
harmed by living in an environment where domestic violence occurs, even
if the violence is not directed at, or conducted in the presence of, the child.
We could also create presumptions that certain types of agreements
should not be enforced, even without a finding of likely harm to the child.
The effect would be to revert to the best-interests standard in certain
circumstances that are especially likely to be adverse to children’s interests.
For instance, some might be concerned that a custody agreement could
harm a child by denying primary physical custody to a parent who has had
the bulk of contact with the child, such that the agreement, in the words of
427. Such an arrangement has, in fact, been imposed by trial courts in certain cases
against the parents’ wishes, only to be reversed on appeal on the basis that such an
arrangement could be detrimental to a child’s development. See Friendshuh v. Headlough,
504 N.W.2d 104, 106 (S.D. 1993) (reversing trial court’s order, against parents’ wishes, that
they rotate custody of their infant son every two months); see also In re Lukens, 587 N.W.2d
141, 145–46 (N.D. 1998) (vacating trial court’s order that parents alternate custody of infant
on a biweekly basis).
428. The procedural review proposed in this Article would also protect such parents by
preventing the enforcement of an agreement where physical or emotional abuse vitiated a
parent’s ability to consent. See discussion supra Part IV.C.1.
429. See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of
Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991) (critiquing
child custody law for inadequately considering domestic violence in assessing children’s
interests, and noting that the exclusion of domestic violence as a factor in custody decision
making originated in the 1970s as part of the deemphasis of fault in divorce and custody
law).
430. See generally, e.g., Merry Hofford et el., Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes:
An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q. 197 (1995).
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the ALI provisions on parenting plans, “would drastically alter the child’s
caretaking patterns.” 431 To address this concern, we could create the
presumption that, where there is one parent who clearly played the role of
primary caretaker, a custody agreement should not be enforced where it
awards less than a certain percentage of custody to that parent. Although
our concern here is with potential harm to the child, we should not create a
presumption of harm. It may well be in a child’s interests to reside
primarily with a parent who had engaged in a minority of caretaking
activity during the parents’ relationship, particularly where the parents have
agreed to such an arrangement. Thus, where an agreement is rendered
unenforceable because it is drastically at odds with previous caretaking
patterns in certain predefined ways, the court should not automatically
reject the custody arrangement set forth in the contract, but instead should
examine the child’s interests and determine custody accordingly, while
taking the agreement into account as a factor bearing upon the child’s
interests.
Another concern might be that a child could be harmed by a custody
agreement that curtails the child’s relationship with a parent. We could
address this concern by presuming that, when the child has already
developed a relationship with a parent, we should not enforce any
agreement that awards that parent less than a predetermined amount of
physical custody. Thus, for instance, when a father agrees to forgo all
rights to visitation in exchange for a waiver of his obligation to pay child
support, if the father already has a relationship with the child, the agreement
to forgo visitation altogether would be unenforceable.432
A more complicated problem arises when custody agreements are not
necessarily harmful, but are unworkable in some way. For instance, parents
might agree in advance to a detailed custody arrangement that turns out not
to be feasible, such as where a specified schedule of visits may be
impossible to reconcile with the child’s school schedule. Here, we should
keep in mind that the parents can always renegotiate such an arrangement,
and that we want to encourage them to do so instead of enabling a parent to
strategically use a claim of unworkability to vitiate an agreement altogether.
However, we need to address how courts should respond when the
arrangement cannot be enforced as written and the parents fail to reach a
new agreement. One mechanism to address this problem would be to
permit enforcement of the general contours of a custody arrangement—such
as the percentage of custodial time that a child would spend with each
parent and the allocation of decision-making authority over various areas of
the child’s life—while precluding enforcement of more detailed terms, such
as when the child would visit each parent or which school the child would
attend. This would enable parents to protect their custodial ties to their
431. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.08 ill. 29.
432. Under the procedural branch of this Article’s proposal, such an agreement would
also be unenforceable on the ground that it exchanges custody for a waiver of financial
rights. See discussion supra Part IV.C.1.
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children, and thus minimize the disruptive and destabilizing potential of a
constant threat of custody litigation, while empowering courts to resolve
any conflicts that arise in implementing an agreed-upon arrangement.
A similar problem occurs when parents incorporate unworkable
standards into a custody agreement, thus requiring a court to in effect
adjudicate custody on the parents’ own terms. A hypothetical example
cited by Katharine Silbaugh as evidence of the adjudication difficulties
posed by premarital custody agreements is a provision that custody should
be awarded to the mother as long as she is a “loving and devoted parent,” an
inquiry that would involve the court in a difficult fact-finding enterprise.433
To address this concern, we could provide that custody agreements can only
allocate either custody or decision-making responsibility (including by
deeming one or the other parent the decision maker about how to allocate
custody), but cannot create the standards by which custody is adjudicated.
Another possibility would be to permit parents to specify which of several
preexisting custody standards should apply in the event of disagreement
(parents could thereby, for instance, elect the approximation standard
currently applicable only in West Virginia), while prohibiting the creation
of novel custodial standards for courts to apply.
Another difficult problem is determining whether to permit modification
of a custody agreement once the agreement has been implemented. While
some states impose significant burdens on modification of custody
arrangements, and many take the middle ground of requiring a substantial
change in circumstances such that modification is in the child’s interests,
others permit modification of custody upon a showing that a change of
custody is in the child’s best interests. 434 To permit modification under the
open-ended best-interests standard would undermine any security that
custody agreements might provide to parents and children. Of course, once
a custody arrangement is implemented, it might become clear that the
arrangement is detrimental to a child. A parent who functioned well in a
co-parenting arrangement may be unable to handle the burdens of parenting
alone, for example, or a parent may enter a relationship with a new partner
who engages in domestic violence. But we should be wary of making it too
easy to modify existing custody arrangements. Whenever an existing
custody arrangement is disturbed, children’s attachments and expectations
are unsettled. Moreover, as Joan Wexler observed in her landmark article
recommending that custody modification be permitted only under very
limited circumstances, courts purporting to address children’s interests will
often modify custody to children’s detriment in order to police the behavior
of custodial parents. 435 The case law contains numerous examples of courts
that have removed custody from primary caretakers—in ways that often
seem harmful to the children involved—because of behavior at odds with
prevailing social norms, such as “promiscuous” behavior by a mother, entry
433. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 131–32.
434. See supra notes 82–83.
435. See Joan Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE
L.J. 757, 797 (1985).
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into a same-sex relationship, or, as in Annie Besant’s case, adoption of
unorthodox religious views.
Thus, for custody agreements to achieve the goal of providing intact
status to families in which parents’ relationships have dissolved, it is
important to adopt a modification standard that gives significant deference
to such agreements, while permitting modification where a child seems at
risk of harm. Here, as in our original enforcement of the agreement, we
could presume that certain situations are harmful to a child, such as equally
shared residential custody between parents who have demonstrated a high
level of conflict in implementing the agreement, or the child’s residence in
a home where domestic violence occurs. To protect children’s affective ties
and their interests in stability, we should also require courts that are
considering modifying an agreed-upon custody arrangement to balance the
harm of continuing the arrangement against the harm that would follow
from disrupting children’s emotional bonds and their established pattern of
care.
A number of substantive concerns can also be addressed by carefully
defining which agreements constitute custody agreements subject to
enforcement under the proposal, and distinguishing these from agreements
concerning parental status. 436 We can define custody agreements with
reference to the limits that courts currently place on custody awards. Under
prevailing custody jurisprudence, parents rarely lose the right to visitation
with their child. Thus, custody agreements should be defined as those that
allocate existing rights, without terminating or transferring them altogether.
Under this definition, an agreement that terminates a parent’s status
entirely, rather than defining the scope of that parent’s involvement, is not a
custody agreement, but, rather, a parentage agreement.
A number of other limits could be imposed on the enforcement of
custody agreements. For instance, to protect against unpredictability, we
might provide for nonenforcement of a custody agreement where an
unforeseeable event has occurred to make enforcement contrary to a child’s
interests. Examples might include the illness of a parent or child, or a job
loss that alters expectations about who will serve as a child’s primary
caretaker. The unforeseeability exception would limit judicial intervention
in custody, while enabling such intervention when the agreement that the
parents made on the basis of their own ex ante best-interests assessment has
little bearing on what they predicted to be the child’s reality at the time of
enforcement.
The more limits we impose on the enforcement of custody agreements,
however, the closer we come to the current regime, in which such
agreements are largely superfluous, especially when time has passed
between execution and enforcement. Thus, any such limits should be
carefully considered, and imposed only when necessary.
436. While the author endorses enforcing parentage agreements as well as custody
agreements, different rules should apply to each, and the two types of agreements should be
able to work in tandem. It is outside the scope of this Article to address the separate set of
problems raised by enforcement of parentage agreements.
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CONCLUSION
This Article does not seek to have the final word on how the enforcement
of custody agreements should proceed. Rather, the Article’s goal is the
more modest one of setting forth the framework under which enforcement
of custody agreements should be considered: a two-level judicial review of
custody agreements, with enforcement predicated on a finding that the
agreement in question is procedurally fair and substantively unlikely to
harm a child’s development. This framework is built on the premise that
children and parents will benefit from greater deference to parental custody
agreements. Such deference would enable all families to carve out the
protections of intact status, and thus to be granted the autonomy, stability,
and freedom from state intervention that today only a dwindling number of
traditional nuclear families enjoy. The assumption of the marital contracts
literature that children’s interests are best protected by requiring judicial
assessment of those interests even when a custody agreement exists does
not survive close scrutiny. The arguments for contractual enforcement
developed in the literature, and to some extent the case law, on parentage
agreements are more persuasive, and should be extended to the custody
context.

